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Preface
Urban scholarship is a forte of social science in Africa and a proper response to urban 
change and innovation. Africa south of the Sahara has been very under-urbanised 
for a long time but currently is undergoing rapid urbanisation, sometimes, as in 
Congolese Kinshasa, with a problematic originality of massive urbanisation without 
any substantial industrialisation or other economic development. Recent years have 
witnessed an urban building boom from Dakar to Dar es Salaam. Lagos, Luanda, 
Nairobi and others have set out the goal to become ‘world-class cities.’
This volume arises from a conference hosted by the Stellenbosch Institute for 
Advanced Study (STIAS) in 2017, with the kind and decisive support of its then 
director Hendrik Geyer, and the African Centre for Cities (ACC) of the University of 
Cape Town. The conference brought together over 30 scholars representing a range 
of different disciplines from across the African continent and beyond, including a 
number of young talented African scholars. It was a conference on African cities 
which looked at the refractions of the national, the popular and the global, analysed in 
my global study, Cities of Power, of which the conference was also an African launch.
The national refers to the constitution of nation-states, of states representing the 
nation, and not a colonial empire or a local king. It meant a nationalisation of cities, 
in their layout, organisation, architecture and symbolism. In Africa, and in the whole 
vast ex-colonial zone, the nation-state was established through independence from the 
colonial power. In most of Europe, it meant a peoples constituting itself as a nation 
independent of the king. South Africa was set up as a settler state, like the Americas 
and Australia, as a nation of European settlers making themselves independent of 
their motherland. The country became an African nation-state only in the 1990s, with 
the fall of racist settler rule. 
Popular moments have occurred when popular forces challenge the rule of the 
national elite, demanding cities built for and serving the mass of ordinary people. 
‘Popular forces’ are non-ruling nonelites whose ranks may comprise different 
characteristics, of class, caste, ethnicity, gender, occasionally religion, as in the ongoing 
conflict in Bahrein between the Sunni dynasty and the Shia majority of the people. 
From an urban studies perspective, a popular moment is not quite the same as the 
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rise of a protest movement. The former refers to successful challenges and protests 
which have an effect on the city.
Global moments happen when global status and attraction become predominant 
city aspirations. Historically there have so far been two such moments in modern 
times. The first had its zenith in the decades around 1900 and was a globalisation of 
nationalism. Cities ‘worthy of the nation’ had to be built, all over Europe, the Americas, 
and a few Asian cities, like Tokyo. Paris of the second empire was then the main urban 
model, with London offering the best infrastructural example, of sanitation, sewage, 
clean water and electricity. In most of Asia and in the whole of Africa there were then 
no nations with states, so here the first global moment passed by. The second urban 
global moment arrived in the late 20th century in the wake of industrial outsourcing, 
de-industrialisation, footloose financial capital, globalised real estate markets and 
mass tourism, as the global moment of capital. Attracting foreign investment, foreign 
business headquarters and solvent tourists became primary big city goals. Becoming 
a ‘global city’ or a ‘world-class city’ has replaced the previous moment’s ‘city worthy of 
the nation.’ 
Both global moments have meant importing global influences and aspiring to 
global recognition and fame, by national and local politicians and capital. They are 
not actively imposed from the outside by global forces. The editors have then done 
a tremendous job turning the conference into a publication. In its geographical 
scope, from Cairo to Johannesburg, and in its thematic range, from efforts at national 
city impregnation in Yaoundé, national-local government relations in Cairo, Addis, 
Kinshasa, Tshwane and Johannesburg, to popular rebellions in Nairobi and Harare, 
and further to top-down globalist planning in the local contexts of Lagos and Luanda, 
this is a major example of the vigour of African urban scholarship.
Thanks go out to STIAS, to its then Director Hendrik Geyer, to Christoff Pauw, 
Programme Manager, and Nel-Mari Loock, Programme Administrator, for making 
the conference happen. Thanks also to those who presented and participated in the 
conference but could not participate in the publication, especially Eduardo Moreno, 
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Philip Harrison, Susan Parnell, Sophie Oldfield, Ntombini 
Marrengane, Glen Robbins, Lindsay Sawyer and Ngaka Mosiane. Thanks go out to 
NRF funding for the South African Research Chair in Urban Policy, held by Edgar 
Pieterse, which allowed for the translation into English of two chapters originally 
written in French. Thanks for funding of this publication go out to STIAS, the NRF 
South African Research Chair in Urban Policy at the University of Cape Town, and 
Stellenbosch University. Appreciation is extended to the Partnership for African Social 
and Governance Research (PASGR) that enabled the research for chapters 9 to 11. A 
special thanks to Sylvia Croese and Simon Bekker for pulling everything together.
Göran Therborn, University of Cambridge
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Simon Bekker, Sylvia Croese & Edgar Pieterse
The urban is old: cities have existed for thousands of years, but they have 
been transformed by the arrival of nation-states over two centuries ago …
The future of globalism looks pretty sure and well laid out …  
The main difficult question is the future of the people.
   – Göran Therborn, Cities of Power (2017: 1, 356)
Scholarship on African cities has been proliferating over the past two decades. This 
is testament to the growing acknowledgement of the importance of cities in an 
increasingly urban age. This Introduction commences with an outline of Africa’s 
urban reality today. Subsequently, an overview of contemporary urban scholarship 
calling for Global South and African approaches to this reality is offered before turning 
to that proposed by Therborn’s Cities of Power. The principal framework to structure 
this volume and its various case study chapters is based upon his publication. Its 
primary theme of seeking relationships between the national, the popular and the 
global in capital cities today is outlined and the notion of refractions of these forces 
introduced. The chapter concludes with the structure of the volume.
In sub-Saharan Africa, urbanisation has grown exponentially. From  1995 to 
2015,  Africa’s urban population doubled from 236 million to 472 million. Over 
the next decade, this population is projected to become larger than  Europe’s (559 
vs. 555 million). It will also be larger than that of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(536 million) (Moreno 2017; UNDESA 2019). 
Urban growth has been associated with social, economic and political 
development. In 1900, life expectancy in Africa was estimated to be 24 years – today 
it has  reached 63 years. Literacy rates  tripled from 23% in 1970 to 65% in 2010. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) multiplied by five times from 1995 to 2015, with 
an expanding  share  of  industry  and  services  as part of  total GDP. Africa’s average 
GDP growth was about 5% per annum (1996–2015) – substantially higher than in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The resource boom of the first decade of the 2000s brought 
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a renewed sense of hope for the continent, translated in the notion of ‘Africa rising.’ 
Two-thirds of African governments now encourage different  forms of  political 
participation  and 40% have  strengthened their safety and the rule of law (2000 
to 2012). It is clear that Africans living in urban settings will remain a force driving 
socio-economic transformation. At 40% urban, African cities contribute 50–70% of 
the continent’s GDP (Moreno 2017; UN-Habitat 2018). 
It is, however, only a few who benefit from the advantages of urbanisation. Cities fail 
to provide sustainable space for all – physically, as well as in the civic, socio-economic 
and cultural dimensions attached to collective space. Africa’s primarily youthful 
labour force is projected to expand from 400 million to 1.2 billion between 2000 and 
2050 but its economies are unlikely to produce enough jobs for this rapidly expanding 
population. A majority of the urban population continues to live in sprawling slums 
and informal settlements. Half of the countries on the African continent have a slum 
incidence of at least 60% and more urban residents are poorer today than in 1990. 
Urban planning in these cities has not been able to keep up with urban growth and 
development. Only 56% of this growth in African cities is currently planned, while 
this was 68% in 1990 (Moreno 2017). At the same time, efforts to plan and transform 
cities into ‘world-class’, ‘smart’ or otherwise ‘modern’ cities through mega housing 
and infrastructural development projects have increased (Croese et al. 2016).
As a result, African cities have fragmented and polarised (Bekker & Therborn 2012). 
Seven of the ten most unequal countries in the world are located in Africa, most of 
them in southern Africa (Moreno 2017; UNDP 2017). Global trends such as the rise of 
new global powers from the South, corporatisation, the digital revolution and climate 
change have important implications for the performance and social polarisation of 
African cities and the ways in which governments are able to address developmental 
agendas and challenges. Political decentralisation has been incomplete at best, and 
stagnant or regressive at worst, while popular protest has been on the rise (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2017).
Contemporary urban studies in Africa manifestly locate their investigations within 
a postcolonial context. Many scholars argue that there is a need to turn away from the 
modernist approach of mainstream European and American scholarship which has 
typified Northern cities as modern and developed and African cities as developing 
along the same modernising route – attempting to catch up whilst struggling with 
rising inequalities, absence of proper planning and pervasive informality, both in 
shack settlements and in the informal sector. A Global South approach is called for that 
could lead both to multiple modernities as well as multiple rationalities that underpin 
contemporary life (Harrison 2006; Pieterse 2010; Parnell & Robinson 2012). 
Schindler (2017: 198) has proposed a Southern urbanism approach, focused 
particularly on ‘a persistent disconnect between capital and labor, which gives rise to 
urban governance regimes geared toward the transformation of territory rather than 
the “improvement” of populations.’ Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) have called for the 
writing of the social back into our understanding of African ‘life forms.’ And Ananya 
Roy (2011) has called for ‘subaltern urbanism,’ revealing the subaltern spaces and 
subaltern classes in the cities of the South.
The most influential disciplines in these contemporary African urban studies are 
human geography and planning. The doyen of these studies, Mabogunje (1990), 
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laid the foundations for a pluralist approach to urban studies incorporating spatial 
analyses with post-modernist methodologies. His work also proposed a pro-market 
and developmental policy agenda at urban level, particularly to address poverty and 
high inequalities in African cities (Filani & Okafor 2006). 
The pervasive informality in African cities has been illuminated by two geographers 
who argue that formal local planning has been notoriously lax in many of these cities 
and, as a consequence, has led to the ‘sprawling of illegal and extra-legal land uses and 
practices, with the informal business and housing sectors overtaking the formal sector 
in many cities’ (Kamete & Lindell 2010: 911). The term ‘informal’ has been used in 
many discourses. ‘Moreover, informality takes on different forms at different times and 
in different places, making each interpretation of the term highly specific … Alternative 
ways of framing these developments are called for’ (Bekker & Fourchard 2013: 9).
Nevertheless, the inequalities flowing from this complex informality have been 
illustrated above. These inequalities, moreover, have been shown to widen further 
by using the concept of spatial justice where space in the African city is defined as 
including both its local representations in maps and symbolic artefacts, as well as its 
physical attributes. Confinement of life in an informal settlement is hereby given local 
meaning (Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux 2009).
Myers, in his publication entitled African Cities which bears the subtitle, Alternative 
visions of urban theory and practice, argues that, despite this title, it would be incorrect 
to promote the idea that African cities make up one unique type. He also remarks that 
Strangely, political science seems only an occasional presence in African 
urban studies, when it ought to be a central field in our analyses, because 
these are such fascinating years for urban politics in Africa. (Myers 2011: 198)
In like vein, Freund (2007: 165) has argued that most scholarship on African cities 
has been that of social scientists rather than historians. He shows convincingly 
that cities in Africa have been established and endured for all of recorded history. 
His publication offers an overview of African urban life during the colonial period 
and summarises scholarly approaches to postcolonial Africa in a fashion similar to 
that reviewed above. Furthermore, he concludes his historical overview with three 
historical city case studies that illustrate both the divergencies as well as continuities 
of postcolonial urban Africa. These are Touba in Senegal, Abidjan in the Ivory Coast 
and Durban in South Africa.
The inspiration for this book draws on the works of Göran Therborn, in particular, 
from his publication Cities of Power which addresses the urban at a global level and 
bears the subtitle The Urban, the National, the Popular and the Global. As will be shown 
below, there is a fundamental historical point of departure to his analysis: globally, 
capital cities have travelled down one of four main routes to national statehood. To 
illustrate his use of the political in the study of cities in Africa, moreover, the following 
extract detailing the informality and sprawl of many modern African cities is drawn 
from one of his earlier publications (Bekker & Therborn 2012: 202):
It was now that Africa became the continent of slums. But the crisis and 
its effects were nevertheless managed by the state – the central state – not 
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the city. African capitals and other big cities did not collapse into general 
misery. They polarised, between the large, impoverished majority and a tiny 
political clique around the president and around business protégés of the 
president … Political power has in this way become the crucial agency of 
social polarisation. The ruthlessness with which political posts are fought 
for, even under electoral auspices, is rational, given how much wealth and 
privilege is at stake.
Cities of power: The urban, the national, the popular and the global 
As outlined in the preface to this book, Therborn argues that, historically, nation-
states have constituted the drivers of modernity and thereby transformed the nature 
and function of cities, particularly their capital cities. However, this has not taken place 
in a uniform fashion. There were, he argues, four main routes to national statehood:
 
•  the European route of ‘states of princes’ to ‘states of nations’, 
•  the New World settler secessionist route, 
•  the colonial and postcolonial route and 
•  the top-down route where modernisation was reactive. 
The influence of the rise of the nation-state – and its associated institutional and 
architectural arrangements – upon capital cities has been extensively researched in 
Europe and European settler states (Hall 1998; Therborn 2002; Le Galès & Therborn 
2010). What is less well-known are the similarities and differences of these influences 
in other world regions. 
Rather than distinguishing between cities of the global North and the Global South 
or, for that matter, insulating cities of Africa as a category of their own, Therborn maps 
out these four routes to nationhood. This also enables comparisons to be made of cities 
across continents. Accordingly, Cities of Power may be used to outline a context for our 
study of Africa’s capital cities. Most of the fifty-four nation-states on the continent 
are ex-colonies. Most of these ex-colonies have attempted to ‘nationalise colonialism,’ 
either by transforming the colonial capital into a national capital, by opting for a 
new capital or by building a capital from scratch. However, most capital cities are 
distinguished by an enduring duality between the ex-colonial and the indigenous city, 
in turn leading to the emergence of a sharp division between a small political elite and 
the large popular masses. 
As an historical case study in Asia, the postcolonial route followed by Jakarta is 
illustrative. Indonesia’s claim to independence in 1945 descended – particularly in 
Jakarta, the colonial capital – into violent conflict between nationalists and the Dutch 
colonisers until 1949 when the Dutch grudgingly recognised their ex-colony as a fully 
independent Republic. This resulted in ‘the first example of victorious rupture with 
colonial rule,’ exemplified in the former colonial capital (Therborn 2017: 116). The 
first president, Sukarno, was both a militant nationalist and a modernist. Symbolic 
nationalism in the capital included two monuments, one – the Monas – embodies 
early Hinduist Javanese culture, the other – the Irian Jaya Liberation monument – 
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commemorates the Indonesian takeover in 1963 of Dutch colonial Western New 
Guinea. A new sports stadium, a national independence mosque and a new parliament 
building represented the turn toward modernism in the built environment of the 
capital. The colonial names of streets and squares were all changed. Two of Jakarta’s 
central boulevards acquired the names of two heroes of the anti-colonial struggle. 
During the sixty-year post-independence period, however, little progress has taken 
place in the burgeoning residential areas of the urban poor – the kampung. Recently 
constructed elevated highways for motor traffic from outlying affluent suburbs into 
the city centre illustrate the continuing divide between an elite and those living in 
the kampung, ‘[a] new postcolonial form of urban dualism,’ in Therborn’s words 
(Therborn 2017: 118).
Few African countries – Ethiopia being the prime exception – qualify as having 
been modernised reactively from above, where threats to their independence by 
European and US imperialism were asserted and led to an imposition of modernity. 
This is most evident in their capital cities, where traditional hierarchical institutions 
and cultural continuity from their pasts have endured.
Bangkok may be used as a second case study in Asia, in this case illustrating 
the top-down route where modernisation is reactive. As capital of Siam in the 18th 
century, Bangkok became the capital city of Thailand in the early 20th century. 
Sandwiched between British Burma to the west and French Indochina to the east, 
the Thai monarchy shared power until the 1950s with both elected as well as military 
governments. The architectural expression of Bangkok as capital began with palaces, 
including the Dusit palace built by Italian architects with imported marble. During 
the 1930s and 1940s, a monument to democracy was constructed and annual 
Constitutional Celebration Fairs were organised. After a military coup in the 1950s, 
earlier urban iconography returned with a renewed emphasis upon the monarchy 
and the king. Today, Bangkok reflects urban dualism, but in a fashion different from 
ex-colonial capitals: many neighbourhoods include ‘still-living indigenous cultural 
institutions, royal and other, alongside its Westernized lowlife [sic] of fast food, cheap 
drinks and prostitution’ (Therborn 2017: 154).
Nevertheless, across all of Africa, the influence of nationalism upon capital cities 
– symbolically and politically, architecturally and in terms of urban iconography – 
has been deep and enduring. In the 21st century, the rising influence of global 
capitalist forces – particularly as the digital revolution broadens its reach into urban 
Africa – will alter but not extinguish the influence of the national. Therborn agrees 
that competition between the global and the national is taking place but argues that 
the claim of a severe weakening of the nation-state is unwarranted. Globalised shifts 
in the architectural design of capital cities, including new business districts, new 
transnational businesses, massive infrastructural programmes and so on, are often 
driven by ‘local nationalists’ rather than a global elite. Hence, the 21st century shows 
not only the intertwining of the national and the global, but also that ‘[t]hey are distinct 
but […] not necessarily incompatible’ (Therborn 2017: 355).
The processes of nationalism and of globalisation in turn interrelate with urban 
communities, both in terms of their life chances and living conditions as well as their 
possibilities of expressing voice and agency. In nation-states that have followed the two 
pathways of nationalisation, of colonialism or reactive modernisation, mobilisation 
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from below is particularly difficult to achieve in their capital cities. The reasons are 
clear: urban dualism in both cases – the deep divide between the elite and the urban 
poor in the first case and between the elite and communities living out a traditional 
lifestyle in the second. However, according to Therborn (2017: 356,357): 
[T]here are two reasons for moderate optimism … the recent return of popular 
urban revolutions… [and] the possibility of urban reformism … Ordinary 
people are not going away. They will continue to disturb the vision of global 
image capitalism. Their chances of social transformation are better in cities 
than elsewhere. 
Refractions
The overarching theme of this book, as outlined above, involves the relationships 
between the national, the popular and the global as points of departure in studying 
capital cities in Africa. Moreover, these relationships are further shaped by the prism 
of refractions. Indeed, we are not only interested in interrogating how and why within 
African capital cities we may think about the intertwining of the national, the popular 
and the global, but also how, as in physics, these forces are amplified, adapted or 
dispersed and what this means for how power operates, how it is manifested or how 
it is resisted.
In an age of ‘dissonance’ (Simone & Pieterse 2017), the boundaries in urban Africa 
between the global and the national, between the public and the private, and between 
the formal and the informal are increasingly blurred. While taking into account that 
Africa has always been global and that it has shaped the rest of the world as much as it 
has been shaped by it (Hodgson & Byfield 2017), 21st century globalisation has produced 
different modes and models of ‘worlding’ (Roy & Ong 2011) that are distinctly local.
Central in shaping such modes and models is the continued ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
or the ways in which the national continues to wield power in spite of discourses 
and commitments to multi-scalar, collaborative and participatory good governance 
(Harrison 2017). At the same time, national power is continuously contested by forces 
that operate both within and outside of the state. These include traditional authorities 
which operate in urban areas all across the African continent and play an important 
role, at times challenging, at times complementing, the role and power of the state 
(Marrengane 2017). Resistance can also emerge from inside the state, revealing its 
multiplicity and porosity and the constant negotiations that take place within and 
between different scales of government. Popular protest, in turn, appears both to be 
on the rise and simultaneously dispersed, showing a spectrum of social mobilisation 
which, depending on and in response to different acts of the state, can range from 
formal, organised resistance to leaderless street politics, virtual defiance through 
social media, and even acts of waiting (Oldfield 2017). 
Structure of the volume
This book materialises from a conference hosted by the Stellenbosch Institute of 
Advanced Study (STIAS) and the African Centre for Cities (ACC) on 1 August 2017, 
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entitled ‘Refractions of the National, the Popular, and the Global in African cities.’ It 
draws on a selection of the contributions presented during this conference, which 
brought together over 30 scholars from across the African continent and beyond. 
In addition, several young African academics were invited to contribute, especially 
colleagues who participated in the study on ‘African Turn-around Cities,’ supported 
by the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research. Accordingly, the case 
studies in this volume predate the global Covid-19 pandemic.
The principal framework used to structure this book is taken from Therborn’s Cities 
of Power and its three urban themes. In addition, two earlier edited publications have 
provided the scaffolding for this book: Capital Cities in Africa: Power and Powerlessness 
published by CODESRIA and HSRC Press in 2012, and Governing Cities in Africa: 
Politics and Policies published by HSRC Press in 2013.  
The first publication focused on capital cities in a number of African countries, 
and traced how the power vested in them has evolved through different colonial 
backgrounds, radically different kinds of regimes after independence, waves of 
popular protest, explosive population growth and in most cases stunted economic 
development. The nine different capital city case studies drew attention to the tension 
between the symbolic power of capital cities on the one hand, and their political 
powerlessness vis-à-vis their national governments, on the other. 
The second publication – on governance – employed a lens focused on the city 
rather than on the national government. Issues of policy, practice and service delivery 
were studied both top-down as well as bottom-up, at city level. The book was organised 
in two parts, the first entitled ‘party politics and the politics of identity’ and the second 
‘urban public policies: problematizing informality.’ Rather than employing case studies 
of individual cities, each chapter focused on a specific theme and its manifestation in 
several cities. Accordingly, each has been written by several authors.
Both publications cover case studies of cities from across sub-Saharan Africa, 
including former English, French as well as Portuguese colonies. 
This volume builds on these characteristics. In addition, it connects the elements 
of the national and the popular to the global, asking how national, popular and global 
forces come together, clash or interact in the African capital city and what kind of 
practices or imaginaries are produced in the process. Each of its three thematic 
sections comprises a number of case studies of African capital cities. Each section, 
moreover, is introduced by brief editorial commentary.
The first thematic section addresses how the national and the nation-state is 
manifested in the capital city. To what extent is the political and the social character 
of the national-state regime expressed in the capital city and its governance? Featured 
chapters discuss tensions and contradictions between national and local government, 
extending this discussion to the city regional level in the north African region. It 
explores the urban challenges that local governments face and the ways in which 
these either close off or open up space for other actors within or outside the state to 
participate and contribute by responding to these challenges. 
The second thematic section addresses the nature and impact of popular forces 
that have mobilised and made themselves heard in the African city in recent years. 
The chapters analyse different popular forces and practices, including resistance from 
inside the state by government officials, the changing role of formal civil society and 
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the rise of informal tactics and street politics combined with the use of social media to 
challenge state power and structures from below.
The third thematic section analyses a range of urban infrastructural development 
projects and policies in the cities of Luanda, Lagos and Addis Ababa in order to explore 
how local political interests, politics and priorities relate, incorporate or respond to 
global urban development plans, policies and imaginaries. The chapters show the 
different ways in which the global and the local intersect in the contemporary African 
city and explore the continuities and discontinuities from colonial to postcolonial 
times.
The concluding chapter seeks to refract through these themes by reflecting on 
contemporary urban scholarship not only on Africa but also globally as well as on other 
continents. It draws on the African capital city case studies in this volume to illustrate 
these refractions without claiming to exhaust the terrain. The continent today is the 
least urban on an increasingly urbanised globe. Accordingly, in all probability, urban 
scholars will progressively situate Africa at the start of a process of large-scale urban 
transformation, a process that will deeply influence its future.
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The national in urban Africa
Simon Bekker
Four case studies of the role of the national regime in postcolonial African cities are 
presented. 
Successive post-independence regimes in Cameroon employed Yaoundé, the capital 
city, as the terrain upon which they built a series of national projects: iconographic and 
architectural examples are provided as well as the political use of urban spaces. These 
new forms of urban geology which include ‘global’ projects in the capital city reflect 
the symbolic power of the Cameroonian nation, as defined by successive regimes.
The next two cases – sited in the Gauteng province of South Africa and the Greater 
Cairo City Region in Egypt – both consider the rhetoric of their national regimes 
regarding the need to decentralise power to lower levels of government whilst 
maintaining authority in national hands, in reality. In the case of Johannesburg and 
Tshwane, both metro governments in Gauteng, the national regime’s promise of 
fairer treatment of households living in informal dwellings is not realised partially 
because of little real devolved authority over housing matters. In the case of Greater 
Cairo, equally, devolution to both regional as well as local scales of state authority 
are limited partially because of confusing legislation. The recent declaration of a new 
Egyptian capital city in the desert is an illustration of national authority taking critical 
urban decisions on its own.
In both cases, moreover, the other major factor inhibiting decentralisation is the 
limited and variable devolution of financial resources. Examples of local ‘popular’ 
initiatives to improve public participation are given and are judged not to have the 
promise of replication on scale as a result of financial constraints at local urban level. 
Authority over finances remains largely in national hands, formal legislation and 
rhetoric notwithstanding.
In our introductory chapter, Therborn defines the postcolonial route to modernity 
as involving attempts to ‘nationalise colonialism’ where capital cities are distinguished 
by an enduring duality between the ex-colonial and the indigenous city, leading in turn 
to the emergence of a sharp division between a small political elite and large popular 
masses. This depiction does some justice to the current urban realities in Yaoundé, 
Cairo and Gauteng. It is also a useful manner to introduce the fourth case study of this 
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part of the book. Kinshasa is the capital city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). Located on the southern banks of the Congo River, it has grown rapidly both 
in population and in area. It was declared a province of the DRC in the 1960s. The 
geographic area comprises three types of urban settlement: the former colonial centre 
where many national state activities are situated, the neighbouring planned area 
where land and urban infrastructure are under municipal administration, and the 
peripheral area (the largest of the three) where such administration is largely absent.
This case study focuses on the role of chiefs and traditional authorities in Kinshasa. 
Given a city and a country characterised by a small political elite and large popular 
masses, traditional authorities – particularly in the periphery of Kinshasa – continue 
to play important roles in the lives of urban residents. Moreover, in 1996, the national 
regime decided to establish a state body designed to enable coexistence of state and 
traditional authority in Kinshasa and in the rest of the country.
These four case studies illustrate the challenges African national regimes face 
in their capital cities since national leaders and new elites are required to cohabit 
with residents in slum areas, bidonvilles and informal settlements, with newly arrived 
migrants and with traditional authorities, their chiefs and their clans. ‘Nationalising 
colonialism’, to use Therborn’s term, is no easy task.
CHAPTER 2
National projects in a postcolonial 
capital city: The example of Yaoundé
Jean-Pierre Togolo
Introduction
Since achieving independence in 1960, the Central African nation-state of Cameroon 
has had three different political regimes, each of which used the capital city of 
Yaoundé to represent not only the emergence of a new nation, but also to reflect the 
power of the State. This chapter aims to focus on the role of national influences on 
Yaoundé, the capital city, while the influences of the global and the popular will also be 
identified. Emphasis will be placed on the illustration of the differing representations 
of the capital city through examples of changes observed particularly in the built 
environment of Yaoundé. Each of the three national regimes developed public policies 
that singled out Yaoundé as the capital city. The implementation of these national 
policies in the capital city is the first aim of this chapter. Their consequences for city 
residents in terms of nation-building and state formation is the second.
After a brief historical overview of the emergence of Yaoundé and the introduction 
of Cameroon’s three postcolonial regimes (Section 2), the focus of this chapter will 
be on the identification and implementation of the differing ideologies of the three 
regimes regarding the capital city (Section 3). Subsequently, the focus will shift to 
the consequences of this implementation, in particular by identifying certain forms 
of monumentality and name changes in the city, as well as the construction of 
commercial infrastructure by national and international businesses (Section 4). 
Before concluding, the use by citizenry of particular sites in the capital city to 
express political and more general opposition to national regimes is addressed 
(Section 5). Since the capital city is widely perceived to be where political power is 
wielded nationally, opposition forces, both symbolically as well as in terms of ‘counter-
power,’ often employ the same venues.
The conclusion (Section 6) assesses the influence of national regime politics on 
developments in the capital city while indicating that global as well as popular forces 
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have also played a role. In addition, these regime politics employ both indigenous 
African as well as global urban elements.
A brief history of Yaoundé and the emergence of Cameroon’s three 
postcolonial regimes
Yaoundé is situated in the space that caught the attention of German explorers in 
1887. A space between 11 to 15 days of walking from the coast in the middle of a lush 
forest described as one of ‘picturesque beauty.’ The city was established in 1889 as 
a military post by two German officers, Kund and Tappenbeck (Von Morgen 1972), 
and served as a strategic base for the German administration in southern Cameroon, 
through which it controlled the hinterland. This security policy, according to official 
German colonial records, was to counter violent threats from local African kingdoms, 
in particular from incursions of Ngila, where Chief Vuté was ‘famous for his slave 
trade in the region’ (Von Morgen 1972). This policy, far from being limited to the 
protection of the populations of the region, was also a strategy to provide the military 
post with greater military protection and to lay the foundations for future conquests 
into present-day northern Cameroon (Essomba 2005: 258).
After the First World War in 1914, Germany lost its colony of Cameroon to the 
Allied forces. Great Britain established itself in the western part of what had become a 
Trust Territory, while France administered the eastern part of the territory – designated 
Western Cameroon and Eastern Cameroon, respectively. During this phase, until its 
independence, Yaoundé was the capital of French Cameroon. On 1 January 1960, 
Yaoundé was confirmed as the capital of postcolonial Eastern Cameroon. One year 
later, in 1961, French and British Cameroon formed a federal republic and Yaoundé 
was declared the federal capital. 
The population of Yaoundé has expanded rapidly in the years since independence. 
Its population grew from 89 969 in 1962 during the first postcolonial federal regime, 
to 313 706 in 1976 during the second postcolonial unitary regime and then to 2 440 
462 in 2015 during the third regime under President Biya. Today, it is the second-
largest city in Cameroon after Douala (MINDUH 2010: 21). 
According to Debbasch et al., a political regime designates the institutions and 
political personnel of a state. Accordingly, it is clear that a political regime involves two 
aspects: the institutional form of power, but also the practices of the leaders linked to 
the exercise of this power (Debbasch et al. 2001: 357). 
This definition leads us to consider two essential changes in Cameroon after 
independence. The first one was a constitutional change which marked the country’s 
conversion from a federal state to a unitary state on 1 October 1972, both under the 
presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo. The second was a presidential transition that took 
place on 6 November 1982. It marked the end of Ahidjo’s presidency and the start 
of the Biya regime. Thus, the history of postcolonial Cameroon may be divided into 
three regimes: 
1. the federal regime under Ahidjo (1961–1972), 
2. the unitary regime under Ahidjo (1972–1982) and 
3. the unitary regime under Biya since 1982. 
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These different political regimes each developed their own system of ideas, beliefs, 
opinions and rules that influenced the processes of construction and change of the 
capital city. 
Ideological impact
The ideological impact of the federal regime under Ahidjo on the public policies 
of the capital city
The system of ideas on which this federal regime was based revolved principally 
around the assertion of the power of the state over its entire territory. Apart from 
multiple public services, policies reflected a distinct desire to concentrate most of the 
power around the president of the republic to whom the government was answerable. 
 This centralisation of presidential power in a federal regime – seemingly contradictory 
in terms – may be explained by the regime’s commitment, in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, to put down the ‘rebellion’ led by nationalists of the Union of the Peoples of 
Cameroon (UPC) (Eboua 1995: 31–35). Significant military force was employed by the 
first postcolonial government and this left it with established central authority, albeit 
in a federal regime.
If public policy is understood to mean the ‘interventions of an authority vested 
with public power and governmental legitimacy in a specific area of society or power’ 
(Thoenig 2014), then the main such policy of the federal regime in Yaoundé began 
with two urban plans: the Urban Plan (PU) in 1963 and the specific Master Plan for 
Yaoundé a few years later. 
Approved by a decree in December 1963, the PU was developed by the federal 
regime to ensure the well-being of the population, with focus on three main goals: 
(1) to improve residential space by extending the urban perimeter, (2) to clean up the 
working-class suburbs by removing the traditional low-cost shacks and slums, (3) to 
Figure 1: Extension of the city of Yaoundé between 1960 and 2010
Source: Adapted from Plan d’Urbanisme Directeur Yaounde 2020 (CUY 2008:34)
1962 2010
Area 2 920 ha 31 000 ha
Population 89 969 2 400 000
Average annual growth 1.6% 6.8%
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adapt infrastructures and services in the city to the functions and roles for which they 
were assigned. In this last aspect, action consisted of reducing or extending residential 
space, and where necessary, redeploying it along the main roads (Ngwé 1982).
Through these provisions, the federal regime ordered and guided the development 
of the capital city (and other large urban areas) according to its ideology. The desire to 
adapt infrastructure to the functions of the city is a testimony to the desire to assert the 
power it has inherited and exercise it by renewing the urban landscape of the capital 
city. This is the same vision that seems to be pursued in the second public policy, the 
Urban Management Master Plan (SDAU), drawn up shortly after the implementation 
of the first one. The SDAU was an ambitious public policy designed solely for Yaoundé, 
which aimed at comprehensive implementation by the year 2000. By taking up some 
aspects of the PU, the SDAU intended to realise the following five goals:
1. Adapting infrastructure to the function of the federal capital.
2. Establishing a balance between residential zones and economic activities.
3. Incorporating peripheral areas through the development of non-urban, 
urban and suburban spaces.
4. Creating a city centre in order to accommodate high-level structures 
necessary to fulfil its role as capital.
5. Creating structural hubs within the suburbs, adapting and rehabilitating 
the working-class districts. (Ngwé 1982: 81)
Furthermore, in order to achieve these goals, the federal regime adapted local urban 
administration by amending the status of the municipality of Yaoundé. In 1967, the 
urban district of Yaoundé became an urban municipality falling under a ‘special regime’. 
 In fact, the functions of an elected mayor at the head of the urban municipality were 
assigned to a government delegate appointed by presidential decree. The activities 
of the delegate in the performance of his or her duties were defined by provisions 
carefully established by the federal regime, which had supervisory authority. 
 Effectively, the delegate exercised the functions generally assigned to the elected mayor 
of an ordinary urban municipality, but did not preside over the municipal council 
(Kuoh 1992: 88). Nonetheless, the delegate was granted discretionary authority to 
manage the capital city according to the ideological orientation of the federal regime. 
The ideological impact of the unitary regime under Ahidjo on the public 
policies of the capital city
The unitary regime period under Ahidjo was from 1972 to 1982. Through the merger 
of the federal institutions in 1972, the unitary regime under Ahidjo further centralised 
and consolidated its power, such as by declaring Yaoundé the capital city of the new 
unitary state (Azevedo 1989). In particular, the ideology of the unitary regime was 
based upon a single political party, the National Union of Cameroon (UNC) (Bwele 
1981). The urban public policies of this party influenced specific developments in the 
capital city during this regime. 
The ideological involvement of Ahidjo in the construction of the capital city can 
be observed in the departments created for this purpose. Mainly attached to the 
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central government, these departments constituted the spearhead through which the 
regime controlled urban growth in Cameroon. A status report on Yaoundé drawn 
up by the urban planning department revealed various urban structures and their 
features whose fragmented and heterogeneous appearance in both residential as well 
as commercial zones left the impression of anarchic living. In light of this situation, 
the government of the unitary state planned to transform the urban space of the 
capital city by establishing public policies whose implementation was intended to 
lead to effective operational urban management. These specifically consisted of the 
Mission for Management and Maintenance of Urban and Rural Lands (MATEUR)  
 and the Société Immobilière du Cameroun (SIC), for property development. 
The application of these public policies in the capital city minimised the participation 
of local administration. Under the unitary regime of Ahidjo, Yaoundé fell under the 
responsibility of an officer-in-charge appointed at national level to head the urban 
municipality. In its organisation, the municipality retained the structure established 
under the federal regime. That is, it was a decentralised public authority with a legal 
personality and financial autonomy (Kuoh 1992: 86). In practice, the government 
delegate appointed by presidential decree exercised the function of a mayor, acting 
as the political authority of the national government (Bwele 1981). Visibly, the Ahidjo 
regime reframed the status of the municipality through measures that reinforced state 
authority over local urban government (Law no. 74/23 of 2 December 1974). In addition, 
the national government had the primary responsibility of establishing the urban 
planning documents that the local urban government were called upon to implement. 
In effect, for all urban areas nationally, control over the management of municipalities 
was provided at national level by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and applied 
at local level by the governor and the prefect of the territorial administration where the 
local community was based. 
The ideological impact of the unitary regime under Biya on the public policies 
of the capital city 
When Paul Biya took over as president of Cameroon on 6 November 1982 after the 
resignation of his predecessor, a decisive turning point in the proposed political life of 
Cameroon took place. Envisaged political changes were conceived within the context 
of what was called progressive liberalisation. Three years later, in 1985, one year after 
the failure of an attempted state coup, the president established his own political 
party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and thereby marked an 
ideological breakaway from his predecessor. The essential aspects of the doctrine of 
this new party as well as its guidelines for government action are carefully set out in 
a book that Paul Biya published in 1986, entitled, Pour le libéralisme communautaire.
In reality, community liberalism is an ideology through which the Biya regime 
planned to promote a democratic awakening in Cameroon through top-down rule. 
This ideology is based upon values that promote the sharing of customs of the multiple 
ethnic groups of Cameroon, each considered an integral part of the Cameroonian 
nation (Mono Ndjana 1989: 31). 
The construction of the nation-state as conceived in the ideology of the Biya regime 
requires the consolidation of national integration. He asserted this under these terms: 
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We must give all Cameroonians a sense of their existential solidarity, the basis 
of the optimal deployment of the vital forces essential for the acceleration of 
the general progress of the country. I therefore consider the achievement of 
national integration, the supreme phase of national unity, to be the main 
historical and priority work that I must undertake with all Cameroonians. 
(Biya 1986: 30) [own translation]
Contrary to the ideology of the National Union advocated by the unitary regime 
under Ahidjo, Biya’s national integration ‘demonstrates the desire to move from a 
juxtaposition to a fusion of cultural realities through links that the regime intends to 
encourage between Cameroonians,’ according to Mono Ndjana (1989: 33). To achieve 
this, the regime needed a strategic location to realise this new orientation of national 
policy. Yaoundé seemed appropriate because it was the seat of state institutions, and so 
would serve as a showcase of the country both domestically as well as internationally. 
One of the first decisions of the Biya regime regarding the capital city can be traced 
to the local government reform of 1987. Pursuant to law no. 87-015 of 15 July 1987, 
a decree was signed to rename the city’s municipality into the Urban Community 
of Yaoundé (CUY). The new name described a decentralised public authority that 
grouped together and coordinated the activities of the four municipalities of the 
arrondissements that Yaoundé had by that point. 
In effect, urban public policy in Yaoundé was controlled by the administration of 
the central government. At the level of the different arrondissements of the capital city, 
responsible for local administration, elected mayors chaired arrondissement councils 
(UNDP 2002). Many decisions at this level required ratification from the community 
council of Yaoundé itself. Instead of an elected city mayor, the government delegate, 
appointed by the President of the Republic, presided over the community council of 
the city and authorised the decisions it took (CUY 2008: 39). In 2008, this centralised 
approach to governance in the capital city was concretised in the Urban Master Plan 
(PDU) of Yaoundé horizon 2020.
Accordingly, it is clear that many of the urban public policies developed and applied 
in Yaoundé after 1960 were influenced both by the somewhat divergent ideologies of 
the three postcolonial regimes as well as by the fact that they wished to implement 
particular policies in their capital city with the intention of symbolising the emergence 
of an independent African nation-state. It is also apparent that these regimes believed 
they required centralised authority over their capital city in this endeavour. We will now 
turn to the visible consequences of these policies on the built environment of Yaoundé.
Transformation of the built environment of the capital city
The two Cameroonian presidents and their central governments – largely by way of 
their control over Yaoundé’s local governments – brought about visible changes in 
the capital city. Three have been selected for discussion, one during each of the three 
postcolonial regimes. These cases reflect the use of the capital city in the process of 
nation-building and of expressing national state power.
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The construction of public and commercial buildings in Yaoundé
Changes and additions to the built environments of capital cities, particularly in the 
years after independence from colonial rule, may fruitfully be viewed in the context 
of nation-building (Bekker & Therborn 2012). In this regard, Maurice Agulhon states 
that ‘political power aims at being recognised, identified and, if possible, favourably 
appreciated by means of a whole system of signs and emblems, the principal ones 
of which are those that strike the eye’ (Agulhon 1988). Here, the focus is on the 
construction of buildings of both national and international significance in Yaoundé 
as well as changes to the names of boulevards and main streets in the capital city 
(Pondi 2012; Essono 2016).
1961 was the year of reunification of Western and Eastern Cameroon and the 
establishment of a federal republic. Accordingly, Yaoundé represented both the capital 
of the Eastern federated state and the capital of the federal state. It accommodated 
2 governments, with 7 ministers for the Eastern State and 20 for the federal state 
(Ze Nguele 1972: 1096). The city also had two legislative assemblies with their 
respective administrations (Bwele 1981). In short, in a physical and visible sense, the 
Federal Assembly of Cameroon, the Supreme Court, and other ministerial buildings, 
contributed to symbolising the power of the new state in its new federal capital. 
At the global level, the confirmation of Cameroon’s independence led to the need 
for the capital city to play a role in international affairs. Yaoundé served as a showcase 
for independent Cameroon when it hosted the head office of the Common African, 
Malagasy and Mauritian Organisation (OCAM); the African and Malagasy Intellectual 
Property Office (OAMPI), which later became the African Intellectual Property 
Organisation (OAPI); the Regional Bureau of Unesco as well as other bodies (Ze 
Nguele 1972: 1096). The architectural style chosen for these buildings – a modern 
mix with German, French and African roots – is also apparent in the headquarters 
of state and private enterprises: the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH) and 
the, then, Central Information Technology Directorate as well as the head office of 
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) are examples.
Change of road names in Yaoundé
Many of the main streets in Yaoundé continue to bear names that signal both the 
period of their construction as well as people of note at that period. First are the names 
of religious personalities: Rue Mgr René Graffin, avenue Mgr Vieter, Mgr François-
Xavier Vogt. Second, the names of French doctors and soldiers: avenue Jamot, avenue 
Maréchal Foch, and third, as Cameroon changed its status from Trust Territory to 
sovereign independence: avenue Kennedy, avenue Charles de Gaulle, Rue Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing, avenue Churchill, and avenue Jean Paul II (Pondi 2012). 
After independence, a number of boulevards and streets changed their names 
to commemorate important dates and personalities reflecting the sovereign 
independence of the nation: the Boulevard du 20 mai and the Boulevard de la 
reunification as well as the Squares de l’indépendance and du cinquantenaire (the 50th 
centenary of Independence). L’Avenue Ahmadou Ahidjo and l’Avenue John Ngu Foncha 
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(a former prime minister of Cameroon) pay tribute to two Cameroonian leaders. 
The table below records a number of the changes that have taken place after 1960, 
identifying old and new names.
Table 1: Some of the road name changes in Yaoundé since 1960
Formerly Currently
Abyedege asi/Bilig bi Embumbun Boulevard du 20 mai
Boulevard Charles de Gaulle Rue Essono Ela
Carrefour Bouillet Place Ahmadou Ahidjo
Plateau atemenque Boulevard de la Réunification
Mfundi assi Av. Ahmadou Ahidjo
Elig Mballa Enyengue John Ngu Foncha
Vallée de Dzungolo Av. Kennedy
 
The national flag and reunification
The design of the Cameroonian flag predated independence. Adopted in October 
1957 by the Legislative Assembly of Cameroon (ALCAM), the legislators selected a 
tri-colour flag with vertical stripes of equal size from the left to the right, in green, red 
and yellow. The green symbolised the large tropical forest of south Cameroon, the 
red indicated power and the blood of the Cameroonians shed during the struggle for 
independence, while the yellow represents the sun, the Sahelian soil and the savannah 
of the northern part of the country (Mbarga 2014). 
Changes made to the flag after 1960 are evidently related to the country’s march 
towards unification. In 1961, the flag was enriched by two gold stars incorporated in 
the green stripe, representing the two federated states and, from 21 May 1975, the two 
were replaced by a single star in the red stripe following the reunification that took 
place in 1972.
It was in Yaoundé that the flag was hoisted for the first time on 10 November 1957 
by the then Prime Minister, André Marie Mbida (Bwele 1981). Subsequently, it has 
been used in official ceremonies country-wide. It may be seen in front of many public 
buildings in the capital city and its third expression – that of the reunification of the 
East and West symbolised by a golden star – was accompanied by the construction of 
the Monument to Reunification in Yaoundé (see Figure 3).
The capital city as the site of claims to ‘counter power’
African capital cities may be viewed as public sites where African governments 
express ‘power over’ their citizenry. This ‘power over’, however, differs from ‘power 
to’: most administrations lack the know-how and resources to address the city services 
and other needs of their burgeoning urban populations (Bekker & Therborn 2012). 
  CHAPTER 2     21
Figure 2: Evolution of Cameroon’s flag since 1957
 
Source: Essono (2016: 238)
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As a consequence, opposition forces often use sites in the capital city to publicly 
express their resistance to the national government. The Boulevard du 20 mai is an 
appropriate example. Located in the city centre, the Boulevard du 20 mai publicly 
and symbolically recalls the 1972 transition of the federal state to a unitary nation-
state. Accordingly, as is well-known in the capital, it serves each year as the setting 
for the parades commemorating National Day, National Youth Day, Workers Day and 
several other national events. It is not surprising, therefore, that opposition forces and 
opposition national parties use the same Boulevard to publicly express their claims 
to voice and to ‘counter power.’ In 1990, a number of political parties demanded of 
President Biya that the next national elections be multi-party. These demands were 
publicly expressed and widely broadcast from the Boulevard.
Conclusion
Since independence in 1960, the built environment of Yaoundé has been deeply 
influenced by national government interventions. The skyline of the central city 
illustrates modern buildings built to accommodate central state and new private sector 
edifices, reflecting both domestic as well as global interests. The names of the capital’s 
main streets, moreover, identify both earlier leadership as well as new nomenclature 
reflecting postcolonial iconic dates and events as well as leadership. 
These changes are due in no small measure to the postcolonial ideologies of the 
three regimes described above. The chronology of regimes from federal to unitary and 
subsequently from the rule of Ahidjo to that of Biya moreover parallels an increasingly 
centralised and authoritarian national control over both the capital city as well as 
the country as a whole. These central government and presidential interventions in 
Yaoundé have contributed toward the vigorous and sustained urbanisation flows into 
the capital city. It is somewhat surprising, moreover, that these internal migration 
streams have not demonstrated superior flows of members of each presidents’ ethnic 
group to the capital during their tenures (Togolo 2019). Rather, the venue of the capital 
city has been identified – by both competing national political parties as well as by a 
restless urban citizenry drawn from Cameroon as a whole – as a public area where 
their opposition and displeasure may optimally be made visible and public.
In conclusion, it is not only the leaders of the central government whose top-down 
control has marked the urban landscape of Yaoundé but also global interests – as 
evidenced in their new edifices – as well as the influences of the urban citizenry. It is 
also worth noting that the nature of these changes to the built environment expresses 
a mix of African and global values. The monument to reunification, illustrated above, 
is an example. 
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CHAPTER 3
Lip service: How voices from informal 
settlements were sidelined during  




A majority of the South African population has been urban since the 1990s (Kok et al. 
2006: 11). Over 22% of this population lives in the province of Gauteng, which, after 
the Western Cape, was the country’s only other province experiencing net in-migration 
at the time of the last census (StatsSA 2011: 2). Local government in the province of 
Gauteng includes the three Category A or Metropolitan municipalities, namely the 
City of Johannesburg, the City of Tshwane, and the City of Ekurhuleni. This chapter 
provides an examination of the top-down treatment by two of these metros of those 
living in their informal settlements over the course of the first decade of democratic 
local government (2000–2010), during which both cities were governed by the 
country’s liberation movement turned ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC).
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality is a single tier local authority 
incorporating a geographical area formerly governed by 11 different local authorities 
with disparate capacities. Johannesburg had begun as a tent camp that mushroomed 
there during the gold rush to the Witwatersrand from 1886 but had grown quickly 
and sufficiently to support travelling traders and several sectors of industry. For most 
of the city’s history, the majority black population has been confined to overcrowded 
residential areas on the periphery of the city and largely excluded from the white 
centre.
The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality governs the city of Pretoria and 
its surrounds. Pretoria had been founded as capital city of the Boer republic, the 
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Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, in 1860. The geographical boundaries of the city have 
changed a number of times over the course of its history. Coinciding with the date 
of the local government elections that took place just after the period covered by this 
study, the incorporation of an additional hinterland municipality, Metsweding, made 
Tshwane the third largest municipality in the world by surface area, at 6 368km² (City 
of Tshwane n.d.). 
Municipal expenditure per capita, including investment in infrastructure, is much 
higher in the metropolitan municipalities than in South Africa’s peri-urban and rural 
areas (SACN 2011). The impressive record of house building in the metropolitan 
municipalities has, however, been ‘over-shadowed by the sizeable, expanding 
population of these areas compared to the rest of the country’ (SACN 2011: 50). The 
building of record numbers of low-income housing has not prevented substantial 
proportional growth in the informal settlements of the urban areas of Gauteng and 
Cape Town, compared to a slight decline in the proportion of informality in the rest 
of the country.
The ways in which the state takes account of, and acts on, informality presents an 
important area for considering state-society relations (UN-Habitat 2003). The South 
African challenge has its roots in colonial and apartheid legislation which impacted 
decisively the incidence, form and distribution across the landscape and population, 
of informal housing. The tangible decline in recent electoral support of the ANC in 
South African metropolitan councils, moreover, raises the question of state-society 
relations under early democratic rule by South Africa’s liberation party. As other 
research has indicated (Huchzermeyer & Karam 2006; Robins 2002), strategies of 
the post-1994 government have perpetuated and exacerbated informal settlement. 
Democratic South Africa, in constitutional terms, endorses a three-sphere 
(rather than three-tier) system of government – the national, the provincial and the 
local – so as to offer equal voice to elected leaders in each sphere. In addition, in 
the local (and metropolitan) sphere, elections produce an equal mix of proportional 
representation and ward-based direct representation of individual candidates. Both 
these constitutional principles are aimed at ensuring that voice is offered to individuals 
at local level, the first through elected councillors by political party and the second 
through elected ward councillors representing residents’ interests at the micro-level. 
This is the basis for the national government’s pledge that public participation in 
planning and implementation of policy includes the voice of the poor and of residents 
in informal settlements. 
Along with basic service delivery strategies, legislation that obliges local authorities 
to consult their constituent communities (Republic of South Africa 2000) has 
accompanied the consolidation of democratic institutions in South Africa. Ward-
level participation feeds into each municipality’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 
which becomes a legally binding programme of development and expenditure upon 
being ratified by a local council (Republic of South Africa 2000). Characteristics of 
integrated development planning include community participation; a strategic focus 
to make the most of limited resources; integration between sectors; and to have an 
outcomes and delivery orientation. The municipalities must prepare five-year IDPs 
that are accompanied by a financial plan. Every year, the IDPs are also subject to a 
review process. 
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This pledge of the national government to ensure listening to popular voices 
from below through its public institutions, both elected as well as appointed, is the 
focus of this chapter. An overview of analyses focused on bottom-up participation by 
urban residents is followed by a short summary of the research methodology used. 
Subsequently, five constraints ‘from above’ on real devolved power to the metros of 
Johannesburg and of Tshwane and to their residents will be identified. 
Before concluding, the role that the state plays in the production of urban informal 
settlements is broached. The conclusion itself will argue that the national state’s 
centralising forces severely limit the extent to which local state institutions are able 
to incorporate the voices of informal settlement residents into their planning and 
practice. Accordingly, the national rhetoric of democratic participation, particularly in 
South Africa’s metropolitan areas, is not accompanied by concomitant practice.
Shortcomings of formal participation from the bottom up
State-created mechanisms of participation are what Cornwall (2002) has labelled 
‘invited’ spaces of participation in order to distinguish them from ‘invented’ spaces 
of participation in which communities respond on their own terms. Since only 
genuinely enabled citizens can realise the potential of popular participation to 
influence government, truly democratic participation spaces are difficult to achieve 
even in societies with low levels of inequality (Esau 2007).
In the South African context, invited spaces of participation have been criticised by 
many scholars. These state-created mechanisms of participation may 
• tie communities to pre-set agendas (Heller 2009; Putu 2006); 
• be dominated by ward councillors’ political allies (Sinwell 2010); 
• rely on overly technical discourses that ordinary people find difficult to 
follow (Putu 2006); 
• treat as aberrations the differences within communities (Friedman 2007); 
• tend to de-radicalise or ‘domesticate’ social movements (Sinwell 2008: 245); 
• privilege the organised over the non-organised (Friedman 2007); 
• manage to attract particularly the middle class (Bekker & Leildé 2003); and 
• present barriers to the poor, in particular those in the informal sector 
(Friedman 2007; Mohamed 2006).
These shortcomings of formal participation processes have been offered as de 
facto explanations for the slow progress with regard to the social welfare of poor 
communities. In most cases listed here, the focus is upon difficulties regarding 
the mobilisation of the agency of the poor, both from below as well as via the local 
authority. Moreover, this planned mobilisation ought to take place within state-created 
institutions.
Methodology
This chapter draws on a study of the local state housing sector in democratic South 
Africa as it responds to informal settlement (Groenewald 2012). The research took 
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the approach of studying up to focus on local state approaches to informal settlement 
in two major cities for the decade after the local government elections held on 5 
December 2000. Until 2000, the continued reliance on racially defined voting 
districts had extended white control at the local level, in what has been termed a 
‘delayed transition at the local level’ (Bekker et al. 1997: 38–43). The period studied 
therefore represents the first decade of local democracy in South Africa, during which 
the character of the post-apartheid local state has emerged, together with the kind 
of urban citizenship that has been constructed under the ANC. The research sites 
were the local municipalities in the cities of Johannesburg and Tshwane, which, 
for the period covered by the project, were two of six metropolitan councils among 
the 284 South African municipalities. In-depth interviews were conducted with 23 
senior appointed and elected officials responsible for housing. More detail on these 
interviews is available (Groenewald 2012).
During the research process it became clear that in each of these two cities a 
dedicated unit coordinated the planning process and drew up a coherent IDP, taking 
into account the needs voiced during this annual community consultation process on 
the one hand, and the electoral promises of the majority party, on the other. Long-term 
strategic city priorities and sector-specific inputs were also considered when council 
made adjustments to the IDP. Actors within the local state felt that the legislated 
obligation to consult communities was indeed being met through an annual round 
of community meetings. They further reported routinely going beyond the legal 
requirements of the IDP process. In both cities, the mayor had arranged opportunities 
for direct engagement with community members, departmental community meetings 
were sometimes held, and service delivery satisfaction surveys had been conducted. 
Every participant in the study mentioned instances where they had personally been 
involved in community consultation. Involvement was therefore limited neither to 
elected politicians nor to appointed officials; neither to policy decision-makers nor 
to those responsible for practical implementation. Both elected and appointed staff 
spent a substantial amount of time in evening and weekend meetings listening to 
community members. Further consultation of specific communities had also been a 
requirement of specific court judgments.
A number of the most influential participants in this study were asked to comment 
on the relative importance of a range of influences over local state policy and practice, 
particularly regarding participation. In addition to the internal shortcomings of formal 
participation listed above, five factors that limit the reach of local participation can 
be distinguished in the accounts of these senior decision-makers within the housing 
sector. These five structural constraints are 
• planning priorities set from above,
• the separation of implementation and accountability,
• the failure of the courts to provide consistent protection to the poor,
• ineffective needs assessment and 
• inadequate funding. 
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Constraints on real devolved power to local metropolitan authorities: 
Factors from above that impede local state responsivity
Priorities from above determine funding and performance targets
Participants indicated that the intentions of the ruling party played an important part 
in determining local state programmes. The IDP had to balance needs articulated 
by communities with the priorities and electoral promises of the ruling party. 
Councillors and officials described the mechanisms by which ruling party priorities 
were incorporated into planning in very similar terms. Elected councillors valued their 
party caucus as a forum that could be used to ensure cohesion in policy and practice, 
while the Mayoral Committee provided direction with regard to various policy areas. 
This was the case in both cities. 
The participants also explained how their performance management was informed 
by political priorities. The mayor of a city would pronounce certain priorities during 
the State of the City address. These priorities would feed into the IDP, which would in 
turn be used by city departments to develop their detailed scorecards. A city’s Annual 
Performance Plan would include all these detailed targets. 
The system mimicked the target development process described by officials in the 
provincial and national government. At provincial level, the budget speeches of members 
of the Executive Council would feed into the targets of provincial departments, while at 
the national level, goals set in the president’s State of the Nation Address would be broken 
down into various ministers’ portfolios, and this would be broken down into targets for 
various sections of a national department. The targets of provincial governments would 
of course inform their budget allocations to municipalities.
Over and above this, officials in the national Department of Human Settlements were 
responsible for ensuring alignment between the IDPs, provincial plans and the national 
planning framework. The Department of Human Settlements conducted imbizos that 
gave community members the opportunity to talk directly to staff of the department. 
Actors in the national Department of Human Settlements said that strategic priorities 
were driven by articulated demand. They expected municipal IDPs to reflect the 
priorities expressed in the president’s State of the Nation address and national and 
provincial priorities, along with local demand. Central state participants were frustrated 
when municipal IDPs did not reflect national and provincial priorities which, they 
argued, were also informed by articulated demand. Projects needed to be initiated by 
municipalities, but aligned with provincial plans, otherwise they would simply not be 
funded by the national department. The devil lies in the detail: due to the timing of the 
financial year-end at municipal and provincial levels, provincial planning is completed 
earlier in the fiscal year than municipal planning which places municipalities at a 
disadvantage. All in all, the metropolitan local state was under significant pressure to 
align its own plans to those of the central and provincial government. 
Separation of implementation and accountability
In the local state housing sector responding to informal settlement, the sway of central 
and provincial government over local government was further entrenched by the fact 
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that accountability was located at a different level of government to that for primary 
control over funding and implementation. 
Participants’ descriptions divulge a practical separation between those who are 
actually responsible for implementing the bulk of housing projects and those who 
consult communities. 
The central government divided the housing budget among South Africa’s nine 
provinces which then had control over the further division of the budget among 
allocations to municipalities and the provincial government’s own operational and 
capital expenditure, including housing projects. No downward accountability to 
specific constituencies is built into the design of South Africa’s provincial level of 
government. Instead, all elected representatives come from a party list.
Provincial officials generally described their role as funded delivery. A technical 
feasibility study, which included a land suitability survey, was conducted as part of the 
planning of each provincial housing project, and layout plans were advertised for public 
comment. Provincial plans would usually be presented to affected communities prior 
to approval. ‘Greenfields’ projects, in which nobody resided on the land earmarked 
for development, would involve no community consultation, while other cases 
might warrant social impact assessment. A dedicated communication division was 
responsible for handling housing project-related queries from the general public. In 
some cases, opportunities for direct engagement between the provincial government 
and the community were arranged by the municipal speaker’s office, when the 
municipality held meetings in informal settlements, or when the central government 
held imbizos. For example, when the members of surrounding suburban communities 
had initially objected to a mixed income state-supported development on the grounds 
that it would affect their property values, these objections had decreased over time, 
said Ned, a provincial official. Participants in the provincial government sometimes 
attended community project updates and community consultation opportunities 
arranged by municipalities so that the relevant background or technical information 
could be provided. Consultation by the provincial government which exercised the 
primary control over decision-making about housing was therefore primarily reactive 
and technical. 
City councillors in the study considered their engagement with communities a 
critical contribution to the housing process, which finds some support in the fact 
that councillors’ knowledge of the grassroots level was both acknowledged and 
valued by their provincial counterparts. Provincial participants said that they relied 
on municipalities to conduct in-depth consultation and to provide information about 
community priorities and preferences. However, the portion of the housing budget 
controlled by municipalities was small and funded primarily from service delivery, 
their current account. Although municipalities had the primary responsibility for local 
planning based on the IDP process, implementation of the priorities identified in the 
IDP depended on the size of the housing capital budget available at the local level. 
Provincial participants experienced this as a functional division of labour; an 
experience which may well have been moulded by their location within a province 
where the local and provincial state is governed by the national ruling party which 
determines the overarching policy framework. The framework removes accountability 
to grassroots communities from provincial officials who implement housing projects 
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that directly affect those communities, but at the same time, holds accountable local 
authorities that have limited influence over the distribution of the provincial housing 
budget. Officials feared that further consultation would add fuel to the fire of already 
frustrated communities. The leaders who were accountable to the constituencies were 
therefore not the ones who had real power over implementation. 
In summary, a separation was practised between the provincial government 
responsible for budget allocation and implementation and the local state responsible 
for community consultation and local planning. The division of competencies 
between the provincial and local state left ordinary residents without direct access to 
or influence over the primary housing decision-makers.
Court rulings give inconsistent guidance
The local state is closest to ordinary people. It has, therefore, become the focus of 
popular contestations over the content of national citizenship. Compared to the rhythm 
of state planning processes and ruling party meetings, court judgments were ad hoc 
and relatively unpredictable. Nevertheless, they had a direct influence on the practice 
of local authorities. Two court cases against the City of Johannesburg, in which the City 
of Johannesburg and other government departments were challenged with respect to 
the provision of water and housing led to limited gains for pure communities (see 
Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others; Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
Others). 
The local state could also seek eviction orders from the courts with regard to 
habitual non-payers residing in social housing, or in cases where public land had been 
occupied for longer than six months, or seek ownership of a bad building that had 
been abandoned by the owner. Although this was not raised by participants, the local 
state in both cities had successfully applied for several eviction orders issued under 
various circumstances. In the City of Tshwane, the courts were ostensibly also being 
used to test in which cases the city would be required to formalise or service informal 
settlements and when they could be evicted or tolerated while being provided with 
rudimentary services only. This transpired from a comment by Nellie, a Tshwane 
councillor, who said that legal informal settlements were ‘the ones where the court 
has instructed us to provide services.’ Court judgments, therefore, provided neither 
reliable relief to the poor, nor lasting guidance to the local state.
Metropolitan municipalities lobbied for greater local state control over housing 
programmes, partly because they had been taken to court by residents with regard to 
housing and shelter. But despite a number of limited victories for poor communities, 
the local state had also successfully applied for eviction orders issued under various 
circumstances. While officials and councillors in this study declared that they had no 
choice but to adhere to court judgments, they sometimes acted in contravention of 
the law by evicting residents without a court order. In the case of informal settlements 
razed to the ground, there was no immediate possibility of return, regardless of court 
rulings. The series of court cases between city residents and the local state have, 
therefore, not consistently resulted in the protection of the poor.
One reason for this inconsistency was apparent in the aftermath of one of the early 
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cases of court-based contestation over citizenship that had faced the post-1994 South 
African government. In the prominent constitutional court case of Irene Grootboom, 
the provincial government was instructed to provide the funds for the relevant 
municipality to provide tents, toilets and water to the informal settlement community 
where Grootboom lived (Grootboom and Others v The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others). The judgment also recognised the right to housing, but like 
other cases in which citizens have taken the state to court over services, failed to resolve 
the question of fiscal responsibility (Huchzermeyer 2004). While popular voices were 
often validated by court rulings, this did not lead to consistent improvement of the 
fate of South Africa’s poor. A constitution that is globally renowned for obligating the 
state to progressively realise rights, has not sufficiently challenged a system designed 
to privilege central control over local spending.
Inadequate funding restricts local state responsiveness
The claim by participants that the allocated funds from the central state were 
insufficient for addressing the identified housing need is supported by several 
pieces of evidence. First, as mentioned above, the two metropolitan municipalities 
in this study exhausted their housing budgets by means of project implementation. 
Second, the number of houses that can be delivered by the local authorities based on 
the available subsidies constitute a small fraction of the known housing need. Given 
the strict criteria for subsidised housing stipulated by the national Housing Code, 
however, estimates of housing need are likely to underrepresent the population unable 
to access adequate shelter via the open market. As mentioned above, the state has also 
placed the burden of self-identification on those who wanted to register their need 
on the housing demand database. Third, the central budget allocation for Housing 
has never reached the 5% of the national budget that the ANC envisaged during the 
transition (Pottie 2003).
Local authorities each have an operating and a capital budget that must be prepared 
together, since commitments in the capital budget incur operating costs. Increases in 
operating expenditure need to be considered before decisions are made about capital 
projects to ensure that the budget will be balanced (ETU n.d.). Capital budgets are for 
longer-term developments or assets and may be funded from a combination of loans, 
donations, government grants, public-private partnerships or the operating income 
in a particular financial year (ETU n.d.). Operating budgets, on the other hand, cover 
the day-to-day costs and income to deliver municipal services and are funded from 
the rates and taxes that municipalities collect together with their equitable share of 
national revenue (ETU n.d.). Since the equitable share depends on the number of 
poor people within the municipality’s area of jurisdiction, rural municipalities benefit 
more than urban municipalities,  although  the equitable share covers only a small 
share of municipal operating expenditure (ETU n.d.). Local authorities are therefore 
effectively expected to be self-sufficient for the purpose of service delivery. 
The severe shortage of funds limits the capacity of the local state to respond 
meaningfully to the priorities identified by community consultation. These priorities 
and those identified in the most recent ruling party election manifesto(s) together 
inform the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of each local authority. The priorities 
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captured in the IDP determine the order in which the proposed projects for a specific 
financial year are funded until the budget has been fully allocated. Once the allocations 
have been depleted, no further projects can be approved. Compared to a properly 
funded local state where various models of meaningful democratic control over the 
budget can be pursued, inadequate funding of the local state limits the influence of 
community consultation to that of prioritising expenditure which essentially pits one 
poor community against another. 
The value of prioritisation is severely diminished by the fact that only a small 
proportion of the population in need of assistance can be assisted with the available 
budget. The waiting periods that result from this relationship of need to provision vary 
widely but have been roughly estimated at a decade. The burden of self-identification 
placed on the poor has therefore been deepened by the obligation to retain the status 
of a qualifier for more than a decade by remaining in the lowest income category and 
continuing to have dependents. Should the ten-year period be sufficient for the state 
to provide that person’s needs, but the dependents reach majority age after nine years, 
the prospective beneficiary would be disqualified from receiving subsidised housing. 
The prospective beneficiaries are effectively expected to be patient indefinitely while 
adequate shelter continues to elude them. 
The challenge cannot be expected to dissipate, as contemporary South African 
cities reflect the trend of previously unparalleled urbanisation taking place across the 
developing world (UN 2016). In the meantime, local authorities are left with little 
choice but to turn to partnerships, giving the private sector exaggerated influence 
compared to ordinary people. 
Ineffective needs assessment hinders planning and burdens the poor
In the province of Gauteng, both the high rate of in-migration and natural growth 
contribute to the need for housing. Local state officials and councillors were aware 
of projections with regard to the urban growth rate in general, including the rate of 
household formation in the lowest income categories and the rate of in-migration. 
Participants in Johannesburg mentioned that in-migration together with the rate of 
new household formation meant that backlogs were constantly growing. Maureen, a 
Johannesburg official, gave this account:
If you look at the City’s Growth and Development Strategy, it talks about 
all these parameters. We have got a Department of Economic Development 
in the City where we have got senior economists who will tell you that in 
terms of population growth we are going to be growing at 1.4% year in year 
out and because Johannesburg is the key economic hub of Africa, the City 
is supposed to grow at this X amount. But 9 out of 10 (times) that is not 
necessarily matched with available resources and that is one big challenge. 
… So we are going to end up here and we hope by some miracle that we will 
have a blip. Because Local Authorities’ funding is based on the ability to get 
more revenue for your Council growth and if unemployment goes up and 
up and up, our ability to increase our revenue base gets eroded as well. ... It 
sounds like an excuse for a government official to say maybe we must raise 
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the rates and taxes by 70%, but the truth is if you look at migration into the 
cities, it is higher than what we can afford.
The degree to which systematic needs assessment and projections influenced 
planning was explored in interviews. Census data and household surveys conducted by 
Statistics South Africa would inform national planning priorities and the distribution 
of funds, but the frequency of the census has been decreased to once every ten years. In 
addition, the South African census is plagued by questions about accuracy, including 
undercounting in excess of international benchmarks (Berkowitz 2013; Schultz 2013). 
Whether accurate or not, these tools appeared to be largely ignored when it came to 
planning at both the provincial and the local level. Instead, all participants considered 
principal source of information on housing need to be the housing demand database. 
In 2007, the approach to housing needs assessment in the province of Gauteng 
had changed from that of a waiting list with limited information about prospective 
beneficiaries and their needs, to a demand database that disaggregated need in 
terms of the kind of housing that the prospective beneficiary wanted and in terms 
of the income category of beneficiaries. The participants in government were visibly 
animated by the cleaning of the demand database which also represented a way to 
ring-fence the vast and growing need for housing. The original post-1994 housing 
waiting list had been problematic because it simply contained a list of people who had 
indicated that they needed state subsidised housing and failed to disaggregate need. 
The list had not been cross-checked against other government databases to exclude 
non-qualifiers who had either claimed to earn lower salaries than they actually earned 
or who had claimed to have dependents who did not actually qualify as dependents, 
and people who received houses elsewhere had not been removed from the list over 
time. 
The list was shortened by means of data cleaning exercises that removed people 
who were listed with incorrect ID numbers, who had obtained or applied for housing 
elsewhere, or who did not meet or no longer met the criteria to qualify for subsidised 
housing – for example, if their dependents had become adults or their salaries had 
increased. In addition, prospective beneficiaries on the waiting list were asked to show 
themselves at state housing offices. Such an indigent approach that shifts the burden 
of proof of poverty onto marginalised households ignores their lack of resources to 
prove that they qualify for assistance (McDonald & Pape 2002). For this reason, the 
burden of self-identification could contribute to a further underestimation of need. 
Following the clean-up, the total number of prospective beneficiaries in the province 
of Gauteng on the database had decreased from around 800 000 to over 600 000.
While the new demand database was a more reliable indication of the number of 
people who had self-identified and qualified for subsidised housing at a given point 
in time, it could not be expected to accurately reflect the need for assistance with 
access to shelter. In addition, because the list was not publicly available and because 
programmes did not respond to prospective beneficiaries in the order in which they 
had registered, communities had no way of knowing whether they had been bypassed 
and whether nepotism or corruption played a part in beneficiary selection. Moreover, 
the demand database was perceived to be applied in a corrupt and arbitrary manner 
(Rubin 2011).
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While the local state broadly relied on regular community consultation to inform 
the IDP, the demand database where the poor had self-identified their need of housing 
assistance was the primary mechanism used to assess housing need. 
With regard to informal settlements, shack registration exercises were conducted 
that could also identify where there was a need for intervention. The provincial 
administration had conducted an audit to identify and record the location of all 
informal settlements in 2005, an exercise that was mentioned and considered 
helpful by all the participants in understanding the demand for state-funded housing. 
However, information on needs assessment was held by the provincial office and did 
not feature prominently in the planning processes in which provincial administrators 
were directly involved. Since the participants were animated by the provincial audit, 
they appeared not to recognise the need for a method that would measure and predict 
need over time, rather than to provide a once-off snapshot of housing need.
To avoid shacks being used as a ‘queue jumping mechanism’, the allocation of 
subsidised housing was linked to a shack number in the city’s database when the 
occupant of a shack became a beneficiary of a government programme, said Maureen, 
a Johannesburg official. This local state approach therefore served to strengthen the 
Housing Code focus on individual beneficiaries rather than geographic areas or 
communities, which in turn limited the scope of state housing assistance. Planning 
and budget allocations responded to a housing demand database that reflected an 
overly static understanding of need on the part of the central and provincial state, 
whose practices placed the burden of identifying need primarily on poor households 
rather than on the state. 
In both cities, the list of people on the housing demand database did not overlap 
closely with the residents of informal settlements, as indicated by participants and 
corroborated by staff of Statistics South Africa. A substantial proportion of people 
living in informal settlements did not qualify for subsidised housing. In addition, 
many temporary workers and migrants did not want RDP housing in the city, whereas 
candidates for family units did not want social housing, which could entail a lifetime 
of paying without owning anything. Participants had taken cognisance of the fact that 
a one-size-fits-all approach to housing was unlikely to succeed, as many migrants did 
not require family housing and a substantial proportion of people without adequate 
housing did not qualify for fully subsidised housing. 
Participants in the local state knew that the estimated need for housing was 
increasing at a high rate due to both internal growth and in-migration. The state 
actors were sufficiently familiar with the results of needs assessment exercises to 
be able to summarise the scope of housing backlogs in the two cities. They were 
aware that the bulk of housing need in the province was concentrated in the two 
cities and participants in each city knew in which specific parts of their city need was 
concentrated. Yet, projections did not play an important role in planning, as the budget 
allocated to the local state did not even allow it to clear housing backlogs. The number 
of people in need of fully or partially subsidised housing far exceeded the number 
that could be assisted, given the funds allocated to address informal settlement and 
housing. The local state did not have at its disposal any housing instrument that could 
adequately respond to known need or urban growth. 
The obliteration of procedural justice is most starkly accentuated by participants’ 
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comments about community participation. Housing need was acute and demand was 
articulated at every community consultation opportunity at the local level, said Gladys, 
a Johannesburg official. In Johannesburg, where there was no indication of a failure 
to spend allocated funds, some participants feared that further consultation would 
serve merely to raise expectations, although no surplus remained to respond to any 
additional consultation. The phrase ‘social exclusion,’ used when multiple deprivations 
associated with poverty push people to the margins of society to the extent that the 
advantages of citizenship elude them (Abercrombie et al. 2000), can therefore be 
applied to the residents of informal settlements in contemporary South Africa.
Informal settlement as a product of state policy and practice 
Debates about the definitions of informality will be familiar to scholars in this field. 
Where Huchzermeyer (2004) has argued that informality should be understood not in 
terms of its lacking physical or top structure, often contrasted to formal dwellings, this 
argument has not relied on romanticising living conditions in informal settlements. 
Instead, it has represented a careful and crucial shift of emphasis away from the 
inadequacy of the dwelling built by the poor, towards the vulnerability contributed 
by the state (Huchzermeyer 2011). This approach held the key to shifting the state 
response away from eviction and towards the improvement of tenure security and 
living conditions of residents of informal settlements. Nevertheless, it is often because 
of their gains and aspirations that residents of informal settlements exercise a choice 
for a precarious place in the city over no place in the city at all (Groenewald et al. 2013). 
Defining informal settlement in terms of its vulnerability, in particular to eviction, 
avoids degrading descriptions that trample on this agency, and is accurate in locating 
responsibility with the state. 
If residents of informal settlements are unable to extract recognition and 
responsiveness from the local state, this cements their position of precarity and in 
particular, extends their risk of eviction. The additional state contributions to precarity 
identified here, therefore, constitute the state (re)production of informality. The theory 
that the state produces informal settlement has therefore been strengthened. The 
centralising tendency of the South African state, therefore, contributes to continued 
informal settlement.
This interpretation resonates with what I would like to call a Fanonian 
understanding of the state. Fanon (1963) locates the cause of the native with the 
coloniser. His argument that colonial administrations are responsible for the existence 
of the colonised, systematically links a series of characteristics associated with natives 
to a series of ways in which indigenous peoples are subjugated under colonialism. He 
demonstrates how colonialism dehumanises its subjects by removing the minimum 
requirements for a humane existence, setting the example of acting in an inhumane 
manner and casting the subjects as less than human (Fanon 1963). Fanon illuminates 
the direct causal relationship of colonial subjugation with the failure of postcolonial 
governments to improve the plight of the majority of indigenous people. While this 
perspective took time to permeate the mainstream, when it did so, it caused three 
critical paradigm shifts: social scientists began to include non-physical factors such 
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as economic capacity into their concepts of race; they began to conceive of these non-
physical characteristics not as inherent, but as inherited from past discrimination; and 
there was a growing recognition that race discrimination was the cause of the distinct 
positions of ‘race’ groups in society, rather than the other way round (Groenewald 
2004). The same advance has yet to materialise in the dominant discourse on 
informality. 
Conclusion 
Alongside the various internal constraints of formal participation that have been 
described in the literature, a variety of factors from above limit the potential of 
participation processes at the level of the city or local state in South Africa. The influence 
of participation was severely curtailed by the structural constraints on the autonomy 
and budget of the local state, as compared to other spheres of the South African 
state. Consultation has therefore not translated into the ability of those in informal 
settlements to make their voices and priorities count. Poor communities often take to 
the streets in an attempt to evoke a degree of urgency over their desperation.
The legislated entrenchment of democratic participation at the local level offers 
scant comfort, as the little influence that residents are able to exert serves to prioritise 
project expenditure. Even full participatory budgeting could leave residents frustrated, 
as only a small portion of priorities can be addressed with the available budget. In 
sum, the political right to self-management and participation in decision-making 
by residents of informal settlements has been stripped of substance. Under these 
conditions, neither the reform of invited participation spaces, nor their abandonment 
in favour of insurgent revolt, can realise social welfare. The meaningful participation 
to which the Constitution of South Africa pays lip service, requires a national ‘will’ to 
build local authorities with greater autonomy and fiscal clout. 
The decentralising rhetoric of the national state diverges substantially from its 
centralising practice, which helps confine the residents of South Africa’s informal 
settlements both to the periphery of urban areas and to the footnotes of the economy. 
They form part of a global underclass that is being abandoned, forgotten, or wished 
away on the outskirts of world cities, disconnected entirely from the potential 
opportunities of a fourth industrial revolution.
In the context of a declining economy, pro-poor activists will have to weigh up 
the potential of different strategies to respond to this dilemma. Support of local 
entrepreneurship, including the informal sector, can help, but may not be enough 
to counter the effects of rising unemployment. Entering the fierce competition for a 
larger slice of a shrinking national budget pits poor communities against government 
departments that already serve them inadequately. Competition for scarce resources 
at the local level can also pit one poor community against another, whether in formal, 
invited participation spaces, or on opposite sides of barricades and burning tyres. 
All of these strategies are important for strengthening local communities, but their 
respective pitfalls make it more urgent to consider a Basic Income Grant as a viable 
policy option for giving ordinary people more control over their own livelihoods and 
dignity, including their options for shelter.
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Centralised urban governance in the 
Greater Cairo City Region: A critical 
understanding of key challenges and 
responses
Amr Abdelaal, Hajer Awatta, Omar Nagati, Salwa Salman & Marwa Shykhon
Introduction
Egypt, like other countries in Africa, has urbanised with an estimated annual rate of 
1.68% between 2010–2015 (CIA 2016). With this exponential urban growth, Cairo, 
the capital of Egypt and one of the most significant cities in Africa and the Middle 
East, conglomerated with Giza and Qalyubiyah, its neighbouring governorates, to 
constitute the Greater Cairo City Region (GCCR) in 1977, Egypt’s main urban region. 
The GCCR’s three governorates serve as administrative boundaries that aid in the 
management of the country’s largest metropolis but are physically intertwined and 
function together as one urban core. It contains between 40–50% of Egypt’s university 
spots, hospital beds, public sector and private sector jobs (Sims 2010), 31% of the 
nation’s economic output (GOPP 2012) and almost a quarter of Egypt’s population 
(UN-Habitat 2011). This undisputedly renders it the most significant region in Egypt. 
It also captures most of the incoming private and public investment and business 
enterprises, with 83% of all foreign establishments located in Cairo (Sims 2010). Its 
location – at the centre of a linear settlement pattern along the Nile Valley and the 
Delta – means that Cairo is well connected to most of Egypt’s smaller cities and towns. 
Today, the GCCR is the best connected and populated urban agglomeration in Egypt 
with an approximate total population of 22.9 million inhabitants, representing 25% of 
the total Egyptian population (CAPMAS 2017). 
Ineffective urban governance is the primary challenge facing the GCCR, 
underscoring all attempts to deal with other, more tangible problems, such as the growth 
of informality as a parallel system for housing, lack of economic opportunities and 
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inadequate services provision. This chapter posits that such ineffective management 
of the GCCR is extensively attributable to centrality, resulting in inefficient resource 
allocation, a lack of coordination and investment in inadequate development projects. 
Centralisation is synonymous with, but not limited to, population agglomeration, top-
down decision-making, and financial and administrative centrality. In this chapter, we 
use the term in contrast to decentralisation, which instead aims at distributing power 
among different levels of government and dissolving the concentration of power 
without jeopardising the sovereignty of the state (Bardhan 2002).
This chapter will explore challenges of urban governance in a context of rapid urban 
growth, with a focus on centralised governance as a main obstacle to development, 
through an analysis of the administrative structure of the Greater Cairo City Region 
(GCCR) in Egypt, and its on-the-ground manifestations as exemplified through three 
urban intervention case studies that span a range of scales of governance. 
First, we discuss policy debates regarding centralised governance in the GCCR and 
approaches to decentralisation. In this context, we will argue that the city region is 
ill-defined within the legal frameworks; that both the absence of an administrative 
body that governs the region as a single unit and the dispersed control over financial 
resources are inadequate; and that the different conceptualisations of decentralisation 
at the national level in Egypt exacerbate the problem. Second, we explore three 
urban projects that highlight the resultant challenges of centrality at different 
scales of government. To avoid a simplified dichotomy between centralisation and 
decentralisation as two opposing forms of government, this chapter recognises a 
spectrum of necessary scales of governance. First, we examine the establishment 
of desert cities at the national (and most centralised) scale; second, we focus on the 
Cairo Metro project at the regional (an intermediary) scale, and third, we discuss 
decentralisation attempts through the lens of a case study at the local (and most 
decentralised) scale. Altogether, we argue that such centrality in urban governance 
leads to highly ineffective management of the GCCR, which further complicates the 
urban challenges increasingly facing the region. 
The concluding section highlights the need for administrative solutions that are 
appropriate to each scale of governance, which, in the present context of the GCCR’s 
administration, necessitates an overarching move towards increased decentralisation. 
It also connects centralisation and approaches to decentralisation in Egypt to the wider 
debates on decentralisation as an instrument for development. Rather than advocating 
a romanticised vision of uncritical decentralisation, which often incorrectly assumes 
its inherent democracy (Heller 2001), this chapter argues that appropriate scales of 
government should be carefully pursued towards a cohesive and effective hierarchy 
of governance.
Urban governance in the case of the GCCR: Centralisation  
vs decentralisation
Following the Parisian example, developed by Baron Haussmann in the early 1800s, 
Khedive Ismaʻil commissioned ‘Ali Mubarak Pasha, a French-trained engineer, and 
reformer, to design a plan for a new Cairo, west of the historical Fatimid Cairo (Rabbat 
2011). The new Cairo has come to resemble several cities across Europe that were 
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rapidly redesigned according to a highly spatially centralised model, ‘the cutting of 
two new boulevards in the medieval city’s fabric, al-Sikka al-Jadida (the New Street) 
and Muhammad ‘Ali Street, does indeed indicate an intention to enact a system 
of spatial control and surveillance’ (Rabbat 2011: 185). The spatial centralisation of 
the new Cairo has, in many ways, mirrored the intense centralisation of Egypt’s 
governance structure since the 1800s. This was further accentuated following the 
Free Officers Movement, in 1952, which overthrew the monarchy and the remains 
of British colonial rule with the support of a large working class and declared the 
independence of Egypt. The Egyptian Republic was led by a military government 
that has since become increasingly authoritarian (Abu-Lughod 1971; Mitchell 2002; 
Singerman 1995). 
The administrative and institutional structure that has developed corresponds 
to the nature of a regime that primarily seeks ‘regime maintenance’ (Singerman 
1995: 12), ultimately resulting in excessive centralisation that hinders democratic 
decision-making and maintains power at the national executive level without 
accountability. The resulting difficulties and inefficiencies in urban governance have 
spurred discussion and attempts towards decentralisation. While there have been 
several approaches towards such decentralisation since the 1970s (El Hag 2015), 
most of these have not surpassed the theoretical level. However, after Egypt’s 2011 
revolution and the constitution of 2014 the Egyptian President, ‘Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, 
ordered the government to accelerate decentralisation reforms. Accordingly, a new 
Administrative Law has been proposed and is currently being reviewed and discussed 
Figure 1: Map of Greater Cairo
Source: TCID
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by the Egyptian parliament (Abu al-Mahasin 2018). This section investigates specific 
forms of centralisation, with a focus on the GCCR, suggesting how centralisation 
limits the overall capacity for effective urban governance. It also sheds light on 
current decentralisation approaches pursued to address some of these issues, and the 
limitations of these approaches.
Incongruent definition of the GCCR
Given the process of incremental interwoven urban expansion and layered growth that 
has resulted in a vibrant and complex urban fabric of the GCCR, its precise definition 
is difficult. We identify two methods through which to comprehend the city region: 
either by the Egyptian Planning System (EPS), or the city dynamics.
The EPS is based on the Unified Planning Law (UPL) no. 118/2008, and the 
Local Administration Law (LAL) no. 43/1979. According to the UPL, there are three 
levels of physical planning and spatial configurations; national, regional, and local. 
The General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP) prepares strategic physical 
plans for each of the three spatial levels.1 On the other hand, the constitution and 
LAL identify only national and local types of administration. At the same time, Egypt 
consists of seven economic regions, including (1) the GCCR, which was established 
according to the Presidential Decree of Egypt no. 495/1977, (2) Alexandria Region, (3) 
Delta Region, (4) Suez Canal Region, (5) North Upper Egypt Region, (6) South Upper 
Egypt Region, and (7) Asyut Region; each region consists of a number of governorates. 
The inefficient management of resources at the regional economic level is partially a 
result of the lack of local representation. 
The other definition of GCCR is based on spatial dynamics. In other words, it is the 
manifestation of where economic hubs concentrate, the distribution of industries, the 
connectivity between different urban areas, and the spatial configurations, etc. The 
complexity of these dynamics within a region such as Cairo is the primary challenge 
that confronts the various attempts to draw borders for GCCR. This unclearly defined 
area, which lies somewhere between the Cairo Governorate level and the GCCR, is 
not only the country’s largest urban area but is considered one of the most populous 
metropolises in the world with approximately 22.9 million inhabitants (CAPMAS 
2017). In 2008, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in cooperation 
with the GOPP conducted a study that suggested a border for GCCR that consisted of 
an area of 4 367km2 and included parts of the north-east governorate, al-Sharqiyya.2 
Four years later, GOPP released, in cooperation with UN-Habitat, a strategy for urban 
development within Greater Cairo that outlined another border for GCCR that covers 
an area of only 3 133km2. The border was identified based on three factors: the spatial 
relations between the different neighbourhoods, a common labour market, and the 
living conditions (GOPP, UN-Habitat & UNDP 2012). These unclear spatial limits of 
the GCCR further impede effective governance which is reflected administratively in 
1  The GOPP is the planning arm of the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development 
(MHUD).
2  There was no justification or methodology given in the JICA study for their demarcation of 
GCCR.
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the lack of a political figure or body that is explicitly responsible for coordinating GCCR-
wide development. One of the results of such administrative vs spatial discrepancy is 
the promotion of executive bodies and companies that override the jurisdiction of 
local authorities to implement city-wide projects across the governorates. A successful 
example of this is the ongoing Cairo Metro, which was facilitated by the establishment 
of separate entities to oversee construction and management, under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Transport rather than the governorates (NAT and the ECMMO). 
While this was essential for the success of such a project, it highlights the need for 
a local administration that spans the governorates, else the direct involvement of the 
central government will continue to be promoted.
Local administrative structures and national-executive influence
The president, the cabinet, the parliament, and the judiciary altogether form the national 
level of government, with the cabinet itself formed of the prime minister and thirty-
four heads of national ministries, who are directly appointed by the Egyptian president. 
Altogether they manage the state’s administrative and financial resources and determine 
laws to be implemented by the local-level government (Tadamun 2013). At the local 
level, Egypt is administered by 27 governorates, of which there are two types: urban 
governorates, and urban/rural governorates. Spatially, each governorate is divided 
hierarchically into districts in the urban governorates, and marakiz (singular markaz) in 
the rural governorates. The smallest spatial divisions in the governorates are shiyakhat 
(singular shiyakha) and villages in the urban and rural governorates, respectively. 
The GCCR, which comprises three separate governorates, has a particularly 
extensive local administrative body. The Cairo Governorate is an urban city-governorate 
– similar to the city-state concept in the federal systems – that extends over 3 084km2 
(Cairo Governorate 2016). The governorate accommodates approximately 9.6 million 
inhabitants living on 188km2 (CAPMAS 2017). It consists of four zones, each consisting 
of a number of districts, in addition to four new satellite cities. Giza is an urban/rural 
governorate that extends over 1 579km2 and accommodates approximately 8 million 
inhabitants, of which 58.6% are living in urban areas (Giza Governorate 2017). The 
urban parts of the governorate are divided into 8 districts and 79 shiyakhas and 2 
satellite cities. Likewise, Qalyubiyah is an urban/rural governorate extending over 
1 000km2 (CAPMAS 2016); the urban part is administratively divided into two districts 
and ten shiyakhas (Qalyubiyah Governorate 2016), and accommodates approximately 
5.8 million inhabitants, of which 44.7% are living in urban areas.
Despite such extensive institutional infrastructure and spatial subdivision, urban 
governance remains highly centralised. Administratively, each governorate – whether 
urban or rural – consists of several entities, of which some members are locally elected, 
that report to the governor. Each governor is appointed by Presidential Decree and, in 
turn, appoints the Heads of Districts within his governorate.3 In the special case of 
Cairo, the governor also designates four deputies at the head of each zone. As such, 
the entire local administration is inextricably tied to the central government through 
the state’s patrimonial political character.
3 Note that the shiyakhat administratively follow the district and do not have separate chiefs.
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Dispersed finances 
While key figures within local administration are directly influenced by central 
government, often becoming more concerned with pleasing their superiors 
(Tadamun 2013), the actual capacity of local government to exercise their powers 
is severely limited by their control, or lack thereof, of financial resources. The local 
administration structure (as outlined by the Local Administration Law No. (43/1979)) 
in Egypt gives full executive authority to governors while limiting their financial 
authority. For example, there are some entities within each governorate, namely the 
directorates, that administratively follow the governor but financially follow their 
corresponding sectoral ministries. It is worth noting also that the national budget is 
unevenly distributed between national ministries and local governorates, with each 
receiving 90% and 10% respectively. Even where local administration has the financial 
authority in theory, in practice, budgets were devised by the central ministries and 
the executive councils of the local administration, and approved by the Ministry of 
Finance before being implemented by local administrators (Tadamun 2013). 
Moreover, local administration is heavily reliant on central government for revenue, 
with Article 184 stipulating the responsibility of central government to provide the local 
administration with resources (Tadamun 2013). While local administrations enjoy the 
legal capacity to collect and spend local taxes, a report by Tadamun has recently shown 
this independent revenue to be mostly insignificant, with locally elected officials being 
reluctant to risk the political disfavour of imposing such taxes, thus ‘reinforcing the 
centralised nature of governance’ (Tadamun 2013). These dynamics are made explicit 
when investigating overall public expenditure which highlights the disproportionate 
expenditure by central administration (79%) compared to that of local administration 
(12%) (Tadamun 2013). This financial dependency on central government results 
in the need for approval of expenditures from the centre which often has priorities 
that are incongruent with local needs, thus reducing local government to a simple 
administrative role. This is made worse by the patrimonial character of both central 
and local government administration, ultimately limiting the capacity for effective and 
accountable local governance.
While institutional mechanisms that facilitate local governance exist, local 
administration is far from independent from central government. Its primary 
actors are appointed through direct patronage from primary political figures, while 
local budgets are significantly monitored and limited by the priorities of the central 
government. Local administration lacks the combination of executive and financial 
authority to facilitate effective local governance. In the specific case of the GCCR, 
incongruent spatial and administrative delimitations lead to an inadequate definition 
of responsibilities and cross-governorate coherence that encourages reliance on 
executive boards and companies for the fulfilment of large-scale urban projects. 
These executive boards, which often enjoy the administrative and financial support of 
leading politicians, become crucial to facilitating the execution of complex projects but 
often render urban development responses to exclusive top-down visions rather than 
a response to local needs. The following section will detail some of the effects of these 
manifestations of centralisation on the actual urban development plans and projects, 
highlighting the crucial limitations of such administrative and financial centrality.
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Approaches to decentralisation on the national level
Decentralisation has been high on the political agenda in many countries in Africa, as 
an integral component to development, throughout the last few decades. According 
to Laila El Baradei (2015: 3), decentralisation involves ‘de-concentration, delegation, 
devolution, and may encompass privatization as well.’ 
In Egypt, there have been numerous attempts to reform the Local Administration 
Law and empower local authorities. The 2014 Constitution took the first legislative 
step towards addressing this issue by supporting decentralisation in Article 176, 
which stipulates: ‘The state ensures support for administrative, financial, and 
economic decentralisation. The law organises empowering administrative units in 
providing, improving, and managing public utilities well, and defines the timeline for 
transferring powers and budgets to the local administration units.’ While this was a 
positive step towards administrative, fiscal, and economic decentralisation, the LAL 
did not provide the elements necessary for the execution of full decentralisation and 
thereby limits the role of local authorities. A study that was conducted by Tadamun 
in 2015 suggests that the law only gave Local Popular Councils (LPCs) an advisory 
role while the central government and appointed executive councils maintained a 
monopoly over decision-making. It is important to note that the LPCs’ elections have 
been suspended since the 2011 revolution and were planned to be resumed by the end 
of 2018 (Ramadan 2017).
On the other hand, the new Draft Law contains 18 new articles, most of which regulate 
the relationship between different local-level authorities and the central government, 
and set the basis for local government capacity building. However, affirming that the 
enactment of the new law would establish the base for a radical decentralisation of 
governance is still guesswork. Wunsch (2001: 278) explains that the reasons for delays 
in applying top-down decentralisation reforms include the wearing down of political 
will at the local level: ‘local governance is discouraged by the absence of real decisions, 
and local civil service administrators can distribute capital resources, often for their 
comfort and convenience, and manage their local work lives without disturbance from 
local demands.’ This has over time already diminished the capacity of local government 
to manage decision-making and financial resources effectively, thus rendering the 
professional capacities of local government themselves an obstacle. 
These attempted legal reforms following and guided by the 2014 Constitution 
offer an example of the possibilities and challenges of top-down steps towards 
decentralisation. However, while many studies have shied away from analytically 
questioning the strategies of decentralisation, Heller (2001) divides approaches to 
decentralisation into two categories, technocratic/top-down approach, and anarcho-
communitarians (ACs)/bottom-up approach. He explains that while the technocratic 
approach ‘produces universally applicable blueprints, and decentralisation-by-design 
promises smooth implementation’ (2001: 137), ACs claim that the technocratic 
approach reproduces the ‘elite-controlled characteristics of post-colonial states’ (2001: 
135). With the absence of a comprehensive top-down implementation of formal 
decentralisation, non-governmental and local civic organisations can thus, in this 
context, play a vital role in supporting community participation and offer models for 
bottom-up decentralisation, which will be reviewed in the next section. 
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Exploring centralisation at different scales of governance
Within this complex context of administrative and financial centralisation coupled 
with various attempts towards decentralisation, this section sheds light on the 
intricate and nuanced effects of centralisation and its practical limitations on urban 
governance strategies. It provides a series of case studies exploring on-the-ground 
urban projects at a cross section of scales of governance, unpacking centralisation 
(and possible decentralisation) at the national, regional and local scales.
The national scale: Desert cities
Desert city expansions have been at the forefront of Egyptian planning policy since the 
1970s and are typically high-profile projects with presidential patronage. Conceived 
at the national scale of governance and directly implemented, they manifest a highly 
centralised form of urban governance that has dramatically impacted the urban growth 
of the GCCR over the last few decades. Despite these projects attracting significant 
criticism, in 2017 the Egyptian government inaugurated the establishment of yet 
another new city, the New Administrative Capital, 60km east of the centre of Cairo. 
The vision of the New Capital aims to overcome the shortcomings of the previous 
experiences of previous desert cities, claiming to focus on best practices in design, 
ecology and culture and will have a variety of medium and high-density districts to 
address the issues of land constraints and population density. The New Capital is 
also planned to host the many public administrative authorities and business centres 
which aim to work as a catalyst for creating synergistic job opportunities for the 
country’s youth (Capital City 2015). 
This project is the most recent in a longstanding tradition of urban desert expansions 
as a form of city management, which claim that such expansions will result in the 
movement of populations that would alleviate a variety of pressures within the urban 
core of the GCCR. In his 2014 book, Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster, 
David Sims provides an in-depth economic, social and urban management analysis of 
the desert urban expansions (new cities) policy. Despite the prevalence of this urban 
strategy, Sims concludes that ‘any desert project whose justification is moving large 
numbers of people out of the [Nile] Valley should be laughed out of the room’ (Sims 2014: 
292). Similarly, at the Egypt Urban Forum 2015 (EUF), urban researcher Yahia Shawkat 
highlighted the relative failures of previous desert expansion projects in response to 
Asim al-Jazzar’s summary of the NSUP 2052 vision. Shawkat suggests that ‘more effort 
should be made to identify those who are willing and unwilling to relocate in order to 
implement projects more effectively [in the proposed plans]’ (UN-Habitat 2016: 32). 
Nonetheless, while the existing desert cities, some of which are still under construction 
and others established over 30 years ago, are still not achieving their targeted populations, 
there is a continued intention to invest in new towns despite heavy criticism from many 
in the urban planning field that this investment could be part of the problem (Tadamun 
2015). This was particularly highlighted at the EUF, where Asim al-Jazzar, chairman 
of the General Organization for Physical Planning, summarised the key strategy for 
dealing with population growth: ‘The main vision of the 2052 [National Strategic Urban 
Plan (NSUP)] is to expand beyond current urban areas and effectively double the current 
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area of inhabited land in the country’ (UN-Habitat 2016: 30). It is thus clear that the 
developmental future of the GCCR remains heavily tied to a vision for the movement of 
the population away from existing urban cores across the entire country, and the plan 
includes several expansion projects in other cities. 
The persistence of these longstanding urban development strategies, which have 
proven largely ineffective, are reflective of narrow and linear governance mechanisms 
that continue to reproduce out-of-touch top-down proposals, without benefitting 
from the breadth of the national and local institutional network or serving to develop 
their expertise and capacities. These projects bypass the local administration in the 
process of their inception, more reflecting the grandiose visions and claims of high-
level politicians than a response to studied urban needs and challenges. However, 
while the adequacy or efficiency of the strategy may be critiqued, the national level 
of administration through which these projects are proposed and coordinated is 
appropriate for this scale of urban planning. Through the centralised national-level 
administration such large-scale urban projects have been feasibly financed and 
constructed. The specific failures of these desert city projects are particularly revealed 
at the smaller scales of governance.
When ‘new cities’ have been implemented within a governorate’s spatial 
jurisdiction, the administrative responsibilities are organised separately from the local 
government. The seven new satellite cities located within the GCCR, administratively 
follow the New Urban Community Authority (NUCA) rather than the governorate 
within which they are located.4 A city council is formed to operate and manage each 
new city and is appointed directly rather than being a representative elected body 
such as the Local Councils established across the governorates. These New Urban 
Communities report directly to the Ministry of Housing, a national body, leaving these 
new cities with no institutional mechanism for local governance, let alone an effective 
one. According to Law no. 59/1979, when this new city development is completed, its 
administration would supposedly return to the corresponding governorate. However, 
until now, such transfer of power is yet to happen. The effects of such absence of 
municipal government and attention was exemplified in the poor management of and 
inadequate response to severe flooding that severely impacted the desert city of New 
Cairo in late April 2018. 
Conceived, administered and financed separately to existing local administrative 
structures, the pattern of desert expansion exemplifies the effects of excessive 
governmental centralisation on urban development. These projects, instead, are 
manifestations of top-down visions that are removed from everyday realities, and 
which correlate closely to the kinds of proposals found in the aforementioned urban 
vision documents. These case studies illustrate and highlight some of the inefficiencies 
of centralised government as they relate to city management. The resultant condition 
is excessive investment in projects and proposals that draw on a limited selection of 
expertise (of the highest-level politicians) and that bypass the authority and potential 
local experience of local government. Ultimately, this results in a weakening of local 
administrations, in both their professional capacity and effectiveness in serving as a 
channel for bottom-up democratic participation.
4  NUCA is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Housing and is governed according to Law no. 59/1979.
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The regional scale: The Cairo Metro Project
In a 1954 report issued by French experts on the future of transport in Egypt, a proposal 
for a two-line metro was made as well as the recommendation for the unification of 
separate transport companies into a single national transportation corporation. Over 
the next two decades, several studies were conducted by a variety of international 
parties that unanimously emphasised the necessity to implement a metro system, 
however, the political and economic circumstances of the time delayed action. In 1969, 
a growing crisis in public transportation led the Council of Ministers, with support 
from then president Gamal Abdel Nasser, to reignite serious study of the project, 
despite the post-war conditions. Accordingly, in September 1970, a tender held by 
the Ministry of Transportation was awarded to the French company, SUFRETO (now 
SYSTRA), which proceeded with further studies (MOIC 2016). The 1981–1983 GC 
master plan was the first to substantially incorporate transportation upgrading within 
the vision of GCCR’s comprehensive development and stipulated the intentions to 
implement the Metro system and Ring Road to ‘improve the efficiency of the transport 
system’ (Word Bank 2000).
The Cairo Metro has since become one of GCCR’s fastest and most successful 
methods of mobility within the congested city, with continuously increasing levels of 
demand. The implementation of the project also successfully spans across the Cairo and 
Giza governorates, indicating a degree of intra-governorate efficiency and cooperation 
not common in urban projects in the GCCR. This success is largely a result of the 
establishment of separate entities to oversee construction and management who are 
each under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport rather than the governorates. 
The National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) was established in 1983 as a governmental 
agency of the Ministry of Transport to undertake the construction of the Metro system 
and has since been responsible for other large-scale tunnelling projects. The NAT has 
also been responsible for conducting the necessary technical and economic research 
related to the project (NAT 2013). 
Such executive regional bodies bypassed an inefficient local administration, and its 
related limitations, to ensure successful management and implementation across the 
involved governorates. The project instead relied on an executive form of government 
stemming from the national and acting on the regional scale. Acting at this regional 
scale of implementation and coordination, the project was ultimately relatively 
successful. However, this scale is not integrated within the existing institutional 
structure but develops as a case-specific solution, highlighting the need for this scale 
of governance in the GCCR to facilitate projects of this size and complexity. Without 
the institutionalisation of this scale, which represents a middle ground between the 
national and local (and the highly centralised and the decentralised), urban projects 
will continue to fail to coordinate across the GCCR’s three governorates or resort 
to arrangements such as those used in the Cairo Metro project, which are also not 
without limitations.
A World Bank report (2000) suggests that ‘fragmented institutional arrangements’ 
across the transport sector in the GCCR, which is a consistent feature of Cairene 
administrations, has led to the unclear delineation of responsibilities and reduced 
overall efficiency. Despite already being a successful and vital element of the GCCR’s 
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public transport network, the Cairo Metro’s full potential has not yet been realised 
due to its slow progress and poor integration with other transport systems; an effect 
of the many bodies addressing transport infrastructure (World Bank 2000). For the 
Metro to work effectively as a solution to the GCCR’s congestion and transportation 
ills, a comprehensive approach must be taken that allows all systems to work together, 
and the progress of the metro project should be assessed in relation to other modes of 
transport, including surface services such as the public buses of the Cairo Transport 
Authorities (CTA). 
While the administrative arrangement of the Cairo Metro project offered an 
appropriate scale of governance for the project, resorting to such a partnership between 
national executive administration and private companies was necessitated as a direct 
result of the forms of centralisation detailed in section two, ultimately resulting in 
poor coordination with the wider GCCR transport sector. Rather than representing a 
successful model for project implementation, the more effective lesson derived from 
this project is the crucial need for this scale of regional governance across the GCCR. 
Such regional level governance needs to be integrated within the institutional system, 
with responsibilities towards and communication with both sides of the administrative 
hierarchy – the national and the local.
The local scale: Participatory approaches
During the last decade, the United Nations have promoted the compartmentship of 
state, civil society organisation, and private sector, as an alternative to traditional state-
led governance/development. This part highlights examples of bottom-up endeavours 
that try to make up for the lack of local governance and mechanisms through which 
the local voice can be heard. Within the context of the GCCR explored throughout 
this chapter, these endeavours attempt to compensate for shortcomings in the local 
governance structures. Two pilot public space interventions are examined here as 
approaches to local integration and decentralisation: a public space and environmental 
upgrading project in ‘Izbit Khayrallah,5 an informal urban settlement in Cairo, by 
the community development organisation Takween in 2016 (Takween 2017) and a 
pilot public passageway intervention in downtown Cairo by CLUSTER, a platform for 
urban research, art and design initiatives (Nagati & Stryker 2016).
In 2016, Takween started a pilot public space and environmental upgrading project 
in ‘Izbit Khayrallah with funds from the Embassy of Switzerland in Egypt and the 
sponsorship of Cairo Governorate. Takween designed the project to help the local 
community overcome the negative repercussions of the establishment of a regional 
ring road that connects Egypt’s main roads and different governorates. The Ring Road 
divided ‘Izbit Khayrallah into northern and southern areas, excluding the southern 
community who depended on the northern area to access different services. After 
conducting needs assessment and documentation of the current situation, interviews, 
and workshops with different stakeholders, including the local community, a tunnel 
5  ‘Izbit Khayrallah is one of the largest unplanned settlements in Cairo, it falls between four 
districts: Misr al-Qadima, Dar al-Salam, al-Basatin, and al-Khalifa. For more information, see 
https://forgottenneighborhoods.wordpress.com/tag/izbit-khayrallah/.
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connecting the southern and northern areas has been chosen for development. In 
a similar vein, in 2014, CLUSTER conducted a participatory workshop to redesign 
and upgrade two public passageways in downtown Cairo – Kodak and Phillips 
passageways – in cooperation with the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) 
and the Center for Culture and Development (CKU). CLUSTER has worked with 
different stakeholders, including property owners and passersby, according to the 
DEDI website the project ‘[…] contributes to larger issues related to public space and 
emerging questions around participatory planning’ (DEDI 2014).
While such bottom-up approaches do reach and impact formal government, 
they usually have minimal impact on national policies and the overall process of 
decision-making. Their value lies in their enriching of urban interventions and urban 
governance strategies with the necessary local bottom-up expertise that limits out-of-
touch proposals characteristic of those of central government. Through the repeated 
implementation of these projects, and the necessary collaboration with local authorities, 
new governance mechanisms can also begin to take shape, affecting institutional 
mechanisms from below. For example, the passageway renovation undertaken by 
CLUSTER in downtown Cairo involved an extensive process of consultation and 
negotiation between different stakeholders, including passersby, passageway shop 
renters, the building owners and the local authorities (Nagati & Stryker 2016). The 
maintenance of the project required the establishment of a ‘passageway board’ that 
sought to mediate an agreement for the delegation of maintenance responsibilities 
between relevant parties, ensuring that the key stakeholders in the space both bear 
responsibility and are represented in the future management of the semi-public space. 
This method, which can be viewed as a localised form of urban governance, was then 
adopted by the local authorities when they renovated other nearby passageways, based 
on CLUSTER’s precedent.6  
In the politically sensitive conditions of post-revolution Cairo, these projects present 
alternative options for a move towards decentralisation and local representation in 
government strategies. While their larger effect on existing centralisation is currently 
relatively small, these forms of urban intervention practice have become a growing 
sector within the urban studies and practice field, highlighting a possible way forward 
towards political reform. Perhaps more pertinently, however, the relative productivity 
and sustainability of projects conducted in such a manner, when compared to the top-
down interventions often pursued through national executive bodies, highlights the 
need for the efficiency of such a scale of governance for effective urban management 
and investment. Unlike the regional scale, local administration does exist within the 
GCCR’s institutional structure, but as described in the first section of this chapter, 
it is ultimately ineffective, lacking the combination of administrative and financial 
authority to fulfil its role, ultimately affecting its capacity as a channel for citizen needs 
and voices and government accountability.
6  The most notable example of this is the renovation of al-Alfi Bey passageway in downtown 
Cairo, not far from the Kodak passageway intervention. 
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Conclusion
This chapter has explored some of the administrative characteristics of the Egyptian 
government and their effect on urban and spatial state-led development practices. 
The highly centralised nature of the public administration system in Egypt is evident 
in several regards, most notably in the role of local administration on the governorate 
level. Limited powers are given to governorates and local authorities in the final 
planning and budget allocation in matters supposedly within their jurisdiction, and 
city administrations are often mandated with the development of their region but do 
not always have full control over the allocation and prioritisation of their financial 
resources. This leaves the governor, the perceived ultimate authority to the public, 
burdened by administrative duties and public expectations to address problems in 
their governorate but they do not have control of their budget. 
For a public entity to be effective it needs administrative representation with a 
clear mandate, decision-making authority, and allocated financial resources. Greater 
Cairo currently has none of the above, and despite numerous proposals, each area 
operates within – and is developed by – its own governorate, with little collaboration 
or coordination between them. Administrative and financial decentralisation in 
the GCCR are challenges that have yet to be seriously and productively addressed 
and are found to be an intrinsic hindrance for the region’s development. In Egypt, 
local governments only receive and have experience with relatively small budgets 
amounting up to 10% of the overall budget, an issue compounded by a general 
condition of institutional weakness inherent to the state’s authoritarian nature, 
resulting in widespread incompetence throughout all levels of government, that is 
exaggerated at the local level (Dorman 2007). These are issues that require attention if 
political decentralisation is to be successfully implemented. The two case studies from 
TCID and CLUSTER highlight how locally orientated organisations and institutions 
can play a vital role in offering new models of participation that can add to a more 
comprehensive bottom-up decentralisation system.
Finally, rather than falling into a simplistic binary of centralisation versus 
decentralisation, this chapter has argued for a more nuanced understanding of the 
multiple levels of urban governance, on the national, regional and local scales. The 
case studies explored within the Greater Cairo City Region offer examples of planning 
and urban development strategies addressing the three scales and highlighting the 
particular challenges of excessive centralisation at each. On the one hand, national 
centralised planning excludes possibilities of local participation, resulting in inefficient 
urban expenditure and out-of-touch urban interventions and management, thus 
requiring a form of decentralisation that delegates more decision-making powers to 
the regional and local scales for specific projects and programmes. Conversely, while 
small-scale interventions on neighborhood and community scales may provide lessons 
for direct engagement and bottom-up approaches, they cannot be effectively scaled-
up without addressing larger planning considerations, such as traffic, environmental 
concerns as well as labour and capital flows, which cannot solely be addressed through 
the local scale of governance. As such, whilst the GCCR requires an overall delegation 
of administrative and financial authority from the national level, it is also essential 
that the institutional structure allows for a coordinating governing body across the 
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three governorates and multiple municipalities within the GCCR. Such a move would 
represent a middle ground between the predominant trend of centralisation and the 
calls for decentralisation. Through the discussion of examples of urban planning and 
development projects at these scales, this chapter thus raises the question of which 
policies, programmes and projects should be assigned to which level of governance, 
addressing some strategies on a more centralised scale to safeguard the public 
good, while delegating necessary local decisions through a matrix of decentralised 
governmentalities to empower communities and enable genuine participation. 
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CHAPTER 5
Traditional chiefs and  
traditional authority in Kinshasa
Philippe Ibaka Sangu
Introduction
After gaining their independence, many an African national government has used 
its capital city to symbolise the emergence of a new nation and to reflect its central 
authority. However, these two processes have not been uniform since different 
postcolonial regimes have developed approaches to nation building and to state 
formation at different stages and in differing ways (Bekker & Therborn 2012). This is 
true of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where, after its independence in 
1960, four successive regimes (between 1960 and 2016) have intervened in the built 
environment of the capital city.
The aim of this chapter is to identify which policies and practices these postcolonial 
regimes have applied to traditional chiefs in Kinshasa and how traditional authorities 
in this capital city have adapted to these interventions. Moreover, the ways these chiefs 
and their authority structures have adapted vary both over time as well as in different 
zones of the capital city. In other words, the various forms of coexistence of traditional 
and modern urban institutions are fixed neither in time nor in space (Ibaka 2019).
A concise history of the capital city culminating in the introduction of modern 
urban institutions will first be presented. This section will include a discussion of the 
demarcation into three zones of the geographical region of what is now the province of 
Kinshasa. Subsequently, traditional chiefs and traditional authorities both in the DRC 
and in Kinshasa will be presented. This is followed by examples of exchanges between 
central governments and traditional chiefs in Kinshasa during the postcolonial period.
The 1980s establishment of a national legal institution designed to legalise the 
coexistence (cohabitation) of the state and traditional authorities changed the nature 
of this relationship in the DRC as a whole. Its application to chiefs in Kinshasa will 
be identified as an important milestone in the process of traditional chiefly adaptation 
in the capital city. The focus will then shift to a discussion of the different ways in 
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which traditional chiefs have adapted to urban realities in each of the three zones of 
Kinshasa. Evidence from three case studies including interviews carried out by the 
author (Ibaka 2019), one in each zone, will supplement this analysis. A key feature of 
these divergent processes of adaptation is the issue of land tenure.
The informal nature of service delivery for most Kinshasa residents is the context 
within which conclusions will be drawn. It appears that most chiefly authority in the 
capital city is diminishing, though a degree of coexistence (cohabitation) endures.
The development of Kinshasa as the capital city of an independent 
DRC
During the period from 1888 to 1910, Léopoldville was the capital of Stanley-Pool, 
one of the administrative districts of the colonial Belgian Congo. From 1910 to 1930, 
Léopoldville became the capital of the district of Moyen-Congo and, in 1929, the city 
became the seat of all colonial state departments. This administrative situation was 
retained until Congo became independent in 1960 (Kiaku Mayamba Niangi 2015: 33).
Léopoldville did not legally gain the status of a city until June 1941. Earlier, it was 
designated as an ‘urban district’ and was divided into two zones: the urban zone and 
the indigenous zone in the south (Munayi Muntu-Monji 2010: 49). Over the last 
two decades before independence, the city grew rapidly in size and incorporated the 
neighbouring settlement of Kimwenza (Kiaku Mayamba Niangi 2015: 34). On 30 June 
1960, with a population of 443 000, Léopoldville became the capital of independent 
Congo and it was not until the Ordinance Law of 1968 that the city took on the name, 
Kinshasa (Kiaku Mayamba Niangi 2015: 35). Kinshasa was granted the status of a 
province in 1982, enabling it to receive the same powers and responsibilities as those 
of all the country’s other provinces. As a province, it was governed by an appointed 
governor at the head of a provincial government tasked with implementing central 
government directives to modernise the city. In 1982, its population was 2 338 000, a 
figure that had risen to 12 624 000 by 2017 (Populationstat 2020).
The names of the presidents who have reigned over national governments in 
the DRC may be used to identify the four postcolonial regimes: Joseph Kasa-Vubu 
(1960–1965), Joseph Désiré Mobutu (1965–1997), Laurent Désiré Kabila pere (1997–
2001) and Joseph Kabila Kabange fils (2001–2016). As the first president, Kasa-Vubu 
promoted the ideals of  l’ABAKO (Alliance or Association of the Bakongo), an ethnicity-
based cultural movement that was transformed into a political party on the eve of 
independence. Subsequently, during his lengthy period of rule, Mobutu employed the 
rhetoric of nationalism under single party rule (N’Sele Manifesto 1965: 6). It was during 
this regime that the National Alliance of Traditional Authorities of Congo (ANATC), 
a national legal institution designed to legalise the coexistence (cohabitation) of the 
state and traditional authorities, was promulgated. The short and conflictual tenure 
of Laurent Kabila culminated in his assassination and the presidential regime of his 
son. Joseph Kabila Kabange employed the rhetoric of ‘revolution of modernity’ to call 
for both industrial as well as agricultural reforms in the DRC (Kambila Kankwende 
wa Mpunga 2017: 131). 
The classification of the national economy of the DRC as that of a rentier economy – 
where access to its enormous natural wealth is controlled by the national government 
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and its associated elites – has been both a shared characteristic and the main driver of 
development during the last three regimes, those of Mobutu, Kabila pere, and Kabila 
fils. Both Kabila presidents have, in this respect, reproduced the Mobutu system of 
patrimonial governance. The DRC has major ongoing security challenges (especially 
in north Kivu), an economy that is broadly informal and a history of distrust between 
ordinary citizens and elites (Trefon 2009: 16). Accordingly, the relationships between 
chiefs in Kinshasa and DRC presidents were driven by the chiefs’ attempts to reconcile 
themselves with the patrimonial system and to gain where they could from the wealth 
controlled at the top. 
Kinshasa’s current economy is also largely informal. The primary sector includes 
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing and forestry, industrial sector manufacturing, 
mining and construction; and the service sector – as may be expected in a capital 
city – includes hotels and restaurants, repair services, leisure activities, tourism as 
well as domestic services, utilities, business services, banking and financial services, 
transport and telecommunications. Nevertheless, the informal non-agricultural and 
the informal agricultural sector are significantly larger than their formal counterparts.
The postcolonial urban development of Kinshasa began in earnest at the start of 
the Mobutu regime. On 2 December 1968, a city ordinance was promulgated which 
incorporated into the city of Kinshasa the traditional Bahumbu and Batéké sectors 
as well as the Benkana chieftaincy as municipalities. A state decree in 1969 saw the 
number of city municipalities rise to 24. In terms of this decree, the vast majority 
of suburban areas neighbouring the former colonial city centre were established as 
municipalities (Munayi Muntu-Monji 2010: 283). In each, an appointed bourgmestre 
headed up the municipal council which in turn was tasked with the modernisation 
attempts initiated by the city and, subsequently, the provincial government. By the 
year 2011, the physical area of Kinshasa (and its resident population) had grown 
significantly. The population growth was due both to in-migration as well as to the 
incorporation of rural, traditional communities within new and expanded provincial 
boundaries. From the 1970s, accordingly, modern urban institutions – the municipal 
council, the municipality itself and municipal courts (often called peace courts) – were 
Figure 1. The three zones defined by urban planning and land tenure, Kinshasa 2011
Source: De Saint Moulin (2011: 28); adaptation (author) 2018
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proclaimed to cover Kinshasa’s geographical area, with varying degrees of success or 
failure regarding service delivery.
As shown in Figure 1, the physical area of Kinshasa may be considered to comprise 
three zones, each defined by city planning and land tenure criteria: the former colonial 
centre (ancienne cité), the planned region outside this centre (cités planifiées) and the 
periphery (périphèrie) where neither city planning nor state land tenure regulations in 
the municipal areas of jurisdiction have been applied comprehensively.
Traditional chiefs and traditional authorities in Kinshasa
A brief overview of the postcolonial legal context of traditional authority in the DRC 
points toward two forms of access to such authority. The first is the rotating form, in 
which the different lineages arising from clans having the same origin and a common 
ancestor rule alternately. The second is the non-rotating or fixed form, in which the 
descendants of the lineage of the ruling clan are exclusively granted recognition as 
leaders, without power sharing (Article 15 of the Vade Mecum). After being appointed 
according to customary rules, leaders are enthroned as chiefs. This distinction has 
resulted in a number of cases of disputes over power and administration within the 
chieftaincy. The effective power of the traditional chief consists of three elements: 
the investiture of the chief who then enjoys indisputable power; the possession of 
a territory (chieftaincy or grouping) whose boundaries are known to its neighbours 
and the tenure of which is customary; and the issuing of a decree of recognition by 
the public authorities, issued by the minister of internal affairs (Article 13 of the Vade 
Mecum). 
When a chieftaincy finds itself in an urban area, three primary challenges to the 
legitimacy of its authority develop.
The first is simply that the process of urbanisation draws large numbers of migrants 
from various clans into the territory of the chieftaincy, outsiders who do not recognise 
the traditional authority of the chief and the traditional institutions of his chieftaincy. 
The second is the establishment in this territory of modern urban institutions, such 
as the municipality, its council and court, and its bourgmestre; institutions that propose 
for residents rules other than those proposed by traditional institutions. 
Third, and of primary concern, is the issue of land tenure. Chiefs supervise land 
under communal tenure. As claimed by a chief in 2018: under communal tenure, the 
role of the chief is not to sell land; he gives it to those who ask for it for their use, at 
the price of various gifts from the beneficiary. The chief shares the fruit of the sale of 
the land with his family; the community finds its share in work and other community 
activities created by the transfer (Ngandoli Musoni, interview conducted in Kinshasa 
on 7 November 2016). In the urban context, however, land reform promotes state and 
private ownership of land by using a process of cadastral surveying and registration.
Accordingly, it is apparent that chieftaincies within the boundaries of the 
province of Kinshasa – whether they have claims as original residents or are migrant 
chieftaincies – are required to adapt to all three challenges. Before turning to the 
ANATC – a legal association intended to regulate traditional-state affairs in the DRC – 
and how chieftaincies have coped with adaption in Kinshasa, the following presents a 
description of a number of examples of exchanges between central governments and 
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traditional chiefs in Kinshasa during the postcolonial period.
In the decade between 1970 and 1980, the central government under Mobutu 
planned a number of hillside urban settlements in Kinshasa. They included Cité 
Salongo in Lemba, Cité Maman Mobutu in Mont-Ngafula, Cité Verte and the Cité 
de l’Habitat pour l’Humanité (Habitat for Humanity) in Selembao. These cities were 
built on steep slopes of the hillsides and formed part of what has become the planned 
zone of the capital city (Lelo Nzuzi 2008: 60). In addition, during the Mobutu period, 
a presidential stock breeding centre was established in the municipality of N’sele. The 
president interacted personally with the chiefs of the Nguma and Mabana clans and 
this breeding centre created employment for local residents.
During the regime of Kabila pere (1997–2001), the president established a central 
Department of National Agriculture and obtained arable land in the municipal area of 
Kingakati/Plateau-Maluku in Kinshasa. Production was intended for the markets of 
the capital city as well as for what was called ‘strategic reserves.’ These developments 
are reported to have taken place by way of collaboration between the president and 
local chiefs. Similarly, during the regime of Kabila fils (2001–2019), collaboration 
with local chiefs is reported to have led to the purchase by the president of a farm at 
Kingakati for personal use. In both cases, agricultural employment for locals had been 
created (Mudi Nini-Manshwo, interview conducted in Kinshasa on 27 January 2018).
Figure 2. Chief Ebalavo M. Davin, Groupement Kimwenza à Mont Ngafula
Source: Author (Kinshasa, December 2017)
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The establishment of the ANATC and its activities in Kinshasa
Prior to the establishment of the ANATC in 1995, the traditional chiefs of Kinshasa 
had already organised themselves into the Téké-Humbu Committee of traditional 
chiefs. The aim of this committee was to settle disputes related to traditional rights 
and to ensure the development of the communal lands they believed belonged to their 
ancestors, the first occupants of Kinshasa. Toward the end of the Mobutu regime, 
the central government decided, for the DRC as a whole, to create an Association – 
the National Alliance of Traditional Authorities of Congo (ANATC) – to oversee the 
involvement of traditional chiefs in the affairs of the country and to promote grassroots 
development in their areas of jurisdiction (Article 3 of the Articles of Association). 
The ANATC is managed by a National Committee that delegates powers to Basic 
Committees each of which is responsible for traditional affairs in a province (Articles 
52–53 of the Articles of Association). Its head office is in Kinshasa.
In 2004, an extraordinary general assembly of ANATC adopted the ANATC’s 
Internal Regulations. Its secretary-general, Chief Pene Mayenge, in his opening 
address, recalled that the Association had become disorderly due to the lack of 
competent and effective leadership. ‘This situation,’ he said, ‘has resulted in us 
missing a lot of opportunities in the face of the political issues of the day. The Alliance 
has lost all its credibility both inside and outside (Kinshasa and) the country as a whole. 
This is why we have decided to convene this Assembly, so that we can speak the same 
language, [...] and set up a new National Executive Committee that can help us reshape 
our story’ (General Assembly 2004: 6). The issue of weak leadership was put down 
to disagreements, inter alia, in Kinshasa, between traditional chiefs who had entered 
into bargains with political and administrative authorities in conflict with one another 
as well as with the guidelines of the Association.
Despite these difficulties, the governor of the province of Kinshasa appointed six 
members of the arbitration commission of ANATC to deal with customary disputes. 
Numerous cases have been heard and two recent cases may be mentioned as 
examples. The first involved disputes in the Kingakati clan in Maluku, and the second 
in the Mikondo clan in N’sele. The Kingakati case concerned the hereditary Chief 
Mudi Ferdinand and the self-appointed Chief Munkani who, not being a legitimate 
successor, was removed from office. Similarly, the Mikondo dispute concerned 
hereditary Chief Ndola Luzayadio and the pretender, the self-appointed Chief Moba 
Embama (Esim Eyum, interview conducted in Kinshasa on 4 March 2018).
Within the periphery zone of Kinshasa, some 20 ‘sectional committees’ (associated 
with ANATC and tasked to identify disputes) in the three peripheral municipalities 
have been established: ten in Maluku, five in N’sele and six in Mont Ngafula (General 
Assembly 2004: 24–25). Nonetheless, a number of chiefs of the Téké-Humbu clans of 
Kinshasa have stated with bitterness that insecurity has become the norm in the city, 
the actions of ANATC notwithstanding. Chiefs of the Téké-Humbu clan, moreover, 
called upon urban development agents to provide employment opportunities in the 
domains of agriculture and road works in their areas of jurisdiction (General Assembly 
2004: 25).
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Adaptation of chiefs in the three zones of the province of Kinshasa
In Kinshasa, traditional authorities and their chiefs are compelled to coexist with the 
city’s modern urban institutions and with the directives of the central government. 
In this context, the establishment of ANATC may be viewed as a legal framework 
defining the coexistence (cohabitation) of tradition, state and private sector in an 
urban environment. Coexistence in this sense is a form of adaptation of traditional 
authorities to the urban environment.
Adaptation in the ancienne cité of Kinshasa 
Urban growth within this section of Kinshasa has led to the displacement of 
traditional villages. During colonial occupation, sites on the banks of the Congo River 
were developed for colonial use and the villages of Kintambo, Kinshasa, Kingabwa, 
and Ndolo (amongst others) were required to resettle to the south, inland from the 
river. After independence, this urban extension absorbed other villages within its 
boundaries. In short, rather than being able to adapt, the traditional way of life has 
been displaced entirely from this zone. Traditional authorities faced with increasing 
numbers of strangers in their territories, the loss of their communal land, and modern 
urban institutions imposing new ways of living either attempted to resettle elsewhere 
in the city or were recognised by the ANATC as honorary chiefs, chiefs in name only.
Adaptation in the planned zone of Kinshasa (the case of Makala-Lemba)
Given rising population densities in the cites of this zone, chiefs and their traditional 
institutions have had to cope with growing numbers of ‘foreigners’ who wish to live 
among the local indigenous people. Formally, these outsiders receive land to occupy 
by providing gifts to the chief. After having settled down, they enjoy the rights of 
usufruct under one condition: never interfere in the internal affairs of local customs 
(Ngandoli Musoni, interview conducted in Kinshasa on 7 November 2016). In theory, 
the chief and his people learn to live with the newcomers in the village or city. 
The case of the chief of the Makala-Lemba clan – located in this zone – however, is 
sobering. He is one among many Kinshasa chiefs who have sold all their land and have 
no customary village in which to exercise their traditional authority. ‘The chiefs in the 
middle of the city have hardly any space,’ states Sabakinu (Sabakinu Kivilu, interview 
conducted in Kinshasa on 17 January 2017). More generally, in the municipalities of 
Kalamu and Limete, as a result of land and cadastral surveying by the state, both 
customary lands as well as private concessions have been ‘fragmented,’ leading to the 
loss of viable communal land (Ngandoli Musoni, interview conducted in Kinshasa on 
7 November 2016). 
In this zone, accordingly, chiefly authority and traditional institutions are faced with 
all three urban challenges: growing numbers of strangers, modern urban institutional 
establishment and loss of communal land. Disputes that flow from these challenges 
may well be addressed by ANATC that recognises the authority of chiefs in this zone 
but the trend towards the loss of authority is clear.
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Adaptation in the periphery of Kinshasa (the case of Maluku and N’sele)
The municipalities of Maluku and N’sele are peri-urban. These former rural areas 
were part of the traditional Kasangulu territory. As revealed above, from time to 
time the state has approached customary chiefs in this zone for land to carry out its 
development and commercial projects within the ambit of the built environment of 
the capital city. The management of land, particularly in this zone, has become a major 
bone of contention. Though during collaboration with chiefs in promoting these 
projects, the state claims to respect communal land rights, realities on the ground 
differ. As densities in this peripheral zone increase, plots are demarcated, bought 
and become the property of the buyers. Simultaneously, in areas where communal 
tenure remains in place and densities are lower, plots are transferred under usufruct. 
When a non-indigenous person arrives to live among the Téké, for example, a plot for 
occupation and use is granted free of charge. Arable land is leased over a renewable 
period of 25 years. When this person leaves the host village, all physical improvements 
and developments (such as fields, trees, houses, etc.) remain behind for the benefit 
of the chief and his community. In short, as Kinshasa densifies, the chiefs in these 
peripheral areas rule over and manage entire villages within which more and more 
requests for the sale of land (rather than a transfer with usufruct) are made. Insofar as 
they acquiesce to these offers, they will find themselves in the same position as their 
colleagues in the city centre: honorary chiefs without land who are chiefs in name 
only. It is apparent that disputes over chieftaincies and over land in this zone keeps 
ANATC commissions busy.
Conclusion
The province of Kinshasa and its multiple municipal councils are responsible for the 
delivery of urban services to their residents. The quality and scope of these services 
is poor for the majority of this urban population and for a growing proportion of 
residents as one shifts the lens from the former colonial city centre to the planned 
zone and subsequently to the peripheral zone (Leclerc-Olive 1997; Trefon 2009; 
Verdet 2014: 11). Most urban dwellers living in the capital city receive most urban 
services informally rather than from their municipalities. It is consequently no 
surprise that many residents consider the traditional institutions of chieftaincies – 
within the boundaries of Kinshasa – as genuine and worthy of support, even if they do 
not belong to the chief’s clan. 
Simultaneously, the precarious nature of urban living in the capital city has led 
to the proliferation of three forms of chieftaincies that deviate from the generally 
accepted institutions of traditional authority in the DRC, and accordingly fall outside 
the ANATC and its legitimisation of the relationship between chief and state. The 
first, chiefs labelled ‘vagabond chefs’ refer to individuals on the streets who claim chief 
status and apply for authorisation without support from clan members and without 
claims to communal land. The second, chiefs labelled as ‘self-proclaimed’ also refer to 
individuals who claim chief status and apply for authorisation. In these cases, however, 
there are residents and a number of local municipal officials who swear allegiance 
to the self-proclaimed chief. In the third place, there are ‘des chefs allogènes’ (chiefs 
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who have migrated into Kinshasa from elsewhere in the DRC). Typically, these chiefs 
enter the province with members of their clans and settle together with a number of 
them. They are not able to make claims to communal land in Kinshasa and are not 
authorised by ANATC as chiefs in Kinshasa (ANATC 2015).
The Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced the existence of traditional 
chiefs and chiefdoms before, during and after colonisation. The province of Kinshasa, 
the capital city of the DRC, shares this experience. Kinshasa, however, has experienced 
rapid urbanisation and provides residence today to some 12 million Congolese (Verdet 
2014). These urban dwellers are a mixture of locally born and internal migrants 
from different parts of the country and, accordingly, from various traditional clans in 
the country. Chiefs in the city comprise indigenous chiefs with clans and claims to 
communal land falling within the area of jurisdiction of the province as well as other 
chiefs (ranging from migrant traditional leaders to those that are self-proclaimed 
or vagabond). New urban institutions operating in the same urban areas include 
bourgmestres and their municipal councils.
The challenge for chieftaincies to adapt to this new institutional urban environment 
is apparent. As identified above, in fact, chiefs and their chieftaincies’ have been 
living within a national state the leaders of whom have monopolised access to the 
natural wealth of the country. Accordingly, their relationships with these leaders and 
presidents have been driven by attempts to reconcile themselves with the patrimonial 
system and to gain where they could from the wealth controlled at the top.
The process of adaptation has not been uniform: its form depends not only on 
the nature of chiefly authority but also whether institutions find themselves in the 
former colonial zone, in the new planned zone or in the peripheral zone of Kinshasa. 
In the former colonial zone, traditional institutions have disappeared and have been 
replaced by modern urban state institutions; in the planned zone, they have lost 
much of their authority; and in the periphery, they tend to coexist with their modern 
equivalents. With the creation of a national institution called the National Alliance of 
Traditional Authorities of Congo (ANATC), some of the traditional leaders in the city 
have been offered a statutory opportunity to collaborate and coexist with modern state 
institutions.
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PART II
The popular in urban Africa
Sylvia Croese
This part of the book explores the role of popular forces in African cities.
The first chapter unpacks the black box of the state and explores the different ways 
in which state officials in the city of Johannesburg in South Africa have contested 
plans for mega housing projects directed by national government. The chapter 
identifies three different repertoires that have been used by state officials at different 
scales of sub-national government that range from passive-aggressive behaviour, to 
cattle-trading and feigned compliance to show that the state is no monolith but is 
comprised of institutional, personal and professional relations, often operating in 
concert, collusion and, just as often, in contestation, contradiction and working at 
cross-purposes.
The following chapter shows that, just as the state represents a multiplicity of 
actors and interests, society is equally pluralistic. Through a study of the role of civil 
society during the years post-Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe, 
the chapter shows that the role of civil society in representing popular interests can 
wax and wane. While having played an important role in challenging the ZANU-PF 
party state, formal civil society weakened in the face of economic hardship, repression 
and informalisation. This opened up space for a popular politics that went beyond 
party politics and divides and instead organised around key individuals and issues, 
played out on the streets and through the use of social media. While unable to effect 
structural change, it led the way to the fall of longstanding President Mugabe in 2017.
The third chapter looks at protest in the informal settlement of Mathare, in the 
Kenyan capital of Nairobi, where community members use community meetings 
to demand water supply and, consequently, to be recognised by city authorities. 
Important here is the continuation of the neglect of the settlement, which dates back 
to colonial times, and the strong disjuncture between what the author calls a denial 
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In 2014, the Minister for Human Settlements Lindiwe Sisulu launched a new 
policy direction for the development of human settlements (Ballard & Rubin 2017). 
The minister said ‘[w]e need to move from small projects of 200 houses to mega 
projects of integrated housing mix to cater for different incomes and needs’ (quoted 
in Petterson 2014). Sisulu noted that the Department of Human Settlements would 
spend 100 days identifying 50 National Priority Projects which would become mega 
human settlements each one a minimum of 10  000 units (Merten 2014). The 
call was subsequently taken up by Gauteng’s premier and MEC Jacob Mamabolo 
(2015) with the announcement of the construction of new towns, catering for over 
60 000 households: ‘In this new vision, we stated two objectives notably, building 
post-apartheid cities, secondly, completing current legacy projects, or RDP housing 
development trajectory.’
Provincial Human Settlements officials were alarmed by the announcement: the 
drive from a national level of the state to institute and push a local project contravened 
provincial and municipal plans, and long-term projects. These national visions were 
generally not shared by the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ tasked with carrying them out. 
However, despite voicing their concerns to their seniors, officials did not gain any 
traction and sought ways to deal with this national interference into the local realm. 
The following chapter intends to operate on a number of scales: it briefly examines 
the manner in which the national, in this case embodied by South Africa’s National 
Department of Human Settlements (NDHS), sought to entrench its specific visions 
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in the local. The core focus though is the sets of practices and micro-practices; ‘tactics’ 
and weapons that generally low-level or less politically powerful bureaucrats and 
officials utilised to fend off nationally imposed policies and approaches. These can 
be conceptualised as the weapons of ‘the weak’ against ‘the strong’ (Scott 1985) using 
the tactics of the other (De Certeau 1984). The end result was not a complete ‘win’ or 
‘loss’ but a set of compromises that make for an unevenly implemented set of policies 
and practices. The cases open up how and by what forces cities and urban spaces are 
shaped, the contradictions and contestations that occur within the edifice of ‘the state’ 
and how these then become manifest in the cityscape (Hornby et al. 2017).
Beyond the edifice: Inside the bureaucracy
The work of administration takes place in the fluorescent-lit rooms of drab 
office buildings where thousands of bureaucrats type streams of information 
into outdated computers or file handwritten notes in inaccessible archives. 
From all appearances, this is not an arena of political action at all. Bureaucracy 
… obviates individual agency. The humanness of the human condition gets 
lost in the files, the halls, the shufflings of bureaucratic administration. 
(Bernstein & Mertz 2011: 6–7)
But it is within these drab shufflings that, if cities are not made, they are certainly 
influenced. In the hundreds of decisions made by these gods of small things that 
laminate over time into the materialities of urban spaces. This section assists in 
chipping away at the ‘edifice,’ presenting the humanity of bureaucrats and moments 
of interface and contestation that exist between levels of government and the networks 
of formal and informal relationships which operate within the state. 
Bureaucracies have terrible reputations and have borne the brunt of the critique; 
caught between a Weberian sense that ‘the professional bureaucrat is chained to his 
activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is 
only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially 
fixed route of march’ (Gerth & Mills 1991: 228). In such thinking, bureaucrats lacked 
agency or even thought and the state was caricatured as a ‘vending machine’ in which 
money and resources went in, and through a set of standardised machinery, an 
assembly line solution produced following the rules of standard procedure (Chipkin 
2011). Alternatively, when agency was allowed ‘[b]ureaucrats at such institutions 
embod[ied] the spirit of this unpredictable and liminal creature. They [we]re at once 
inanimate – lazy automatons, blindly serving larger powers – and animate – nefarious, 
self-interested obstructionists’ (Hoag 2011: 82). 
However, beginning in the late 1960s a different and more human view was 
proposed. Lipsky (1969) posited the street-level bureaucrat who questioned whether 
officials’ ‘actions in determining whether or not to provide services [operated] according 
to laws, regulations, and professional norms’ (Hoag 2011: 84). Lipsky (1969) saw that 
bureaucrats were often at the mercy of intersecting forces: political and hierarchical 
pressure from those above, community groups and social connections, and their 
own prejudices, politics and sympathies. More recent work takes its inspiration from 
gender studies and intersectionality based on Haraway and others who reject the 
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idea of a neutral ‘cog’ in a bureaucratic wheel and ‘reclaims vision as an embodied 
practice, reminding us that all gazes are from somewhere, and a specifically material 
somewhere’ (Lipsky 1969). 
As a consequence, daily practices and everyday lives and decisions that constitute the 
activities of bureaucrats has become an increasing field of interest. How bureaucrats 
make decisions, their reasons for assigning or not assigning resources, their discretion 
have been the subject of ethnographic work, examining the sets of social rules that 
govern exchanges and make them possible. The relationships that exist between ‘the 
public’ and the bureaucrats has also become a fertile area of study, particularly in the 
context of the Global South, where Chatterjee identified ‘political society’ and the need 
for platforms of engagement due to the illegality or extra legality of certain urban actors. 
Where local ‘big men’ act as mediators on behalf of groups who otherwise would not 
be able to access the official mechanisms of the state (Chatterjee 2004). Others have 
noted the informal or so-called ‘rude’ forms of accountability which, through shame 
and embarrassment, pressures to maintain reputation and status, and the threat of 
violence force action and service delivery (Hossain 2010); as well as the institutional 
structures, which allow front-line bureaucrats to evade responsibility (Chatterjee 
2012). Much of the work has focused on the more negative aspects of the bureaucracy 
and the blame for the failure of state policies. There are fewer attempts which examine 
the ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007), and note the ‘best intentions’ of bureaucrats or take 
less normative stances, attempting to understand the informal practices of the state at 
the micro-level. These are attempts to understand the interface between the state and 
its client, customers and citizens: the state’s public guise as it faces outwards. 
There is also a burgeoning literature that looks at some aspects of the inward gaze, 
however, here too it is dominated by more negative accounts with much of the work 
examining various iterations of corruption. There is a focus in postcolonial and post-
communist states on the force of corruption as a driver and shaper of the bureaucracy 
and its daily function: pointing out the institutional design of bureaucracies to 
enhance and support lines of personal gain and political patronage (Golden 2003), 
or the ‘politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy to the desire of governing 
parties to enhance their political control over the formulation and implementation 
of public policies’ (Meyer-Sahling 2006: 274). In general, there is the sense that ‘[t]
he institutional legacies of a relatively weak state, coupled with the emergence of 
resource-poor and power-hungry political parties, have historically provided a fertile 
ground for the emergence of patronage politics in many areas of the world’ (Bratton 
& Van de Walle 1997). In Africa, a disturbing line of argument is that ‘the state’ is a 
‘pseudo-Western façade’ which is still largely captured by society and politics (Chabal 
& Daloz 1999: 9–16). As such, the state operates within the coils of ‘personalised’ and 
‘particularised’ relationships with the political and social.
In South African literature authors such as Chipkin (2011, 2013), have taken the 
bureaucracy as an object of study; Cameron (1996, 2005, 2014) attempting to clarify 
institutional and structural aspects of the post-apartheid government, and Benit-
Gbaffou (2007, 2008) has looked at the interface between the state and modes of 
engagement. All of which are useful, but it is to Von Holdt (2010) that I turn as he has 
complexified and unpacked patronage in the South African context, where policies of 
affirmative action and a culture of deference, coupled with a skills shortage ‘generat[e] 
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a powerful culture of moving onwards and upwards’ and ‘encourages a culture of 
facing upwards’ rather than outwards towards the sites and interfaces of engagement 
with the public. As a consequence, civil servants are removed from on-the-ground 
engagement, leading to what is often called ‘poor service delivery.’ 
Facing upwards is not the only way of examining the hierarchy, and urban theorists 
note that there is no automatic acceptance of national policies into local and daily 
practice, rather accomplishing such a feat requires the acceptance, and validation of 
those who need to implement it (Buitelaar, Galle & Sorel 2011). Such acceptance and 
internalisation is also at the mercy of the informal networks and local cultures that 
exist. Veron et al. (2003) noted these dissonances in India’s bureaucratic architecture, 
explaining that the lack of validation is driven, at least in part, by the stark contrasts 
between the levels of government and also the class and educational gaps between the 
various bureaucrats within the state. 
This begins to shed light into the vast differences between those who promulgate 
policies and regulations and those who implement them. It is into this gap that the 
following case steps, acknowledging that bureaucracies are key sites of city-making, 
and that they are not homogenous monoliths, but are comprised of people with their 
own gaze, histories and politics, much of which is not political or necessarily self-
seeking but may come from an opposing or different set of rationalities (Watson 
2003). It is these differences, both in vision and position, which act as ‘obstacles’ to the 
institutionalisation of national policy (Buitelaar et al. 2011). However, what has been 
less explored are the mechanisms and modes of contestation within the state through 
which rebellion occurs. The following sections offer a non-normative account of some 
of these methods, beginning with an explanation of the national/local contexts and 
followed by a discussion of the modes and repertoires of contestation. 
The national vision in the local sphere: Long-term trajectories
The mega project or mega human settlement vision was first espoused by Minister 
Sisulu in her 2014 Budget speech:
MinMec have decided that we will now embark on mega projects, because 
in this way the economies of scale will be in our favour. In these mega 
projects there will be a collaboration of all three spheres of government. Local 
government will ultimately inherit the projects once completed.
In addition, the aim was not only to build new, post-apartheid cities, but to also address 
issues of poverty, inequality and informality that seemed to be plaguing existing cities 
and which had been obdurate and unyielding in the face of numerous state attempts 
(Ballard & Rubin 2017). The idea was that the new cities would somehow stimulate 
economic growth, offering economic activities and employment, along with a full 
range of services and facilities. They should also include a range of income groups, 
moving beyond the current perpetuation of segregated development in these terms 
(Harrison & Todes 2017: 32–33).
In October 2014, following the initial announcement, the Department of Human 
Settlements hosted a Housing Indaba. A key moment at the indaba was the unveiling 
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of a social contract which required signatories to commit to ‘[b]uild 50 catalytic 
projects and install basic services in all developing towns including revitalising mining 
towns.’ It was apparently also at the indaba that the minister called on all spheres 
of government and the private sector to submit lists of potential mega projects to 
national for their consideration. 
What followed was a scramble by various departments to support this new policy 
direction, which in many ways came out of the blue. This is apparently quite normal 
for South African policy-making: ‘[This] is a classic case: which is … the political 
announcement is made first, and then go in and do this’ (Narsoom 2016). As such, the 
Housing Development Agency (HDA) was tasked with making the policy direction 
viable; a difficult task, since there was ‘No consultation initially and although projects 
were supposed to be decided with relevant local authorities, it was realistically left to 
the HDA to scramble to devise a process for assessment that could be used to select the 
relevant projects’ (Anonymous HDA officials 1 and 2, 2016). Furthermore, according 
to an Ekurhuleni Official: ‘Private sector developers submitted directly to national 
without coming via local or provincial,’ circumventing local planning processes. This 
left the HDA in a very awkward position, ‘It’s very difficult to go back on a political 
decision or political announcement … how do we almost manage this, what’s the word 
I’m looking for, ameliorate sort of … and it’s me thinking with my bureaucratic hat, 
“oh god this is a disaster how do we fix it up without allowing anybody to have their 
noses out of joint?”’ (Anonymous 3, 2016). 
Thus, the HDA was left to devise a process that appeared to legitimate a new set of 
spatial interventions that circumvented all of the planning legislation and effectively 
stamped the authority of national on to the local sphere. Also ignored by both national 
and provincial authorities was the fact that this form of sprawl flew in the face of years 
of work by the larger metros who had dedicated time and effort to legislating more 
compact, denser cities, structured along transit-orientated development principles. All 
of which was disregarded in favour of a model that promoted sprawled urbanisation 
across the province.
The ministerial pronouncements were taken by officials at all levels, that mega 
projects would be the new direction of the various Departments of Human Settlements. 
In Gauteng, the policy was picked up with alacrity and by April 2015, Gauteng 
launched its own mega projects policy with some of its own provincial ideals. It was 
argued that the proposed new fully functional mixed income, mixed use towns, built 
outside of existing cities would effectively deal with the wicked and entrenched issues 
of apartheid spatial planning, and provide much needed economic impetus to the 
stagnating provincial economies. Mega projects also satisfied a political agenda, with 
a premier and high-level ANC officials who wanted recognition for contributing to a 
radical, transformative project leading up to the ANC’s policy conference, scheduled 
for December 2017. 
In some ways, such practice should also be seen within its most recent historical 
context. After the democratic transition of South Africa in 1994, there was a long-
term sustained project to decentralise powers and responsibilities to the local 
sphere. The South African Constitution clearly designated a number of mandates 
to local government: planning, land management and infrastructure development. 
The Constitution also designates three cooperative but autonomous spheres of 
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government, where there are moments of conjoined and independent responsibility. 
Despite the protections offered by the Constitution, national government has 
consistently interfered in the operations of municipal government, often seeing it as 
nothing more than the service delivery arm (Steytler 2005). A number of both overt 
and subversive strategies have been undertaken in attempts to pull local government 
back into the central fold (Moya 2008). Moya’s (2008) analysis of five dimensions 
of recentralisation including fiscal and policy-making autonomy, Kroukamp’s (2008) 
examination of the attempted implementation of the Single Public Service Bill as an 
outright attempt to regain control over the municipalities, whilst Cameron’s (2014) 
analysis of the acts of subversion in the Western Cape all illustrate the strong and 
indomitable will of the national government’s attempts to maintain control over 
municipalities, especially those wayward enough to elect other parties. 
There were also global forces and national political intentions at work. In the South 
African context, the last few years have seen a loss of legitimacy of the African National 
Congress on the national and international stage. The allegations of corruption and 
charges of misconduct against the top leadership have tainted the country’s reputation 
and large infrastructural projects are loaded with political symbolism, intended to 
‘demonstrate national technological prowess’ (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 335). Mega 
projects, which have generally been constructed within cities, have been used to 
signify rebranding of cities, making them more attractive and competitive to elite 
residents and international capital (Hannan & Sutherland 2015). At the same time, 
there has been a move towards ‘new cities’ or cities from scratch across the globe. 
These are often private sector-led housing projects, located on the urban peripheries 
of existing cities (Herbert & Murray 2015). Cairo, Moscow, Lagos and Nairobi, to name 
a few, have designed and committed to this urban form, largely leaving the issues 
of the past behind in the hope of rebranding and marketing these cities locally and 
internationally.
Thus the implementation of the mega projects vision, initiated by national 
government and pushed by provincial elites, can be read in light of the longer trajectory 
of national interference into the urban space and part of an ongoing battle between 
national, provincial and local structures over land and cities as the powerbases and 
vote-banks of the major political parties. It was also a political move intended to 
demonstrate effectiveness and capacity delivery (Ballard & Rubin 2018) and the ability 
to compete in the international arena. Thus, the timing of the mega projects approach 
was hardly coincidental since it occurred in the run-up to local elections and the 
party conference which took place in 2016. With some commentators arguing that 
prescience born of extensive political astuteness, the mega projects approach was a 
last ditch attempt by national government to gain control over urban space before it 
lost the major metros in the next election and appeal more broadly to a disillusioned 
and disaffected urban constituency. 
Nevertheless, local or provincial government officials did not simply take on the 
national vision. It was within this milieu, where elites were not paying attention to 
either the procedural deficits of the approach or critiques of the content, that officials 
began to find ways of contesting the process through various means.
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Strategies and tactics: Weapons of the weak
There are two main lines of analytical framing, and one minor one, that become useful 
when looking at the response and behaviour of state officials. The first originates with 
De Certeau (1984) who argued that the city was constituted by the strategies of city 
producers, the state, the government, business and other institutions. It is through these 
strategies that bounded, codified and ruled space is constructed and dominated. Maps, 
laws, regulations, and grids constitute the mechanisms and controls of space through 
which a powerful elite hold on to and pursue power (Jessop 1997). Strategies are used by 
those within organisational power structures, whether small or large, such as the state 
or municipality, the corporation or the proprietor, a scientific enterprise or the scientist. 
Strategies are deployed against some external entity to institute a set of relations for 
official adversaries, competitors, clients, customers, or simply subjects (Blauvelt 2003) 
However, everyday practice usurps, contests and destabilises these strategies through 
the tactics of the other, the subaltern and the non-powerful (Mould 2014):
The place of the tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into 
the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking over in its entirety, without 
being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base where it can 
capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence 
with respect to circumstances. (De Certeau 1984: xix)
Scott’s (1985) work speaks to the ‘subtle but powerful forms of “everyday resistance”’, 
not the grand gestures of coups and rebellion, but the small ways in which the less 
powerful respond to and contest domination. Scott (1985) importantly identifies non-
cooperation, ‘foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, 
slander and sabotage’ as the everyday counter-hegemonic acts of the ‘weak’ against 
the ‘strong’.
There is a point of divergence that the following cases surface: both De Certeau 
(1984) and Scott (1985) conceptualised the state as ‘strong,’ the entity against which 
tactics and weapons of the weak are deployed. However, as discussed earlier, ‘the state’ 
is no monolith but is comprised of institutional, personal and professional relations, 
often operating in concert, collusion and just as often in contestation, contradiction 
and working at cross-purposes. Furthermore, ‘the state’ does not embody merely 
one political group, one class of employees or even one unified ideology. It is a very 
human machine with all of the whims, quirks, prejudices and faults that typify the 
vast majority of everyday interaction. Given the above then, it can be seen how within 
departments, between hierarchies and across departments, particular groups of 
officials may not and do not approve of or embed the status quo and actively find ways 
to protest and rebel. 
In the cases that are described in the next few sections, relatively less powerful 
officials within the state hierarchy protest against powerful politicians and political 
forces. In such cases, direct confrontation and open disobedience are simply not 
options, both because they are not sufficiently powerful to be paid attention to and 
also because many of the officials are life-time civil servants. As Von Holdt (2010) has 
pointed out in the South African context, becoming a civil servant is a potential road to 
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social mobility and is a long-term commitment. Given the highly hierarchical nature 
of the South African bureaucracy and its close ties to party politics, open protest and 
confrontation could be a career limiting move. Thus, as Hull (2003), pointed to in 
other contexts, there is the need for ‘the erasure game that is required: bureaucracies 
generate collective agency, but it is achieved paradoxically through the elaborately 
detailed individuation of action, and bureaucrats’ professional survival relies on their 
careful and continual eschewal of authorship’ (Hoag 2011: 82).
As such, officials need to find modes of protest that are at once covert, and 
untraceable but more effective than direct and open hostilities. The advantage of 
these means of resistance is that they ‘require little or no coordination or planning; 
they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct 
symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms’ (Scott 1985: 29). These are 
the tactics of the other within the state and, as will be seen, comprise a repertoire of 
action and inaction that is generally ascribed to non-state actors. 
There is also an important point of convergence with Scott’s (1985) work on poorer 
communities and De Certeau’s (1984) on the subaltern, which is the response by the 
strong. In both framings, the ‘strong’ are neither idle nor unresponsive, they too find 
ways to adapt, respond and push back: varying from violence to the incorporation and 
adaptation of the counter-hegemonic ideas for coercion and securing agreement. 
Provincial officials: Passive-aggressive behaviours
In Gauteng province, officials in one of the units of the Departments of Human 
Settlements, protested the planned mega projects but the politicians and senior officials 
were apparently not listening. Possibly driven by political ambitions, senior figures 
‘might have … rallied behind the issue … since government came in place they have not 
created any cities … we’ve been in power for 20 odd years but … we can’t show a city that 
we have created …’ (Anonymous provincial official 5, 2016). As such, there was pressure 
that the public ‘should see the fruits of this, in this current political term’ (Anonymous 
provincial official 5, 2016). 
These provincial officials had been working on spatial change in the province, 
looking to increase the number of units delivered but as one official put it ‘our goal 
should be compacting cities’ (Anonymous provincial official 2, 2016). The officials 
were also concerned about the feasibility of the mega projects policy direction. As 
the implementing agents, they wondered how such a project could ever be made a 
reality, noting concerns around scale and ‘the challenge of giving massive numbers 
to one contractor is what if there happens to be hiccups in that, […] on that site’ 
(Anonymous provincial official 3, 2016). As well as the lack of sufficient funding 
‘policy implementation will have to shift, we should not be talking about USDG [Urban 
Settlements Development Grant] and HSDG [Human Settlements Development 
Grant] alone because that will not be sufficient in building the kind of ideology that 
you’re looking for’ (Anonymous provincial official 4, 2016).
Their fears were not addressed, so they came to Professor Philip Harrison’s 
research chair in Spatial Analysis and City Planning (SA&CP) at the University of the 
Witwatersrand which has strong connections, personal and professional, to many of 
the officials. Although the provincial team had been asked to work on a mega projects 
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document, which they duly did, the project was eventually handed over to a service 
provider who, together with the MEC, produced the final document and they had a 
number of anxieties over the new document. The requests were simple: 
Could we assist with the construction of a ‘neutral’ space in which to raise 
concerns and demonstrate that there were strong empirical arguments for 
why mega projects were a bad idea? 
The team leader worried that ‘there were so many things … which were basically cut 
and paste from somewhere else’ (Anonymous provincial official 3, 2016). The new 
document raised concerns that, ‘The modelling of the cities was based on some picture 
that was taken from China or somewhere’ and had no basis in the actual infrastructure 
layout of the province and did not access the repository of information that the officials 
had access to and used in their work. Effectively, their expertise and their knowledge 
were sidelined. Furthermore, they were also left in a more awkward position: ‘How do 
you critique what you initially conceptualised?’ (Anonymous provincial official 4, 2016). 
The officials were also keenly aware that the process had been top-down and that ‘for 
municipalities … not to be in [on it from] the beginning … was an oversight, especially, 
knowing, we [provincial government] are going to their spaces to build’ (Anonymous 
provincial official 4, 2016).
It was being caught in this bind that also inspired the officials to approach Wits 
University to host an event, invite municipalities and metros so that they could also 
voice their concerns. The idea was to invite the relevant politicians and officials to 
ensure that they heard all the parties. We were also asked for any readings, research or 
materials that could be shared to help them with their internal briefs. These actions 
were motivated by trying to bring the status of the university to bear, to ask for an 
external voice, something driven by both research and ‘science’ to get through to those 
in power. Officials clearly recognised and had previous experience of engagement 
with academics and their so-called ‘authority,’ recalling an event where the MEC had 
had a conversation with Professor Harrison which had helped to shift some of the 
MEC’s thinking: ‘And he [the MEC] was keen on engaging on that because, cause 
remember how Phil [Harrison] gave him information, the information he could have 
gotten inside from us … [but] when he hears it outside he’s like wow!’ which does 
imply that coming to our specific unit also was no accident.
A workshop with a combination of leading ‘experts’ and officials was planned for 
engagement between the various units in the provincial department, a way to get 
the senior officials to listen and a channel to allow municipal officials to share their 
thoughts, since they had not been consulted. The workshop went ahead but at the 
eleventh hour, the senior politicians declined and did not attend, leaving the platform 
in some ways as a proverbial case of preaching to the choir. However, a conversation 
began where local authorities voiced their disenchantment: ‘If Gauteng Province 
seeks to pursue a model which promotes dispersion, while underpinning metropolitan 
municipalities are pursuing compaction, there’s a problem with this and we do have to 
align it.’ And arguing that there is a need to continue to engage with the MEC, ‘So I think 
it’s more important to engage with him to kind of lower expectations around this agenda 
(CoJ official 2016).
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Following the meeting, it was agreed that there could be a set of actions undertaken 
by Wits University, the Gauteng City Regional Observatory (GCRO) and provincial 
officials: (1) another colloquium organised by the Provincial Department of Human 
Settlements similar to the first one but this time more specifically focused on municipal 
engagement, (2) a city lab organised by the GCRO, as well as using a MEC-MMC forum 
(IGR), both technical and political meetings, as sites of engagement. The provincial 
officials also continued with what may be termed a low-level set of activities: writing 
memos, preparing research and asking the academy for opinion-editorials and material 
to support their protests against mega projects. Their tactic seemed to be one of utilising 
empirical findings, and fact-based analysis to contest rhetoric and political force. 
However, most of these activities were halted when the key figure in the provincial 
department was mysteriously seconded to another province, officials noted ‘since he left 
then it was, like, this dialogue just died’ (Anonymous provincial official 4, 2016); a move 
that was apparently in the works for quite some time but was suspicious in its timing. It 
did mean that the unit leading the charge was left without a head. Almost simultaneously, 
other members of the project management team were moved to regional offices with 
new mandates. These transfers served to successfully intimidate some of the staff who 
were critical of the new policy direction. It was also at this point that officials became 
slightly more cautious and began to speak about how their engagement with the 
researchers, was really about ‘looking at the core concept [mega projects] critically and 
… trying to actually enhance it and make sure that it succeeds’ (Anonymous provincial 
official 4, 2016).
Contesting and cattle-trading:  
The City of Johannesburg (COJ)’s response
A key concern voiced by the provincial officials was the lack of consultation, and the 
‘top-down’ nature of the new policy, which was also an area of frustration for the 
metros. The CoJ engaged in two courses of action. Both of which were relatively more 
confrontational: they continued to argue against mega projects within the internal 
and regular meetings that are a part of the normal cycle of engagement between the 
province and the metros. Also, instead of attempting to wrangle with the provincial 
department of human settlements, where they apparently were having no effect, 
they engaged with the provincial planning department with whom they shared a 
longstanding and collegial relationship. The stakes were high for the city and were 
both specific and principled: the specific stakes were around particular projects and 
sites that the CoJ objected to, amongst them were Syferfontein, and Lanseria, both 
of which are far outside of the areas designated for development. The related matter 
was the CoJ’s principled stance on development: the promotion of densification and 
compaction along transit-orientated routes, and within specified nodes, to curtail 
sprawl and redevelop parts of the city. Mega projects as a directive contradicted all of 
these approaches. 
The interaction with the provincial planning authorities was broader than just 
about mega projects and included ensuring coherence between the key planning 
documents such as the spatial development frameworks. The documents were duly 
aligned and, given that the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) is supposed to be 
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the overarching framework of spatial development, the presumption was that most of 
the mega project ideas would be quashed. However, this was not to be. 
Feigned compliance: Ekurhuleni
The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) took a very different approach: 
that of feigned compliance. The geography of the municipality is highly dispersed, 
comprised of a number of old town centres that are separate and spread out. The idea 
of another new town or towns within this area was simply untenable. However, instead 
of directly confronting the province or national government, the officials apparently 
agreed to the policy by stating that there was ‘a council resolution in support of mega 
projects.’ But then they ‘re-packaged’ a number of smaller, infill projects, into so-called 
mega projects, noting ‘we didn’t want to submit too many projects so we aggregated 
16 projects into 3: northern cluster, eastern cluster and southern’ (Anonymous EMM 
official 1, 2016).
Using some very ingenious political thinking, they noted, ‘There is still no clear 
distinction between mega projects and catalytic and we are for both. We have clustered 
projects. We have 9 towns and 9 townships. Lots of buffer in between. If we keep on 
looking for land on the urban edges there (will be) no services or social facilities. So, 
we are looking inside. They are both mega and catalytic’ (Anonymous EMM official 2, 
2016). The EMM have cleverly adopted the language of national but continued with 
their own spatial plans.
Conclusion: The successes of the tactical deployment of weapons 
of the weak
The cases analysed in this chapter demonstrate three modes of contestation: 
provincial officials began with direct engagement but after its failure used the 
research unit at Wits SA&CP as mediator in order to mobilise the status of experts, 
scientific knowledge and empirical evidence to counter political rhetoric. However, 
the success of such a strategy seems very limited with most of the ‘rebel leaders’ being 
transferred and senior figures still determined to continue with the policy direction. 
The CoJ, which also began with direct confrontation ended with circumvention, 
found some success and some compromise: it would seem that the Departments 
of Human Settlements found ways to get round their objection to Syferfontein, by 
simply excluding Johannesburg from the decision-making cluster around projects in 
the province, despite the fact that it is Johannesburg’s land. There is also speculation 
that there was some cattle trading and CoJ agreed to other projects if the province 
would support another version of urban renewal in Alexandria. Finally, EMM ‘feigned 
compliance’ which seems to have garnered the greatest success. At the time of writing, 
the mega projects list to be approved included all three of the projects that EMM 
proposed. Instead of engaging in confrontation, EMM officials chose their moments, 
found collaborators and mediators to act as their mouthpieces, used alternative paths, 
circumvented processes and feigned compliance to use the rules of the game against 
those in power. Taken together these demonstrate the weapons of the weak within 
the state. While their success was mixed, it is also clear that the national government 
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responded. It removed people, transferred them and thus intimidated the rest of the 
teams, dragged its feet, utilised opaque processes and finally compromised. 
There have been subsequent changes to the list of approved projects and mega 
projects are now referred to as Priority Human Settlements and Housing Development 
Areas or PHSHDAs. The latest list, revealed in May 2020, shows a number of projects 
that are neither mega nor new and seem to indicate there have been more backroom 
negotiations and debates since the original research was commissioned. However, 
these PHSHDAs are still seen as vitally important to the National Human Settlement’s 
strategy and will receive a significant portion of national funding and attention over 
the next few years (Business Insider 2020). This very top-down approach, is also in 
direct contravention with the more ‘bottom-up’ approaches of in situ upgrading in 
informal settlements and other resident-led modes that have also been encouraged by 
national government and will no doubt lead to further contestation and conflict within 
the state and with its stakeholders over the next few years.
These narratives demonstrate how contested a terrain the state actually is. Although 
the national government’s vision is powerful and is being pushed into the realms of 
the local it is not uncontested. Despite the power, violence and authority of national 
government elites, local actors push back, using the weapons at their disposal and 
the politics of the other to reshape policy tools and intents. As such, the city landscape 
becomes a compromise influenced as much by the powerful, obvious agendas of the 
strong as the subtle tactical deployment of the weapons of the weak.
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CHAPTER 7
Popular protests and the limits of civil 
society in the struggle for democracy  
in Zimbabwe, 2013 to 2016
Ngonidzashe Marongwe
Introduction
Using the cases of Itai Dzamara of the Occupy Africa Unity Square movement, 
#Thisflag by Pastor Evan Mawarire of the Baptist Church and Tajamuka (We have 
rebelled), this chapter discusses the impacts of the growth of popular protests on 
governance and struggles for democracy in Zimbabwe during the period 2013–2016. 
Earlier postcolonial protests were organised by and around formal civil society (CS) 
movements and organisations (CSOs). What sets the protests that took place between 
2013 and 2016 apart is that they were centred around particular individuals and issues 
such as the dislodging of President Mugabe from power, the annulment of Statutory 
Instrument 64 of 2016 (SI 64/2016), which restricted imports and other issues of 
concern without necessarily containing the vision for long-term politics. Furthermore, 
compared to traditional CSOs, protesters did not use rule-bound methods of 
negotiating with the state but used tactical and informal methods such as violent and 
unsanctioned demonstrations as well as undiplomatic language.
This chapter utilises the work of the Indian scholar Partha Chatterjee on political 
society to analyse the characteristics of these popular politics. As opposed to the CS 
that Chatterjee considers as bourgeoisie, restricted and elitist, ‘political society’ is an 
arena where ‘politics emerg[es] out of the developmental policies of government aimed 
at specific population groups. Many of these groups, organised into associations, 
transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work … [As such, state] 
agencies … deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient 
instruments for administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population 
groups’ (Chatterjee 2004: 41). Chatterjee’s formulation contrasts sharply with the 
traditional liberal understanding of the CS that is conceptualised in the work of 
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other scholars who value CS as a ‘progressive [transformational] social force’, which 
‘struggles against [the undemocratic and often authoritarian] modern state … and 
against a pre-modern communitarian sociality … often lodged in rural areas [in the 
third world]’ (Helliker 2012: 42).
Drawing on this distinction, the central question for this chapter is: What was the 
role of popular politics in the democratisation of Zimbabwe in the period between 
2013 and 2016? In order to tackle this profound question the chapter further asks as a 
sub-question: To what extent were the shortcomings of traditional CSOs and methods 
connected to the rise of the violent popular protests in Zimbabwe? 
The use of tactical and informal methods and politics by protestors was not 
so much because they belonged to a population group that did not have access to 
bourgeois legality associated with CSOs. In fact, some leaders of organisations with 
international connections, such as Pastor Mawarire and Itai Dzamara, theoretically 
belonged to the CS. Instead, their modus operandi essentially emanated from the 
repressive state that stifled room for formal CS operations. Consequently, protesters 
ended up using measures and membership from the unemployed ranks, informal 
traders and cross-border traders that belong to Chatterjee’s political society. In doing 
this, the chapter analyses the significance and limits of the mobilisational strategies of 
the Zimbabwean popular protests. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first historicises the development 
of violent protests by the CS against the government in the 1990s and highlights 
connections with the recent popular protests. The second part discusses some of the 
leading popular protesters, including Itai Dzamara, arguably the pioneer of the post 
2013 anti-Mugabe protests from Africa Unity Square (AUS). The third part traces the 
impacts of the popular protests on the democratisation struggle in Zimbabwe. 
Civil society and the antecedents to the 2013–2016  
popular protests 
This section reflects on the development of militant protests by the CS in Zimbabwe, 
which offer a precursor to the 2013–2016 popular protests, especially in their 
deployment of non-rule bound styles of engagement. CS is considered in this chapter 
as ‘a plurality of social enclaves which exist in contradistinction to the dominance 
of a particular monopolistic social system within the same social realm or territorial 
unity’, like the state, church, market economy and political parties (Moyo 1993: 2), 
including non-governmental organisations, gender-based organisations, charities, 
trade unions, work associations, social movements, business associations and 
advocacy groups (Ncube 2010). However, the earlier CS postcolonial protests differed 
from the 2013–2016 popular protests in the sense that these were organised around 
more formal movements, and occurred before the large-scale informalisation of 
the country’s economy that took root during Zimbabwe’s crisis (Bond & Manyanya 
2003). The development of CS in postcolonial Zimbabwe occurred in phases. In the 
first decade of independence in the 1980s, the CS sought to be on the side of the 
state for reasons such as continued economic prosperity which enabled the state to 
roll out massive social service programmes, and the continued domination of the 
mainstream economy by the minority whites which presented the state with the 
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opportunity to present itself as the midwife for economic democratisation (Ncube 
2010). Additionally, the ZANU-PF government, like its predecessor, the colonial state, 
and also in pursuance of its ‘democratic centralism’ under its targeted one-party state 
(Moyo 1993: 2), actively discouraged the growth of an independent CS in favour of one 
that it created, controlled and bank rolled (Helliker 2013).
However, from the end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s the CS-state 
relations soured as the CS radicalised and asserted its independence and became 
more militant (Moyo 1993). This was based on the decline of economic prosperity 
and as the negative effects of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) 
worsened the livelihoods of the majority (Moyo 1993; Ncube 2010). The CS also 
openly challenged the ZANU-PF state’s preferred one-party state (Helliker 2013). As a 
result, there emerged a plethora of CS organisations including clubs in urban areas, 
political parties, burial societies, trade unions, industrial confederations, commercial 
organisations, student groups and fundamentalist religious cults in addition to ‘white-
dominated’ CS such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Commercial 
Farmers’ Union (CFU), Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) and 
the Employers’ Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) (Moyo 1993: 4). Out of this 
constellation emerged assertive CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition, in addition to various other NGOs such as the Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace (CCJP) that also nagged the government for democratisation and 
societal transformation (Helliker 2013). Additionally, there also emerged protests from 
the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), militant academics and women 
lobby organisations. Eventually and critically, the ZCTU and the NCA protests gave 
birth to, and provided most of the national leadership of, the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Marongwe & Makaye 2016). 
Below, the chapter turns to the discussion of the 2013–2016 popular protests with a 
view to evaluating their impact on the democratisation of  post-Government of National 
Unity (GNU) Zimbabwe, as well as to exhibit how they were different from the CS 
demonstrations discussed above. As shall be demonstrated, these various individuals 
and groups were made up of marginalised and disgruntled citizens, including the 
unemployed youth, clergy, cross-border traders, civil servants, despondent ZANU-PF 
and MDC supporters and those in underpaying employment. What is important to 
note is that whilst these demonstrators articulated the need for economic and political 
reforms as well as the need for former President Mugabe to leave power, they were 
not led in the protests by opposition leaders nor were they openly supported by these 
leaders.
Itai Dzamara and the Occupy Africa Unity Square movement
Itai Dzamara, the forerunner of popular protests from AUS became famous following 
his abduction from a Harare township barbershop by five unidentified men on 
9 March 2015 (Musewe 2015). The abduction helped to focalise attention not only 
on Dzamara, but on the growing wave of popular protests in Zimbabwe. He was 
a father of two, a journalist and the editor of the News Leader newspaper which he 
founded in 2008 having previously worked for various publications including The 
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Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard and The Zimbabwean. Dzamara also operated a 
Facebook page also known as News Leader (Ifex News 2015). Between October 2014 
and 2015 Dzamara led the pro-democracy group Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS) 
(Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2015), in demonstrations primarily targeting 
President Mugabe to resign because of his advanced age and for mismanaging the 
economy of Zimbabwe. At some point Dzamara delivered a petition at President 
Mugabe’s Munhumutapa Offices imploring him to quit (Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum 2015). He also addressed an MDC-T rally at Harare Grounds in Highfields 
on 7 March 2015 calling for mass protest action against the declining economic 
conditions in Zimbabwe (Amnesty USA 2015). 
Prior to his abduction, Dzamara had, on various occasions, either been arbitrarily 
arrested or severely beaten by both state security agents and ZANU-PF members 
for his activism (Amnesty USA 2015). For example, on 6 November 2014, he was 
brutalised by the police and left for dead (Amnesty USA 2015). Also, on 26 November 
2014, Dzamara together with four other members of the OAUS, was arrested after 
presenting a petition to the Speaker of Parliament and after staging a peaceful protest 
in Parliament’s Speaker’s Gallery (Amnesty USA 2015). Upon their arrest they were 
allegedly undressed, severely beaten and ordered to beat each other before being 
released (Amnesty USA 2015). In addition, at times, Dzamara and the OAUS members 
were denied legal representation; had their lawyers also beaten; and yet at other times 
the lawyers would be denied access to Dzamara and other OAUS members (Amnesty 
USA 2015). 
Pastor Evan Mawarire and #Thisflag campaign
Pastor Evan Mawarire of the Baptist Church started the #Thisflag campaign after he 
had failed to raise school fees for his children in 2016. #Thisflag campaign started on 
19 April 2016 when Mawarire, wearing a Zimbabwean flag around his neck, recorded 
a video titled Thisflag. In the video, the Pastor lamented that: ‘When I look at the flag, 
it’s not a reminder of my pride and inspiration, it feels as if I want to belong to another 
country’ (Allison 2016). The video went viral, generating up to 115 000 views within 
a few days from Zimbabweans who also vented their anger against Mugabe and the 
ZANU-PF government (Chidza 2016a). 
Among its well-known campaigns, #Thisflag ran a campaign of 25 ‘days of digital 
activism using #ThisFlagday’ from the 1st to the 25th of May 2016 (The Zimbabwean 
2016). Broadly, this was a call for the citizens to post comments of their stolen hopes, 
dreams, anger and disillusionments under the banner of #Thisflag. Among the issues 
that the campaign targeted included rampant unemployment, deteriorating social 
services, Mugabe’s continued reign, corruption, and diminishing hope among the 
citizens (The Zimbabwean 2016). 
What made #Thisflag profound was the symbolism of the appropriation of the 
central symbol to Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, the national flag. As a column by the Daily 
Maverick in The Zimbabwean (2016) highlighted:
#ThisFlag has appropriated the state’s most potent symbol. They have seized 
the one icon that the state can’t ban or suppress, and made it their own. The 
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flags that fly above government buildings, the flags that are pinned on the 
chests of government officials, the flags that fly on the bonnets of President 
Mugabe’s motorcade, these are all now subversive acts that the regime cannot 
ignore – or does so at its peril.
Tajamuka/Sesijikile and a Zimbabwe ‘shutdown’ campaign
Protests under the banner #Tajamuka/Sesijikile were witnessed across the country on 
Wednesday, 6 July 2016. The prelude to the nationwide protests were the Monday, 4 
July 2016 demonstrations of commuter omnibus taxi operators in most of Harare’s 
high density suburbs who protested against police clampdowns and blatant police 
corruption at roadblocks that resulted in the arrest of up to 113 people (NewZimbabwe 
2016b). The Wednesday, 6 July 2016 protests targeted the removal of former 
President Mugabe through a ‘total shutdown of business and official administration 
countrywide’ by staying away from work (Raath 2016). Indeed, the protest message was 
overwhelmingly received as home industries, industrial sites, schools and hospitals 
were closed for business. Central business districts across the country were deserted 
with most businesses shut down, except for a few outlets such as OK, Bon Marche, 
TM, Pick ’n Pay, Spar and Choppies that remained open (The Financial Gazette 2016a). 
Despite managing a nationwide stayaway, Tajamuka/Sesijikile did not have 
a recognised leadership. Rather, it had a faceless leadership and its activities were 
coordinated via social media platforms, primarily WhatsApp, and others like Facebook 
and Twitter (Raath 2016). This is notwithstanding the fact that some ‘leaders’ 
eventually emerged or began to be associated with Tajamuka/Sesijikile, including 
Pastor Evan Mawarire, Stern Zvorwadza and Promise Mkwananzi. Most of these 
‘leaders’ were intermittently arrested and released. The advantage of using the social 
media platform, especially WhatsApp, was that it was largely beyond the control of 
the state. It also meant that the majority of Zimbabweans with cellphones were able 
to access the message of the stayaway. Critically, it also demonstrated how, in the 
absence of viable mobilisational capacity by the groups, social media could undercut 
the hegemonic power of a repressive state that strictly controlled state media. 
It, however, has to be said that there were some threats of violence made against 
those who would not heed the call to stayaway. To this extent, there were some 
messages on WhatsApp that called for violence against those who would attempt to 
go to work or the kombis that ferried people to work. There were also some reported 
cases of violence against those who were against the stayaway. These included the 
skirmishes in Mufakose suburb of Harare where some protestors attacked some 
commuter omnibuses that were ferrying people and in Makokoba suburb of 
Bulawayo, tyres were burnt to blockade roads which invited the police to fire tear gas 
canisters resulting in some running battles between the protestors and the police 
(Raath 2016). In Harare’s Epworth suburb, the police engaged in running battles with 
some protestors (Kanambura 2016). As well, there was an ongoing civil service strike 
over salaries that was in motion (Raath 2016). However, the fact that most businesses 
closed shop was illustrative of the success of the protest action.
A follow up attempt on 13 July 2016 was, however, a spectacular flop as most 
businesses remained open and most of the remaining workers, in formal and 
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informal employment, reported for work (Chidza et al. 2016). Nonetheless, the failure 
can also be attributed to the threats of state violence on protesters. The Ministers 
of Home Affairs, Defence, State Security and Information, gave chilling threats at a 
press conference held on 12 July to this effect (Chidza et al. 2016). The threat seemed 
real coming from a government that had periodically unleashed violence against its 
citizens to great cowing effect. Indeed, some personalities who were blamed for the 
successful 6 July protests were arrested on the eve of the 13 July protests, including 
Promise Mkwananzi of #Tajamuka/Sesjikile and Pastor Mawarire of #Thisflag. 
In total, between the 1 July Beitbridge protests and the 4 and 6 July protests and 
stayaways, some 200 people were arrested (The Financial Gazette 2016b). It also has 
to be mentioned that the call for a follow up stayaway within one week of the first 
one seemed too close for comfort to many potential protesters as they feared losing 
their jobs and livelihoods. The essence of this was neatly captured by an unidentified 
businessperson who pointed out that ‘we need to work otherwise there would be no 
bread and butter on the table’ (The Financial Gazette 2016b). In the end, the saving 
grace for the protestors was that there was a huge turnout at Pastor Mawarire’s court 
hearing on the same day (NewZimbabwe 2016c).
From the foregoing, against the backdrop of heightened state intimidation and 
other coercive tactics aimed at thwarting the popular protests, including abductions, 
arrests, physical lynching of the protesters and media attacks, the protests continued. 
A host of measures were taken in sustaining the protests, incorporating shifting 
tactics, illegal demonstrations and increased resort to social media. Below we now 
turn to some of the central reasons behind the growth of the popular protests in the 
post-GNU period which indicate the failings of the CS.
Convulsions in ZANU-PF and the MDC-T and their failure  
to represent the people’s interests 
Between 2013 and 2016, the country’s two main political movements, ZANU-PF and 
the MDC-T suffered tumultuous implosions and splits which not only weakened them, 
but which also divested from their political mandate of representing the interests of 
their supporters. To start off with, ZANU-PF was enfeebled by divisive, tumultuous 
and often violent Mugabe succession politics. This resulted in the purging of former 
Vice-President Joyce Mujuru and her alleged supporters from both ZANU-PF and 
government in 2014, including ministers (Magaisa 2017). 
Added to the above, ZANU-PF failed to arrest the deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions in the country that were undergirded by rising de-industrialisation, 
unemployment that was spurred by a Supreme Court ruling of 2015 that allowed 
employers to dismiss workers on three months’ notice (The Herald 2015), the rampant 
informalisation of the economy, rampant corruption and failure to access lines of 
foreign credit by the Zimbabwean government (Choruma 2016). Furthermore, the 
conditions were exacerbated by the indigenisation policy that required foreign owned 
companies to surrender 51% equities to locals. As well, ZANU-PF leadership exhibited 
unmitigated financial indiscipline as evidenced by former Vice-President Phelekezela 
Mphoko’s close to two-year residency at the expensive four-star Rainbow Towers 
(Manayiti 2016). What made ZANU-PF’s position worse was a crisis of legitimacy 
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it suffered following its controversial victory in the 2013 elections. Notwithstanding 
the apparent peaceful nature of the 2013 harmonised elections, there were allegations 
that ZANU-PF had rigged the elections with the support of the Israeli-based Nikuv 
International Projects (Raftopoulos 2016). As a result, the election results were not 
widely accepted by the international community as representative of the wishes of 
Zimbabweans. In the end, based on the lack of sympathy from the international 
community, the ZANU-PF government perennially struggled for lines of credit to fund 
its operations (Raftopoulos 2016). On the whole, the deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions manufactured rampant poverty and widespread existential hardships.
On the other hand, the MDC-T also underwent major paroxysms. Troubled by 
incessant splits; reduced funding; waning support base; and the health woes of its 
leader, ideologue and face, Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC-T increasingly struggled for 
continuity (Marongwe & Makaye 2016). Due to MDC-T’s continued devolving into 
smaller factions, it lost the stamina to wrestle power from ZANU-PF as it was reduced 
from being a major movement into a pale shadow of its former self. Outside of the 
2005 split of the parent MDC which resulted in the formation of MDC-T and the 
smaller MDC led by Arthur Mutambara, the MDC-T further split in 2014 into the 
main MDC-T that still remained under Morgan Tsvangirai and the smaller faction led 
by former Secretary General Tendai Biti known as the MDC-Renewal that went on to 
splinter further into the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) led by Biti and the Renewal 
Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) led by Elton Mangoma (Marongwe & Makaye 2016). 
The following is a pithy discussion of how the deteriorating economic crisis – one of 
the hallmarks of ZANU-PF’s failures during the post-GNU era – facilitated the growth 
of popular demonstrations.
Deepening economic crisis
Following the end of the coalition government in 2013, Zimbabwe’s economic situation 
took a turn for the worse. From the serious recovery path that the economy had 
witnessed since 2009, the period 2013 to 2016 saw significant economic downturns. 
To start with, the growth rates recorded since the GNU’s foundation continued to 
decline significantly from 10.6, 4.5, 3.1, 2.7 to 1.7% in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 
2016, respectively (Choruma 2016). This was largely due to many company closures. 
Additionally, many workers were laid off under the controversial Supreme Court 
ruling that allowed companies to lay off workers after giving them three months’ 
notice without offering them retrenchment packages, which worsened levels of 
impoverishment. Following this ruling, up to 20 000 workers were retrenched in July 
2015 alone (The Chronicle 2015). At another level, as already alluded to, the ZANU-
PF government also failed to access lines of credit to ameliorate the situation based 
on legitimacy concerns, its failure to provide an acceptable repayment plan, lack of 
property security and the need for some reforms in governance (Raftopoulos 2016).
The government also worsened the economic difficulties by striving to curtail the 
growth of the informal sector, especially the cross-border trading business, by passing 
SI 64/2016, which imposed stringent import controls. Among others, SI 64/2016 
precipitated the Beitbridge violent protests of 30 June 2016 that served as the harbinger 
of the 4 and 6 July 2016 demonstrations. The latter demonstrations saw the torching 
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of some commuter omnibuses and some buildings, including some Choppies shops 
owned by Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko who had spent many months staying 
at the Rainbow Towers. As Stern Zvorwadza, the Vendors Association of Zimbabwe 
leader, posited, SI 64/2016 was an instrument designed to drive the informal sector 
out of business because the Zimbabwean government was ‘responsible for the poverty 
and pushing people into being vendors, yet the same government [was] coming 
up with policies to stop people from earning an honest living at a time when they 
[had] killed the economy and failed to create jobs’ (Raftopoulos 2016). What gave 
further credence to Zvorwadza’s argument was that Zimbabwe had a low industrial 
capacity utilisation of between 25 and 30%, which meant that there was very little 
manufacturing in the country and the increased informalisation of the economy that 
saw up to 95% of Zimbabweans eking out livelihoods in the informal sector mostly 
through selling or reselling imported wares (Choruma 2016).
What worsened the economic situation were the cash shortages experienced from 
April 2016 which resulted in winding bank queues as people struggled to withdraw their 
savings or salaries. The government tried to reduce the cash shortages by introducing 
a surrogate currency called bond notes, which officially were to work alongside the 
basket of foreign denominations. However, the introduction of the bond notes resulted 
in panic withdrawals and a black market for cash trading (Choruma 2016). 
Democratic struggles enhanced?
One major goal of the protests was to open up the closed democratic space in 
Zimbabwe by calling for the resignation of President Mugabe. The demonstrations 
were, according to Evan Mawarire, a means to push the national leadership to be 
responsive to people’s needs and ‘restore order and cast [a new] vision’ for the nation 
(Chidza 2016b). Traditionally, it had been inconceivable for one to openly discuss the 
failings of the state, including corruption and Mugabe’s shortcomings, in particular 
his advanced age and long stay in power. Such actions were construed as undermining 
the authority of the president and usually brought the full wrath of state-sanctioned 
violence on the culprits, including being sent to prison or being tortured (Phiri 2015). 
One of the profound effects of the protests was in tackling head on and undercutting 
the Mugabe and ZANU-PF fear factor. The essence of debunking the mythical 
standing of President Mugabe by the protesters was encapsulated in the words of a 
social media commentator Tom Gumede who posited that the protests ‘represented 
the courage and new momentum [that was] building in Zimbabwe’ (NewZimbabwe 
2016c). Citizens were literally ‘girding their loins, raring to take the government’ (The 
Financial Gazette 2016a).
The essence of the protests undercutting Mugabe’s standing came, first, from the fact 
that most of the protesters openly challenged Mugabe to step down. Second, discourses 
also began to emerge around some of the leaders of the protests as potential presidents 
of Zimbabwe. Pastor Mawarire, among others, was presented as potentially ‘the new 
face of Zimbabwe’s struggle for democracy,’ a ‘national hero’ and one who ‘suited the 
profile of a national leader and enjoyed [massive] support’ (NewZimbabwe 2016c). In 
the end, what also emerged is that the protests inadvertently refocused attention to 
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the succession issues both within and outside ZANU-PF, former President Mugabe’s 
party. The common questions around which included: who could/would succeed 
Mugabe? And, what kind of a leader and politics would Zimbabwe desire in the post-
Mugabe era? Regarding the former question on the possibility of change of leadership 
for Zimbabwe, the discussions occurred against the backdrop of the growing crisis to 
which the then current government seemed out of solutions to address and where the 
citizens were getting bolder and more fearless in their assertions for socio-economic 
reforms. The latter question emerged out of the need to move away from a generally 
suppressive authoritarianism that had dominated the last stages of colonialism and 
first four decades of postcolonial rule towards one that strengthened responsiveness 
from the state and entrenched strong pillars of participatory democracy. That desire 
sought to move the nation from its previous 50 years or so that had been dominated 
by two rulers, Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe, whose successive governments had, in 
Sachikonye’s (2011) terminology, literally, turned against the citizens.
It is imperative to note, however, that the deepening economic crisis seemed to 
coalesce different sections into a galvanised opposition to Mugabe’s continued reign. 
Among others, as the Zimbabwean political analyst Ricky Mukonza aptly noted: ‘the 
youth cannot find employment, businesspeople cannot do business because of a 
disabling environment and civil servants cannot get paid at the end of the month 
(Chidza 2016b)’. To this the Zimbabwean academic Maxwell Saungweme added that 
‘the socio-economic problems Zimbabweans are going through are vast and people 
have naturally reached a level where they cannot take it anymore. People have been 
pushed to the wall and the only option is to question the system through action and 
words’ (Chidza 2016b). In the end, as one western diplomat posited, ‘Zimbabweans 
have never faced a future so devoid of hope, there is nothing this government can do 
to fix it. People know that and they want change’ (Raath 2016).
Against the backdrop of a tightening and biting economic crunch, regarding which 
the Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, admitted that the state coffers were 
empty, leading to non-payment of salaries for state workers, President Mugabe had 
reportedly flown to eight countries between January and June 2016 and undertaken 
up to ten trips to Singapore. In addition, former Vice-President Mphoko had been 
staying in the expensive presidential suite at the Rainbow Towers for long periods 
even when the state had purchased a USD 3.5 million house for him (Raath 2016). 
Because the protests were citizen driven, they were vital in bridging the political 
divide amongst Zimbabweans who had in the past been cast in the political polarity 
of ZANU-PF and MDC-T. In this fashion, the protests managed to draw support from 
across the ZANU-PF-MDC-T divide, especially from those who were disillusioned 
by the (already discussed) convulsions that had afflicted these two major political 
parties since 2013. By straddling the political polarity the protests grew in strength as 
they articulated, in non-partisan discourses, the everyday challenges that confronted 
many ordinary Zimbabweans such as the constitutional failure by the government 
to eradicate poverty, enduring corruption, unending and potentially fleecing police 
roadblocks, the desire to stop the government from printing bond notes, the 
annulment of SI 64/2016 and salary delays for civil servants (Raath 2016).
Following the protests, especially the nationwide 6 July 2016 stayaway, the 
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government rescinded some of its policies. Among others, the government realigned 
the civil servants, pay days to fall within the calendar month, reduced the number 
of roadblocks (Kanambura 2016), and it revised SI 64/2016, allowing individuals to 
bring import limited quantities of basic commodities per month without penalties 
(NewZimbabwe 2016a; NewZimbabwe 2016b). 
Catching on the wave of regime change and personal  
aggrandisement?
The converse side of the argument that popular protests kept the democratic struggle 
alive in Zimbabwe is the narrative that some of the leaders of the protests sought 
personal gain, including fame and fortune. This view was largely articulated by the 
ZANU-PF government which even went to the extent of linking some of the leading 
protesters to western-led regime change efforts. Constructed in this modality, the 
popular protesters were regarded as stooges of imperialists whose machinations 
were designed to remove the ZANU-PF from power. Former Home Affairs Minister, 
Ignatious Chombo, amplified this discourse by directly accusing the United States of 
America (USA) and France ambassadors of helping to ‘engineer [the] civil disturbances’ 
and for ‘working through dodgy groups and leveraging on social media to foment civil 
disobedience and ultimately destabilise Zimbabwe’ (Bwititi 2016). Even more telling 
was the insinuation by the state that when Mawarire left the country following his 
release on Wednesday, 13 July 2016, he had gone to the United States of America 
to ‘debrief on his activities and possibly to secure more funding for his campaign’ 
(Chitemba 2016). 
It was also insinuated that some of the protesters acted in order to get recognition 
and political asylum in economically better rewarding countries. In this context, 
appearing to lead the protests was taken to be a new form of career in a search for 
better livelihoods based on the economic gains accrued from the donor community, 
especially from the western countries that were considered to be against President 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s continued reign. Walking the streets of many cities of 
Zimbabwe, it was not uncommon to hear whispers intimating that Mawarire had, for 
example, made a fortune for himself and had secured sanctuary for his family in the 
USA. This was after his family had been granted asylum in the USA. 
Elsewhere, some of the leaders of the protests were regarded as attention seekers. 
Among the most vocal in this camp was former Minister of Higher Education, 
Professor Jonathan Moyo, who characterised Pastor Mawarire’s #Thisflag as simply 
a ‘pastor’s fart in the corridors of power’ (The Zimbabwean 2016). In this fashion, 
the derision did not only dismiss #Thisflag as a fluke, but also categorised it as an 
attention seeking gimmick, targeted to get Pastor Mawarire some publicity or to grow 
congregants of his church. A more damaging attack on Mawarire came through the 
state controlled The Herald newspaper, which ran a headline story on 23 July 2016 
titled ‘Mawarire is no saint,’ which, among other things, alleged that #Thisflag was 
Mawarire’s ‘money spinning venture’ (The Herald 2016) In spite of such attempts at 
defamation, the demonstrators managed to influence the governance of the country by 
forcing the government into implementing some levels of reform and accountability 
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(as highlighted in previous section). As events unravelled, however, it became evident 
that, apart from providing temporary platforms for disillusioned Zimbabweans 
against the country’s leadership, popular protests were unable to sustain as potent 
forces beyond 2016. This was primarily due to lack of coordinated and consistent 
leadership and heightened state repression that was directed against the leaderships 
of these movements.
Conclusions
On the whole, the chapter has demonstrated how popular protests visualised a 
subversion of the grand narratives of the Zimbabwean nation that were formulated 
around unquestioned loyalty to President Mugabe and ZANU-PF, which ratcheted 
pressure on the ZANU-PF government for important pro-people reforms. The 
protests utilised a gap that the crises in ZANU-PF and in MDC-T, as well as a 
worsening socio-economic decline, presented. Besides contributing to the worsening 
livelihood conditions for the majority of Zimbabweans, these crises also demonstrated 
the weakening of the formal CS that had in the 1990s provided a rallying point for 
channelling grievances against the state’s shortcomings and excesses. The enfeebling 
of the CS was based on the entrenched authoritarian rule and growing socio-
economic hardships that generated massive unemployment and the informalisation 
of the economy. Notwithstanding the above, popular protests could not take full 
advantage in their attempts to democratise the country because they faced challenges 
related to state repression, long-term sustainability rooted in the absence of constant 
leadership, a lack of mobilisational capacity, inadequate management skills and also 
legal protection. 
As such, the chapter has showcased the limits of the transgressional tactics 
of engagement of what Chatterjee has termed political society in the struggles for 
greater representation in postcolonial Zimbabwe. What became apparent was that 
the popular protests lacked the strengths of the older CS movements in postcolonial 
Zimbabwe that had been derived from the combination of trade union structures 
and mobilisational capacity interlinked with the leadership skills of middle-class 
intellectuals and professionals. The lack of such structures and the circa early 2000s 
weakening of a middle class not linked to the state in Zimbabwe greatly affected 
the sustainability of the popular protests. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the 
above weaknesses, and the abuses by the state that the demonstrators suffered 
including physical harassment, torture, media condemnation and disappearances, 
popular politics kept the democratic struggles active besides nagging the state into 
implementing some levels of accountability. What needs to be noted, however, is that 
while the popular protests failed to dislodge Mugabe from power, this desire remained 
popular amongst Zimbabweans who supported a military-underwritten removal 
of Mugabe as state president in November 2017 through participating in urban 
demonstrations that, together with a parliamentary impeachment process, sanitised 
the controversial ascendancy to power of President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
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‘We will be back to the street!’: Protest 
and the ‘empires’ of water in Nairobi
Wangui Kimari
You and water can never be close even a little bit, how many days have  
you not washed? – Michi, The Real Househelps of Kawangware
You ask yourself ‘why do people have water and electricity and I don’t?’  
– Youth Leader, Mathare
Introduction
On 25 August 2016 there was a water protest in Mathare, and a resolution was 
prepared for prompt dissemination. Community members from the six wards of this 
poor settlement sent a message to all concerned through the mobile phone platform 
WhatsApp, which I set out unedited below:
25th August 2016 Mathare protest resolution. Let’s petition government to 
remove Nairobi water company CEO for failing to supply adequate, clean and 
safe water. For several months now residents of Mathare and other informal 
settlements have lacked sufficient, clean and safe water to drink and for use 
on there day to day activity at there house, due to cartel surrounding the 
business and incompetency man power. For example residents of Mathare, 
Mashimoni, huruma and ngei in average are forced to purchase water for at 
least ksh 20 per 20ltr up from ksh 5 per 20ltrs on normal days. Today on 25th 
August 2016 resident of Mathare staged a protest along juja road to demand 
the reconnecting of water pipes that has led to water shortage for mathare 
for almost 2week resident blocked road with tires, rocks, mukokoteni, and 
human shield from as early as 8am to 3pm in a bid to attract the attention of 
the relevant authority. The bid by Pangani OCPD, Huruma AP commander 
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and deputy OCS to stop the angry protesters mostly comprised of women 
and children did not succeeded in return they opted to arrest Richard Bonke 
whom they later released unconditional after public opted to continue with 
the protest over night. Most of the protester claimed they have not bathed for 
3days due to lack of water, other claim there haven’t cleans there kids uniform 
keeping in mind school are opening next week, mzee onyango, and mutisia 
claimed there kids are now admitted hospital due to poor hygiene due to 
lack of water. The demo stopped at around 3:30pm after some area started 
receiving some traces of tap water and the release of Richard Bonke. Note: 
this 3rd protest in four months over inadequate water supply, result have 
been the safe the pipes are reconnected after several hours. This were some 
of the resolution. 1.We will be back to the street in case of water shortage and 
supply since is the only solution with immediate answer. 2. A bid to open a 
long time camp across Nairobi on right to clean and safe water. 3. To develop 
a petition to impeach Nairobi water company [CEO] for failing to execute his 
mandate to give clean safe and adequate water to Nairobi resident. 
It is important to note that residents were not protesting the ongoing lack of water from 
taps in their own houses, but the absence of water in the few communal and ‘illegal’ 
water points that dot the landscape, infrastructures usually shared by hundreds if not 
thousands of people (Dafe 2009; MSJC 2019; Kimari 2019). The objective of this 
chapter is to attend to the histories that have enabled these now formalised drought 
conditions and elaborate on the methods that residents of Mathare take up to address 
this situation.
For almost a century Mathare has stubbornly existed within, but also seemingly 
without, Nairobi’s city grids. Despite its endurance and the unusual distinction of 
being (against popularised narratives about ‘recent’ rural-urban migration causing 
slums in Nairobi) one of the city’s oldest neighbourhoods, it remains unconnected 
to the formal water system and other basic services. As a consequence, the residents’ 
actions for water noted above register the persistent and metamorphosising violence 
of uneven urban governance in Nairobi. This is spatial management that, through 
seemingly intentional omission, deprives many residents of basic rights guaranteed 
in the Kenyan Constitution. At the same time, however, the fact that this was the third 
water-related protest in four months and was accompanied by innovative solutions 
(including a call to impeach the CEO of the city water company), illustrates the many 
incremental ways that residents, long tired of pursuing the path of least resistance, 
stake enunciatory and material claims for their rights (Deleuze & Guattari 1987). They 
engage in imperfect ‘messy-labours’ (Simone 2015), comprised of both ‘machinic 
assemblages and collective assemblages of enunciation’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987),1 
to ensure they have water, however temporarily, while also acting to counter narratives 
1  Derived from Deleuze and Guattari (1987) I use ‘machinic’ assemblages to refer to the 
multidimensional physical work residents take up to improve their terrain, while collective 
assemblages of ‘enunciation’ are joined up to index the language residents use symbolically 
to alter the status quo. These assemblages come together to bring about the effects desired by 
their protagonists, although unanticipated consequences may also be produced.
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that position them as undeserving of this resource. To these ends, they organise 
meetings and campaigns like the ones I describe within this chapter, which – in 
the absence of real political will to provide water to the poor – target access to this 
resource while also deploying local narratives that speak of imperial orders to explain 
the absence of, and demand, this service within their community.
 I, therefore, centre ‘the[ir] desperate, indignant, and defiant acts that duress’ can 
produce (Stoler 2016: 35), in this case, the institutionalised lack of a basic service. 
What’s more, I also make evident how Mathare residents narrativise their lives without 
this resource, and, in the context of hypermodern city developments for which the 
public purse always pays, highlight what they see as the continuation of empire in 
their poor region. In the following section, a brief history of Mathare is provided to 
contextualise the chronic lack of water that residents continue to endure. Thereafter, 
under the rubric of ‘waterless scars,’ I document the failures over the years of urban 
planning in Nairobi, before turning to some of the ‘machinic’ and ‘enunciatory’ 
community-led initiatives to ensure residents access to water, and show how they 
frame its scarcity as connected to the persistence of ‘empire’ – an imperial governance 
of the city. I conclude by reviewing my main arguments and suggesting directions for 
future research on water access in Nairobi.
Mathare 
Both in public discourse and in the archival record, Mathare is imagined through a 
number of registers. On a socio-political index it is constructed, as a recent member 
of parliament for the area decreed, as a site of ‘criminals and prostitutes’ (Kimari 
2016). Current and not so current alcohol raids have also firmly entrenched it as the 
headquarters of illegal brew in the city. And while it is also identified sympathetically 
as a ‘slum’ or ‘unplanned settlement’ (County of Nairobi & Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency 2014: 2–4; Médard 2010), there is an unspoken insistence that 
it is unworthy of basic services due to the amorality supposedly fixed in this setting.
While other local ‘slums,’ many of which are also located in the eastern part of 
Nairobi, are subject to similar representations,2 Mathare is consistently constructed 
as a more extremely immoral geography. In this sense, there are definitely hierarchies 
of rectitude applied to this region that legitimise its exclusion vis-à-vis other poor 
urban settlements and Nairobi broadly, even though in geography and population it 
remains relatively small. It is only 3km2 in size and has roughly 350 000 inhabitants 
– significantly less area and population than Kibera and even the Mukuru settlements 
(Muungano Support Trust 2012). Certainly, Mathare is depicted as a site where ‘the 
real thugs live,’ and the habitat of the city’s detritus, casting a long shadow over the 
mainstream ‘visions’ of this East African metropolis.
Elsewhere (Kimari 2017) I have documented how these now normalised positionings 
of Mathare residents as amoral citizens, established over decades, influence urban 
planning discourse and practices, enabling what I argue is spatial governance not of 
inclusion but of neglect and force. This is since these negative framings are popularly 
anchored within the decaying ‘slum’ environment, engendering a space-subjectivity 
2 In my experience, Dandora and Korogocho are framed in similar ways.
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enterprise that, in a ‘cognitive feedback loop’ (Vargas 2006: 51, 63), maps this polluted 
ecology onto residents’ bodies and subjectivities in a process that has been reified, 
formally and informally, across decades. As these monikers of home (and their 
residents) coincide and inform one other, they cascade into the many scales of urban 
spatial management, principally animating the omissions and exclusions within 
‘master-planning’ for Mathare and the other poor settlements of Nairobi. Accordingly, 
such an imperial order reproduces a negative symbiosis between subjects and their 
space in the longue durée and is often called upon to explain shortages of water and 
other basic services.
Despite provisions for the right to water in Article 43 of the Constitution, nationally, 
41% of the Kenyan population relies on ‘unprotected wells, springs or informal water 
providers,’ and another 69%, many of whom live in poor urban settlements, do not 
have ‘access to safe and hygienic toilets or latrines’ (Wekesa 2013). A study conducted 
in Mathare in 2015 found that, on average, about 315 people, and in some areas up 
to 1 500, relied on a single public water point (Corburn & Hildebrand 2015).
 
A more 
recent study by a community organisation identified approximately 117 public water 
points in this settlement. Therefore, if everyone in Mathare needed to use them, it 
would amount to 2 560 residents for each water point (MSJC 2019). Furthermore, 
given both regular leakages and regular shortages, long waiting lines to access water 
are common (Corburn & Hildebrand 2015).
 
In sum, residents of Nairobi’s informal 
settlements are disadvantaged fourfold: they pay more for an inferior supply, inferior 
access and inferior quality (Ng’ethe 2018), even as the governor of the city continues 
to promise ‘water for all’ (Capital News 2019).
Against this background, residents’ life stories highlight what they see as the 
continuation of empire, since the neglect of Mathare – part of the former ‘native 
city’ – began with the colonial administration and continues today, both formally 
and informally, under postcolonial urban governance regimes. As a consequence, 
the grounded discourses expressed by Mathare residents are intentional everyday 
ideological practices contesting an ongoing imperial city management, one that, in 
this case, provokes community members to threaten: ‘we will be back to the street!’.
Waterless scars: The failure of urban planning
Since its early days, Nairobi’s administration has not been immune to accusations of 
investing in inappropriate infrastructures as well as financial malfeasance. Anderson 
(2005) details how in the 1950s colonial city administrators used public monies to 
build swimming pools for their own residences and engaged in numerous nepotistic 
contracting ventures. More recently, in 2015 the governor of Nairobi, Evans Kidero, 
reportedly allocated KES 50 million (Kenyan Shilling) from the county purse in order to 
give the city a ‘face lift’ for former US President Obama’s ‘homecoming,’ a significant 
portion of which went towards planting a few kilometres of what has come to be known 
as ‘Kidero grass’ (BBC 2015b). While these events contribute to an archive documenting 
the proliferating infrastructural irresponsibility and corruption in both local and national 
government operations, it is Mathare residents, and those from similar settlements, 
who know, intimately, the follies of an urban governance that refuses to provide equal 
and accessible basic services to the majority of Nairobi’s residents.
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Historically, municipal documents have often argued otherwise, that the city 
administration consistently invests in, as its current motto provides, a ‘better city, 
better life.’ Nairobi’s first Master Plan, the 1948 Nairobi, Master Plan for A Colonial 
Capital (White, Silberman & Anderson 1948), for instance, purported to eschew the 
racial segregation established in the city since its beginnings as a railway town in 
1899. Rather, the three South African planners who were its authors argued: 
The Master Plan however, is able to be completely neutral on the subject 
of racial segregation by being confined to the principles of planning which 
take their measure on the human and technical needs. It is concerned with 
the satisfaction of wants which all men require such as privacy, open space, 
education, protection from through-traffic, water supplies, etc. The more 
attention that can be devoted to what is common to man the more likely are 
we to concentrate on what can to-day be planned in the light of reason while 
leaving to political and educational action and to the individual to sort out 
the rest. If the plan has a bias it is this humanistic one. (White, Silberman & 
Anderson 1948: 49) 
Of these humanistic claims to universal ‘privacy, open space, education, protection 
from through-traffic [and] water supplies,’ few were made available to all: little urban 
infrastructure was provided for the majority of Nairobi’s residents (Médard 2010; 
Slaughter 2004). 
Scholars such as Hake (1977) and White (1991) document the negative impacts 
of infrastructural distinctions drawn and implemented between the east of the city 
and other more prosperous parts of Nairobi, both before and after this 1948 plan. 
In this context, Londsdale (2001: 220) is able to argue that the colonial metropolis 
‘was a perfect Apartheid city without trying.’ Postcolonial urban governance efforts 
unfortunately cannot be said to have improved on these segregatory practices, in 
particular in areas like Mathare – the former ‘native city.’ Accordingly, Hake (1977: 
248, 99) comments that formal post-independence spatial management practices 
remained ‘ambiguous, half-hearted, confused and self-contradictory’ with little change 
‘since 1922, when the Municipal Council discussed native squatters on Kikuyu Road.’
 Thirty years after Hake’s (1977) evaluation, Owuor and Mbatia (2008) do not 
see any definitive change between the first post-independence urban plan, the 1973 
Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy, and earlier colonial spatial designs. In their 
paper they show how the first postcolonial planning proposal emerged from within 
the embryonic Nairobi Urban Study Group, which sought to chart the development 
of Nairobi until the year 2000. However, despite some of the more progressive 
interventions proposed in this vision, Owuor and Mbatia (2008) contend that this 
1973 submission ‘supported the interests of the hegemonic class alliance of the local 
bourgeoisie and the multinational corporations.’ And, as a result, ‘the urban majority 
were marginalised further and informalisation thrived since the late 1970s to date.’
Subsequent efforts such as the 1988 Nairobi City Commission Development Plan 
and the ‘Nairobi We Want’ forum of 1993, also failed to bring about any substantive 
changes for the majority of poor areas in the city (Owuor & Mbatia 2008: 4). And 
while more recent interventions pursue ‘world-class city’ status, such as the Integrated 
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Urban Development Masterplan for the City of Nairobi (NIUPLAN) (County of Nairobi 
& Japanese International Cooperation Agency 2014) and Nairobi Metro 2030: A World 
Class African Metropolis (2008), when it comes to providing basic services for the large 
number of disconnected city residents, they only inspire what Myers (2015) calls a 
‘jaundiced optimism.’ As a consequence, many Nairobi dwellers, like those in Mathare, 
have to continue to find ways to sustain their own neighbourhoods themselves. 
In terms of access to water, these residents have to bear a quadruple penalty: they 
are exposed to higher costs for a less dependable, accessible and safe water supply 
(Médard 2010; Rodriguez-Torres 2010; Corburn & Makau 2016; MSJC 2019). 
Waterless scars: Local mobilisation
Beyond protests like that of 25 August 2016 highlighted in the introduction to this 
chapter, there have been many fervent collective attempts to change the grave water 
situation in this settlement. For example, Hake (1977) describes an instance in the 
early 1970s when some Mathare residents and their sympathetic MP collaborated to 
take up the cost of laying pipes within a yard of the city’s water arteries, in a bid to 
get formal access to this network for Mathare. This was in the same decade that an 
average of 870 residents shared the same water tap and there were roughly 136 people 
to each latrine (Corburn & Makau 2016: 164). In spite of these collective efforts, the 
city declined to include Mathare in the water network and their inflexibility prompted 
a question that was widely asked in response: ‘Who, then, was responsible if they 
drank impure water?’ (Hake 1977: 161). No one has claimed responsibility yet.
Four decades later, in a series of community meetings held in 2018 and organised 
by local activists, a cross-section of residents of all ages and genders – fathers, students, 
carwash operators, mothers, young workers – continued to lament the absence of 
this basic service. It was noted that even in the formal building where these water 
campaign meetings were being held, the last time anyone had seen ‘even a drop of’ 
water was in November 2016, almost two years earlier.3 
Attendees spoke of the increased costs of water when they purchased it from 
unregulated local providers, expenses far beyond what those connected to formal 
water grids paid, and how this impacted what were already very tiny family economies. 
Speaking to these costs, one participant shared that:
It is expensive to buy because of cartels. In a week people can even pay 900 
shillings [USD 9] if they have kids, when they do not even have 200 shillings 
[USD 2] extra for water.
What’s more, the water that came was ‘so-so’ water, a resource whose providence and 
purity was heavily suspect. Claims were made that it brought typhoid and cholera and 
even caused the death of a brother of one of the water campaign activists, who said of 
his kin: ‘He just fetched water to drink from a jerrican that my mother had bought, 
and the next day he was sick and died.’ 
3 See Anand (2012) and Graham et al. (2013) for similar examples of this in Mumbai.
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For those who came to these community meetings from other peri-urban informal 
locations, such as Kayole and Ruai, complaints of paying for water meter connections 
even when these instruments did not work, and water never appeared, were raised. 
In addition, they lamented that their piping was of poor quality, held together by 
rubber bands, and, especially during the rainy season, had seepage from sewage and 
sanitation systems, making many local residents sick. The extent of illness was so bad 
that, and as one female participant from Kayole shared, ‘in 2017 we had the highest 
cases of cholera in Nairobi.’ The ‘slum’ equivalent of these meters are the neoliberal-
era automated ‘ATMs’ for water that were established with much fanfare in 2015 (BBC 
2015a), but that have since stopped working, and have never been repaired by county 
authorities. 
Besides the costs to purse, health and time, participants also discussed the 
‘stigmatisation by people if you are dirty’ that leads to a lack of self-esteem. In a country 
where ethnic identity can have shifting and tragic salience, the lack of water at times 
contributed to an ethnicised spatial divide in Mathare. For example, one interlocutor 
shared that:
It brings ethnic conflict because, for example, in August 2017 [during the 
elections] there was no water in Mathare except in the 4A and 4B [Luo] area, 
and then people here had to go and buy 20 litres for 50 shillings and even 100 
shillings across the river – this caused conflict.
There were, indeed, many ‘waterless scars’ in Mathare.
Undoubtedly, water rationing occurs in other neighbourhoods in the city, including 
in wealthy areas, and is scheduled to continue for a few years until adequate dam 
infrastructure is built. Notwithstanding these shortages across Nairobi, what 
participants in these Mathare campaign meetings were contesting was not rationing, 
but a systematic absence, what Graham et al. (2013) term ‘systemic dehydration,’ or 
a lack of ‘hydraulic citizenship’ (Anand 2012). This systemic absence is anchored in 
long-term colonial neglect and divestments from populous city areas, providing fertile 
ground for a wide array of actors to build water ‘empires.’ 
The empires of water
‘Empires’ of water in Nairobi, established by local water operators – usually city elites 
with strong connections to the main water regulator – were regularly identified during 
the 2018 community meetings. That they were seemingly above the law and had 
consistent access to water to sell to various consumers even when most of the city was 
‘dry,’ illustrated the reach of their business kingdoms.
In one area close to Mathare, it was reported that despite frequent house fires, 
‘cartels had stopped a fire hydrant from being constructed because they were afraid 
people would get free water.’ At the same time, notwithstanding the criminality 
inherent to these operations, the generous profits produced by these businesses 
proved alluring even to those who suffered from a chronic lack of this resource. So 
much so that one young participant shared how some of his peers were ‘think[ing] 
about getting or stealing water to sell.’
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Unlicensed ‘booster’ pumps that were paid for among neighbours in Mathare, 
and used to tap into the water network, are prohibited and oftentimes confiscated 
violently by the police and Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company (NCWSC) 
officials who accuse residents of ‘dragging water from the main pipes.’ Though these 
officials complain of the ‘waste’ of what they term ‘non-revenue’ water in poor urban 
settlements – water ‘illegally’ tapped from main lines and that could not be costed 
– it was in fact in the more prosperous city areas where more blatant abuse of this 
network was and remains in play (see Kimari 2019; MSJC 2019).
Ultimately, however, it is long-term exclusionary spatial conditions, based upon 
clear ‘biopolitical’ choices (Graham et al. 2013: 123), that have created conditions for 
the development of these mini empires. One respondent at a community meeting 
stated:
I think the people responsible for Mathare are the British because they are 
the ones who took land away from the communities. They forced them to 
establish a slum in Mathare. I also think the leaders who came immediately 
after independence are responsible because they did not return the land 
back to the original owners. And politicians to date, they keep promising 
people that they will change issues, but they don’t, so I think they are also 
responsible.
It is the persistent longue durée neglect in this part of the city by subsequent county 
administrations that is held responsible for the dearth of water in Mathare and in similar 
communities. As is apparent in the interview excerpt below, it is the commodification 
of water in an unequal urban environment that ought to bear the blame:
Water is life! It is becoming a normalised thing that you can sell water. It did 
not used to be this normal in the 1990s, and now people are accepting this 
and there is even rationing. Ten years ago it was not such a big problem, but 
now it is increasingly a commodity when WATER IS A RIGHT! Kwani we 
don’t pay taxes ama? It is our right!
While residents within elite neighbourhoods such as Runda can dig their own 
boreholes and create their own water company that provides water exclusively to this 
wealthy area, Mathare residents are left at the whim of empires, both recent and not 
so recent, that deprive and exploit. At the same time, their incremental actions — 
going to the streets, trying to impeach water CEOs, ‘illegally’ tapping into the water 
system and consistent demands for basic services — appear to be bearing some fruit: 
the governor of Nairobi, who campaigned on the promise of bringing water to poor 
settlements in 2016, had, during our 2018 community meetings, further commited 
himself to this intention, and was to begin with Mathare and a few other spaces. I 
was informed of these governmental promises a few weeks after I had participated in 
a water meeting where the participants were seeking to sue the government for not 
providing water. Okocha (not his real name), a resident and activist, asked me whether 
I had heard of the governor’s new water intentions. And when I replied that I hadn’t, 
he said:
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It [is] as if he has heard all of the work we have been doing and what we have 
been saying. Let us see if he will bring water like he said in the campaign, at 
the same time we will still continue with our campaign.
Conclusion
Nairobi, named after the Maasai term Enkare Nyrobi, the ‘place of cool waters,’ has, 
despite its original name, never been able to provide adequate water for its growing 
population. Certainly, for those who live in the ‘slum’ settlements that persist in what 
was formerly the native city, provision has always been a dream. While Article 23 of 
the 2010 Constitution states that all citizens are legally required to have access to 
‘clean and safe water in adequate quantities,’ those confined to what is considered 
‘informal’ and ‘impermanent’4 regions and infrastructures, have never been privy to 
any formal inclusion in the water network. Their own community efforts, ‘machinic’ 
initiatives – that produce ‘non-revenue’ water – are often criminalised. And their 
voices on the streets of Nairobi – ‘enunciatory’ community-led initiatives – have not 
to date succeeded in enabling long-term access to this resource. As a consequence, 
they continue to pay more for irregular and unsafe water brought to them by various 
‘empires.’
Yet, undoubtedly, there will continue to be many more resident-led efforts directed 
towards finding alternative sources of water, and towards achieving a more just urban 
environment. These are not perfect, and constitute the ‘illegal’ improvisation and 
‘development from below’ that have become the daily enterprise of many of those 
confined to poor neighbourhoods in the Global South (Hake 1977; Bayat 1997, 2000; 
Simone 2004). Future research on ‘systemic dehydration’ in Nairobi should continue 
to document and historicise the long-term denial of ‘hydrological citizenship’ for the 
majority, and how residents narrate the absence of water through a tale that speaks of 
colonial and postcolonial empires, against which they are always ready to protest, to 
come ‘back to the streets.’
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PART III
The global in urban Africa
Edgar Pieterse
This section brings together three chapters on three cities that are amongst the 
most rapidly growing on the continent. With over 20 million inhabitants, Lagos 
surpasses that of other major metropolises on the continent, such as Cairo, and 
is expected to be amongst the world’s largest cities in the next few decades. With 
an estimated 4 and 7 million inhabitants, the cities of Addis Ababa and Luanda, 
respectively, represent a different scale, but with rapid growth rates, they face similar 
urbanisation challenges.
The chapters show that the ways in which city governments deal with rapid 
urbanisation are not only determined by colonial legacies, local histories, politics and 
geographies, but also by the circulation of global knowledge circuits and imaginaries, 
plans, policies that represent the ideal city as ‘world-class’, as well as by global finance. 
The interplay between both domestic and external forces is manifested in different 
ways in each city, but results in similar governance challenges.
All three countries are democratic in name, but federal (in the case of Nigeria and 
Ethiopia) or national (in the case of Angola) governments continue to exercise power 
over cities, limiting the ability of local governments to effectively manage their cities. 
Lagos is different since the state government is a decisive actor but, given the size of 
the state population, still at considerable distance from local communities. In all three 
cities, there is little space for bottom-up civic engagement.
In Lagos, after decades of military rule and urban neglect, the state government 
of Lagos managed to take a proactive approach to urban management. A series of 
flagship projects demonstrate how urban reform has been inspired by examples from 
Dubai and Singapore and framed around the notion of smart cities, but with different 
outcomes.
In Addis Ababa, in spite of the relative autonomy of the city government, the 
flagship Light Rail Transit project was driven by the prime minister’s office as a way 
to mark ‘Ethiopia’s renaissance,’ leading to a record time implementation but at a 
significant financial cost and with unintended negative socio-economic impacts.
The redevelopment of the war-torn Bay of Luanda equally shows how political 
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drivers and top-down decision-making translate into flagship projects that project 
political power. Whereas, as in Lagos, Dubai also represents an important source of 
inspiration, the case of Luanda shows that colonial models and legacies continue to 
influence aesthetical preferences in seemingly contradictory ways.
CHAPTER 9
Africa’s new Dubai? Intersections 
between the global and the local in the 
redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda1
Sylvia Croese
Introduction
Ten years after the end of nearly three decades of civil war, in 2012 then Angolan 
President José Eduardo dos Santos inaugurated the first phase of the redevelopment 
of the Bay of Luanda. Hailed internationally as a successful waterfront redevelopment 
project (PR Newswire 2013) and widely promoted as the ‘new face’ of Luanda 
(Lopes 2011),2 critics see in the redevelopment proof of the capital city’s increasing 
‘Dubaification’ through the emulation of an architecture that is marked by the 
construction of skyscrapers (towers), but also ultra-modern and distinctive airports, 
trade centres, office blocks and retail centres (Elsheshtawy 2013). 
Indeed, according to Power (2012: 15), ‘Dubai has become both a critical reference 
point and a model of the city’s future.’ Vanin (2015: 166) in turn speaks of ‘Dubai-like 
aesthetics’ as a driving paradigm behind most new constructions in Luanda, while 
Blanes (2015) refers to the ‘botox real estate’ that underpins the becoming of ‘Dubanda’.
Such voices echo a growing critique of the increasing emulation across the African 
continent of new models of urbanism represented by cities such as Dubai. Previously 
1  This chapter draws on research conducted with financial support from the UK Government’s 
Department for International Development (DfID) as part of the research project ‘Urban 
Governance and Turning African Cities Around’, managed by the Partnership for African 
Social and Governance Research (PASGR). Parts of this chapter were previously published by 
the author in Croese (2018).
2  For promotional videos see the YouTube channel of the Bay of Luanda: https://www.youtube.
com/user/baiadeluanda 
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seen as part of the ‘Third World,’ Dubai, and cities such as Singapore and Shanghai, 
have now joined the world city hierarchy in which, for decades, cities have been ranked 
according to their place in global capital, service and knowledge production (Hall 1966; 
Friedmann 1986; Beaverstock et al. 1999; Sassen 2001; Taylor 2004). In doing so, they 
have become models of global cities in their own right and examples for (plans for) 
the redevelopment of African cities ranging from Khartoum and Nouakchott (Choplin 
& Franck 2010) to Kinshasa (de Boeck 2011), Kigali (Goodfellow & Smith 2013) and 
Nairobi (Myers 2015). In these cities, urban redevelopment is characterised by iconic 
high-modernist architecture, as well as large-scale urban renewal or restructuring 
through the construction of new satellite cities and close links to global circuits of 
finance and property construction (Watson 2014; Murray 2017). 
While post-war urban redevelopment in Luanda mirrors global world-class city-
making elsewhere, efforts to revive modernist colonial architecture as part of the 
redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda show that alongside Dubai-like futuristic 
aesthetics, internal and historical considerations equally play an important role in 
shaping the city’s built environment. Based on the case of Luanda, the chapter seeks 
to provide a better understanding of the variegated and inherently local drivers and 
dynamics involved in world-class city-making in Africa or the ways in which global 
plans, models and visions of the urban are shaped and adapted at the local level.
Research for this paper was conducted from 2015–2016 as part of a comparative 
research project on urban governance in African cities and involved the review of 
relevant historical and academic literature, as well as grey literature such as government 
policy and research reports, legislation, online media records and archived newspaper 
articles. In addition, interviews and informal conversations were conducted with 
government representatives (central, provincial, municipal/district government level), 
representatives of the private sector and civil society, as well as ordinary residents of 
Luanda.
The chapter will start by outlining the main tenets of the quest for world-class 
city-ness as it has unfolded in Luanda over the first decade after the end of the war. 
It then offers a brief overview of the history of the Bay of Luanda and its post-war 
redevelopment, before turning to the elaboration of the central argument. It concludes 
by reflecting on the usefulness of the case of Luanda for thinking about world-class 
city-making in other African cities and the Global South more generally.
World-class city-making in Luanda: Africa’s new Dubai?
The city of Luanda offers an interesting case study of world-class city-making in Africa 
as, unlike places such as Kinshasa or Nairobi, many urban development plans have 
actually been translated to reality (see Cain 2014 in response to Watson 2014). 
In the decade that followed the end of the war in 2002, Angola became known 
as the posterchild of the ‘Africa rising’ narrative. From a war-torn and failed state, it 
rose up to being Africa’s second largest oil producer, one of Africa’s fastest growing 
economies and an Eldorado for foreign investors (Soares de Oliveira 2015). 
Central to Angola’s rise have been the government’s post-war reconstruction 
efforts, which have been largely financed through oil-backed loans from China. While 
the construction and rehabilitation of basic infrastructures and services have covered 
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the entire country, they have been concentrated in the capital of Luanda, turning the 
city into a permanent construction site. As such, Luanda has been at the centre stage 
of the post-war economic boom, with the city accounting for two-thirds of the national 
GDP which grew at double digit rates in the period between 2002 and 2007. At the 
height of the boom in 2007, 55% of all companies were established in the capital, 
generating 77% of jobs in the private sector and 27% of jobs in the public sector (Alves 
da Rocha 2010). 
Yet, more than simply rebuilding the city’s infrastructures and services, such as 
roads, schools, hospitals, water and energy networks, reconstruction efforts have 
been underpinned by the desire to transform Luanda into a modern ‘world-class 
city’ (Croese 2016). Perhaps the most (in)famous illustration of this desire is the 
construction of the new city of Kilamba, a USD 3.5 billion project financed with 
an oil-backed loan from China and contracted out to the Chinese state-owned 
company CITIC. Other mega projects include the construction of a new port and 
international airport, the latter (still under construction) promoted as ‘Africa’s 
largest airport,’ a Special Economic Zone, (plans for) the creation of a Bus Rapid 
Transit system and major real estate, office and commercial development. All 
of this changed the city’s landscape and skyline, sparking numerous references 
and comparisons by critics as well as admirers to the city as ‘Africa’s Dubai’ (e.g. 
Sonangol Universo Magazine 2008).
As in other aspiring world-class cities, world-class city-making in Luanda has also 
been accompanied by its fair share of urban boosterism or city branding: ‘strategies 
intended to distinguish cities as part of interurban competition which include 
advertising, sloganeering, and marketing tactics’ that construct aspiring world-class 
cities as a commodity to be marketed (McCann 2013: 6). This includes extensive 
media campaigns to advertise the governments’ investments and efforts which 
are broadcast on public television, radio, newspapers and billboards, as well as on 
international channels such as CNN. In addition, government documentaries such as 
Made in Angola3 and promotional videos by the Angolan National Investment Agency 
(ANIP) contribute to an effort to rebrand and promote the country, all with a particular 
focus on Luanda. Over the course of the first post-war decade, Luanda also hosted a 
number of mega sporting events, such as the Africa Cup of Nations in 2010, as well as 
international and regional events and summits, all of which have been accompanied 
by the construction of stadiums and hotels to host visitors. 
These campaigns and events have been implemented against the backdrop of 
the adoption of a number of development plans which, like city development plans 
adopted elsewhere on the continent (Myers 2015), position Luanda as a future 
regional and global hub that is ‘open for business.’ The first one, dating from 2007, 
is the country’s long-term development plan, Angola 2025: Angola a Country with a 
Future: Sustainability, Equity and Modernity, which outlines the country’s vision for 
the future and in this regard speaks of the aim of turning Luanda into a ‘modern, 
efficient, creative and unified metropolis’ that connects the country to the outside 
world (GoA 2007 – part III: X-46). The National Development Plan adopted in 2012 
for the years of 2013–2017 in turn refers to the metropolitan region of Luanda as a 
3  See the MadeinAngola channel on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/MadeInAngolaTV/ 
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‘platform of internationalization’ (GoA 2012: 86). This idea similarly formed the basis 
for the Provincial Development Plan for Luanda for the years 2013–2017, which refers 
to Luanda as already ‘one of the most dynamic and diversified cities of the African 
continent and a leader of great initiatives in its community’ (GPL 2014: 22). 
The new master plan for Luanda launched in December 2015, which was to be 
implemented over the following 15 years, in turn identifies three pillars of change 
which are to transform Luanda into a ‘liveable’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘international’ city. This 
last pillar foresees the establishment of Luanda as ‘a future economic, touristic and 
service pole in Southern Africa’ by ‘keeping its international profile’ and ‘creating world 
standard infrastructure’. More specifically, Luanda’s new port and airport hubs are set 
to ‘bolster Luanda’s regional and global profile, as a centre for services and logistics, 
manufacturing and as a market for agricultural produce to diversify Angola’s economic 
base in a world-class capital city environment’ (GPL 2015: 10). This aim was reiterated in 
Angola’s most recent National Development Plan for 2018–2022 (GoA 2018).
In this context, the redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda represents the epitome of 
efforts towards the positioning of Luanda as a world-class city and a typical illustration 
of the type of imaginary and development usually associated with global world-class 
city-making. Before challenging this initial impression, the next section provides a 
brief overview of the history and redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda.
Redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda
Until independence the Bay of Luanda was known as Avenida de Paulo Dias de Novais, 
after the Portuguese explorer who founded the city of Luanda in 1576. Like waterfronts 
elsewhere in the world, the Bay of Luanda has traditionally been a place of ‘flow’, 
connecting the city/state to the world (Dovey 2005). For centuries, the Bay represented 
the heart of the city, where goods such as rum, food, clothes, sugar and tobacco, as well 
as hardware came into the country from across the Atlantic in exchange for slaves, 
ivory, wax and seeds (do Amaral 1968: 43). 
Until the first half of the 20th century, boats would dock at the entry of the bay, 
along a strip of sand referred to as the Ilha or Island of Luanda (see Figure 1), with 
the connection to the shore made by smaller boats. The construction of a new port, 
with its own wharf, under the urbanisation plan for the waterfront of Luanda (Plano 
de Urbanização da parte Marginal de Luanda) of 1943 and subsequent construction 
works under the Colonial Urbanisation Department, created in 1944 for the design 
and execution of architecture and urbanisation projects in the Portuguese colonies 
(Vaz Milheiro & Dias 2009), shifted the main focus of the city’s movements from the 
centre of the bay to 2km north of the city (do Amaral 1968: 27). 
In a context of rapid economic growth, fueled by a coffee boom, and increasing 
investments in and growth of the city, during the 1950s and 1960s the Bay of Luanda 
became a place of leisure, the symbol of the city’s transformation to modernity and the 
postcard of the jewel of the Portuguese colonial empire (Fonte 2007: 184). According 
to Rossa (2016: 109–110), city-ports like Luanda served to concentrate the political, 
military, and administrative importance of Portugal’s colonial territories and boost 
their economic activities and cultural development, thereby becoming important 
centres of cosmopolitanism.
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After Angola achieved independence in 1975, the name of the waterfront was changed 
to Avenida 4 de Fevereiro, which refers to the date of the start of the armed struggle 
against Portuguese colonial rule in 1961. During the years of war that followed 
independence, the waters of the bay started to become polluted as sewerage and 
drainage systems stopped working as a result of a virtual standstill of public investment 
in urban infrastructures. By the end of the war, raw sewerage continued to flow into 
the bay, roads and buildings were frequently flooded and a substantial volume of 
contaminated sludge was built up in the bay along most of the waterfront and traffic 
on the waterfront was increasingly congested (Booyens 2013).
In 2003 plans were commissioned by the Ministry of Public Works for the 
redevelopment of the bay. A Portuguese businessman, José Carlos Moreira Récio, who 
had been working in Angola since the late 1980s, in collaboration with his Angolan 
partner, António Mosquito, a business man with ties to the ruling party, presented a 
proposal for the redevelopment of the Bay to the government in October of the same 
year in a ceremony assisted by President dos Santos (Nexus 2003). 
Figure 1: Bay of Luanda
Source: Produced for author by Jhono Bennett
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The proposal included, amongst others, plans for the dredging and cleaning of 
the bay, the extension of the waterfront road and the construction of parking lots and 
green spaces. According to the proposal, these works would be financed with private 
funding to the cost of about USD 76 million. In return, the promotors asked the 
government to compensate this investment with land, which would be reclaimed 
using dredged sand of the ocean, in order to create two artificial islands with an area of 
900m2 in the bay of Luanda parallel to the Island of Luanda to be used for private real 
estate development with a projected investment of USD 462 million. The proposal 
was subsequently scheduled to be discussed at the next Session of the Council of 
Ministers, which took place on 30 October 2003 (Nexus 2003).
However, concerns soon arose regarding this plan (Mukuna 2003). A group of 
prominent citizens, including the first prime minister of Angola, Lopo do Nascimento, 
a number of famous Angolan writers and intellectuals, but also professionals such 
as doctors, businessmen, teachers and university students, sent a series of signed 
petitions to President dos Santos expressing their concern with ‘a private project of 
this nature and size’ which went ‘against the traditions and identity of the people of 
Luanda’ and threatened to destruct ‘the soul and mirror of the city of Luanda and 
its ex-libris, its Bay, considered to be one of the most beautiful of the world’. The 
letters furthermore expressed a fear that the project had not sufficiently taken certain 
essential issues into account, such as the environmental, ecological, cultural, geo-
physical and socio-cultural impact of the project. Finally, they stated that, for a project 
such as the redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda to be approved, prior consultation and 
a wide and public debate was required.4 
Notably, decisions regarding the project were delayed while an ‘awareness raising 
campaign’ was launched by the Luanda Waterfront Corporation, the company set 
up to implement the project, reportedly upon the request of the minister of public 
works at the time, Higino Carneiro (Semanário Angolense 2003). This involved the 
organisation of special meetings aimed at journalists and ‘opinion makers’ (Guerreiro 
2004), as well as the publication of a number of advertisements in the daily state 
newspaper Jornal de Angola. 
Eventually, the initial plan was reformulated and the creation of the two artificial 
islands scrapped and substituted by the reclaiming of land along the waterfront and 
Island of Luanda. After its approval by the Council of Ministers in 2005, followed 
by further studies, the completion of the final design and the licensing process, 
construction works under the first phase of the project eventually began mid-2008 
(Angop 2005).
The works under this first phase were largely completed in August 2012 and 
inaugurated on the 70th birthday of President dos Santos on 28 August, three days 
before the country’s second post-war elections. With a total investment of USD 376 
million (almost triple the amount initially projected), the new bay of Luanda now had 
a 3km upgraded promenade with over 2 000 newly planted palm trees, 147 000m2 
pedestrian spaces, about 3km of cycle lanes, ten new open spaces along the beachfront, 
three playgrounds, three sport fields, five basketball courts and five spaces for cultural 
4  Letters signed and dated 28 October 2003, 26 November 2003 and 19 January 2004. Copies 
kindly made available by Associação Kalu and in possession of author. 
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events, in addition to a new waste water system, a six-lane road (three-ways each), a 
fuel station and a fly-over connecting the waterfront to the Island of Luanda (Expresso 
2012; SBL 2015).
In return for the investment made, Sociedade Baía de Luanda (SBL), the holding 
company set up to finance the project, received a 30-year concession for all publicity 
outdoors along the waterfront; a 30-year concession for all retail spaces along the 
waterfront; and a 30-year concession for access to all newly built 3 100 parking spaces 
along the waterfront, in addition to 60 years’ land development rights of three plots 
of land of 38 hectares that had been reclaimed during the process (Resolution 51/05 
of 26 October). 
Office and residential development on the three plots of reclaimed land on ‘prime 
locations’ along the waterfront and Island of Luanda started in 2013 as part of the 
second phase of the project (Interview SBL, 9 July 2015). In addition, this phase 
included the installation of kiosks at strategic points along the promenade to function 
as restaurants, snack bars and shops, introducing the concept of ‘open air shopping’ 
and turning the waterfront into a ‘point of reference within the capital for internal and 
foreign tourism’ (Angola Today 2016).
Retrospective city-making: Backward into the future5
As outlined in the previous section, references to modernity and the future are rife in 
the numerous plans that underpin Luanda’s post-war redevelopment. These reflect 
an overall desire to do away with the past and the poverty, informality and disorder 
associated with it, a common feature of urban planning in the Global South (Watson 
2009). Similar references can be found in the promotion material produced in the 
planning phase of the redevelopment of the Bay. Advertisements refer to the project 
with the slogan: ‘the future starts now’, while the start of construction works was 
marked by a billboard which alerted those passing that ‘the future is arriving to our 
Bay’. In various magazines and publications promoting the project, the redeveloped 
Bay has been referred to as the face of the ‘new Angola’ and the symbol of Angola’s 
efforts to construct ‘a bold new country’. Promotional material published for the 
occasion of the 440th anniversary of the city in January 2016, in turn celebrates 
Luanda as ‘a city turned towards the future’ (see Figure 1). According to Vaz Contreiras 
(2013: 126), this is part of a process of starting anew: by ‘giving the postcard image of 
the City of Luanda – its Bay – a new face it claims a new post-colonial originality and 
can therefore claim a new history’.
However, more seems to be at play as the image accompanying the promotional 
material of 2016 includes an image of the Bay of Luanda taken in the early 1950s. This 
illustrates a recurring pattern in which references that portray the Bay as a symbol of 
modernity and the future are almost systematically accompanied by references to the 
past and the need to restore the Bay to its ‘original’ state.
5  I draw here on the title of the conclusion to John Friedmann’s (2005) book China’s Urban 
Transition.
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Other examples include promotional material on the project published in the daily 
state newspaper Jornal de Angola when the redevelopment was still in its conceptual 
stages, explaining that:
This project was conceived to meet the need to give back to the bay its natural 
splendour, upgrading Avenida 4 de Fevereiro – Marginal, turning it into the 
unequivocal signifier of the city of Luanda. […] This is our dream, the dream 
of revitalizing the image of our capital, the dream that will celebrate its 
unequalled beauty and energy.
According to an architect from the Portuguese firm that was involved in the design of 
the project, conscious efforts were made to ensure the continuity of the new design of 
the Bay with its original state.
The design was based on the idea of the city as a place of encounter. The 
Marginal is not a new place, it was already heritage of the city, what was 
attempted was to turn it into something closer to current times, something 
Figure 2: Luanda: a city turned towards the future
Source: Sociedade Baía de Luanda, 2016
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more contemporary, allowing for a more universal use. […] The strategy was 
to create a spatial structure of continuity, not of rupture (Interview architect 
Costa Lopes, Luanda, 4 December 2015)
With reference to the completion of the first phase, SBL’s business development 
manager in turn highlights the way in which the project has achieved the almost 
impossible task of reviving the historical image of the Bay as it was known in the 
heyday of colonialism:
There is the environmental aspect, because the project cleaned the bay of 
Luanda, which is, […] a symbolic area of the city. In all the pictures of the city, 
even the old ones, the bay of Luanda appears as a postcard of the city. It was 
a shame that this postcard had become polluted, its image had become worn 
out. So, this image was cleaned, the waters were cleaned, and today we can 
for instance see dolphins in the bay, something once unthinkable (Interview 
SBL, Luanda, 9 July 2015)
References to history and heritage in contemporary urban development projects are 
not new and especially common in projects involving urban waterfront regeneration. 
Projects across the world, ranging from the redevelopment of Zanzibar’s Stone Town 
(Hoyle 2002), to the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront Development in Cape Town 
(Ferreira & Visser 2007), or waterfront development in Singapore (Chang & Huang 
2011) mobilise history and heritage in different ways. However, these references 
usually function to attract outside heritage tourism or investment or serve as a way to 
pay lip service to local heritage lobbies or global sustainability agendas and sources of 
funding. 
These motives may not entirely be disregarded for the case of Luanda, as we have 
seen that initial plans for the creation of artificial islands in the bay were reformulated 
in response to resistance from a group of prominent residents of the city. However, 
the way in which the redeveloped waterfront subsequently was planned to mirror its 
original colonial design goes beyond paying lip service to these demands, but rather is 
reflective of a more deep-seated and structural way in which post-war urban policies 
and planning are informed by the country’s colonial past rather than a clear vision of 
the future. This kind of retrospective city-making in turn extends beyond the revival 
of a certain historical aesthetics to the mobilisation of associated notions of grandeur, 
allowing for the creation of ‘spaces of power’ (Mabin 2015).
Indeed, the redevelopment of the bay of Luanda does not stand on its own but 
forms part of a wider project of urban redevelopment and renewal of the city’s 
politico-administrative centre and associated public buildings and infrastructures that 
surround the bay, with the aim of allowing for the return of the country’s President 
and political power to the city centre after years of absence. 
Ever since proclaiming the country’s independence in 1975, the ruling Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party has been based in the capital of 
Luanda, from where it waged a war with the forces of the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the countryside. However, during most of the 
war, President dos Santos (in power from 1979 to 2017) operated from a presidential 
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compound located outside the city centre in an area called Futungo de Belas (see Map 1). 
According to the Angolan anthropologist António Tomás (2012: 97), in colonial times 
Futungo de Belas was the summerhouse of the governor, while the Cidade Alta (High 
City) was his official residence. In 1975, Agostinho Neto, the first Angolan president, 
transformed the governor’s palace into his presidential palace, but a few years later he 
established his official residence in Futungo de Belas. His successor, dos Santos, in 
the context of cold and civil wars, transformed the entire area of Futungo de Belas into 
a military compound. During these years, the state and people became increasingly 
disconnected, with the state failing to fulfil even basic state functions. 
When the war was seen to be coming to an end in the mid-1990s, preparations 
started to move the seat of the president back to the Cidade Alta, the part of the city 
which overlooks the Bay and Island of Luanda and the traditional headquarters of 
political power ever since the foundation of Luanda. In the following years, works 
developed under this project consisted of the rehabilitation of some of the main 
buildings in the politico-administrative centre, such as the presidential palace, and 
the completion of a memorial centre around the mausoleum containing the remains 
of President Neto. Works also included the expansion of the area with road works, 
laying a new main road southward called the New Marginal or Nova Marginal, as well 
as the construction of a new High Court and a new National Assembly. In line with 
the colonial continuity sought in the design of the redeveloped waterfront, the new 
building of the National Assembly, inaugurated in 2015, is modelled after the National 
Bank of Angola, another symbol of the neoclassical architecture of the Portuguese 
Estado Novo which was concluded in 1956 and which has since been a landmark of 
Luanda’s skyline. 
Moreover, since the conclusion of the initial works in the politico-administrative 
centre and the first phase of the redevelopment of the Bay of Luanda, the area has 
served as the primary location for the realisation of key events such as President dos 
Santos’ inauguration after his first official election as President in 2012 and military 
marches which display the state’s power on the day that marks the anniversary of 
the start of the country’s armed struggle for independence. More recently, plans 
were presented to extend the site with the construction of a new neighbourhood, 
called the Bairro dos Ministérios or Neighborhood of Ministries, which would link the 
new National Assembly to the Presidential Palace in the Cidade Alta and house 28 
ministerial buildings, including a building for the Council of Ministers, a convention 
centre and an exhibition space (Jornal de Angola 2019).
Hence, while in cities such as Dubai the ‘technology of symbolic power’ or the 
development of world-class infrastructures and the construction of iconic buildings 
primarily serves to ‘seduce a global audience’ (Acuto 2010: 276), the redevelopment 
of the Bay of Luanda forms an important part of a wider project that serves to convey 
a political message about the nation-state, not just to an international but also to 
a domestic audience. From this perspective, the redevelopment of the bay – while 
incorporating some elements of global plans and models of ‘word-class’ urban 
development – forms part of an effort to project political power onto the physical 
landscape, a common feature of capital cities in postcolonial Africa, especially in the 
early years of independence (Bekker & Therborn 2011). In doing so, the city becomes 
a vehicle for the national government to convey messages about the state and invoke 
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global imaginaries of modernity and development, even in the face of pervasive levels 
of widespread urban poverty and deprivation. 
Indeed, while the waterfront is widely used as a public space for leisure, it is largely 
disconnected from the rest of the city and inaccessible for most of Luanda’s nearly 
7 million residents who inhabit the vast informal settlements spread out in the city’s 
periphery. The costs of products sold in the waterfront shops also mean that most of 
its patrons are among Luanda’s most well-off residents. Hence, while branded as a 
landmark to attract foreign investors and tourists, the bay is mainly visited by locals. 
Similarly, the main investors in both the first and second phase of the redevelopment 
have been Angolan. Following the drop in oil prices and the ensuing economic crisis 
of 2014, during which much real estate construction and development ground to a 
halt, the Angolan government intervened and nationalised the bay by assuming all 
rights to the exploitation and development of the waterfront and surrounding areas, 
leaving no doubt as to who was in charge all along.
Conclusion
Luanda represents an example of increasing attempts across the African continent 
towards world-class city-making in the image of new global city models represented 
by cities such as Dubai. Futuristic and iconic architecture and aesthetics mark (plans 
for) the construction and redevelopment of waterfronts, shopping centres and entire 
new cities across Africa.
However, the case of Luanda also shows that alongside these global and futuristic 
imaginaries, historical models and legacies continue to influence aesthetic preferences 
in seemingly contradictory ways. Numerous other plans have emerged in Luanda’s 
post-war years which involve the revival or restoration of unfinished ambitions dating 
from late colonial times, such as plans for the development of the Island of Luanda 
and the area of Futungo de Belas and architects, contractors and companies involved 
are often from Portugal (Fonte 2007). At the same time, such efforts go hand in hand 
with the demolition of icons of colonial modernist architecture, such as the Kinaxixe 
market, and their replacement with new and shiny shopping centres. 
Projects such as the redevelopment of the bay are then indicative of the ways in 
which utopia and nostalgia intersect in the remaking of a postcolonial city such as 
Luanda (Siegert 2014). While problematic in terms of the selective mobilisation and 
appropriation of colonial memories of grandeur and modernity for political purposes 
and the uncritical reproduction of a misplaced sense of colonial nostalgia, such 
tendencies do not necessarily have to be seen as oppositional. Instead, they should 
be seen as a reflection of the ways in which global models of urban planning are 
provincialised through local histories, interests, politics and laws (Datta 2015).
Hence, the case of Luanda contributes to an understanding of the variegated local 
drivers and dynamics that may be involved in practices of world-class city-making in 
postcolonial as well as post-conflict contexts. The study of the different dynamics of 
city planning, development and renewal as they are currently arising and developing 
across the African continent may in turn prove useful for re-thinking notions and 
practices of world-class city-making across the wider Global South. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Urban governance and smart future 
cities in Nigeria: Lagos flagship projects 
as springboard?
Muyiwa Elijah Agunbiade, Oluwafemi Olajide & Hakeem Bishi
Introduction
Lagos colony emerged from the creation of a geographical entity known as Nigeria, 
through the amalgamation of the southern and the northern protectorates by the 
British in 1914. This, supposedly, set the stage for the building of a prosperous and 
egalitarian society. Agunbiade and Olajide (2016: 1), note that the ‘quality of physical 
form, socio-economic structure and governance outlook of what later became of 
Nigerian cities are products of many interacting forces over time and space’. The 
historical and political development of Nigeria can be generally categorised into three 
eras – pre-colonial (years before 1861), colonial (1861–1960) and postcolonial (1960 
– present). Agunbiade and Olajide (2016) further discuss the political dimension 
of governance in Lagos, in time and space, as well as the implications on urban 
development and service delivery.
In the early years of Nigeria, there was less need for infrastructure development. 
In addition, the governance arrangement remained effective in meeting the needs of 
the indigenous society. The period of colonial administration, particularly from 1900, 
has been described as a period of rapid urban growth and metropolitan expansion. 
Major cities like Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano experienced dramatic changes in 
population. For example, the population of Lagos increased marginally from 25 518 in 
1871 to about 40 000 in 1901, and subsequently to 267 407 in 1953 and was projected 
to have risen to 662 246 by 1963 (Mabogunje 1961). As noted by Decker (2010), this, 
however, led to several social problems and corresponding poor urban management. 
The consequences of these included inadequate social infrastructure, poverty and 
massive rural-to-urban migration that could not be effectively managed or contained 
within the regulatory capacity of the government.
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The structure of government since Nigeria’s independence in 1960 has been that 
of three distinct administrative levels – national, state and local government areas – 
each with defined spheres of jurisdiction and constitutional functions. Lagos region 
emerged as one of the federating states in 1967 and has since dominated the country’s 
socio-political landscape despite its relatively small land area, the smallest in the 
country.
The country’s political trajectory, shortly after independence in 1960, ended in 
jagged governance systems. Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed 
political and economic instability occasioned by continuous military interference in 
the political and governance system. As noted by Gandy (2006), the successive military 
governments reinforced the earlier colonial forms of social, economic, political and 
spatial inequality. The military interrupted the political structure in 1966 and ruled 
from 1966 to 1979 and once again between 1983 and 1993. Thereafter was a mix of 
military and civilian rule until 1999. In all, the military had ruled Nigeria for a total of 
34 years. The military ruled without respect for the rule of law and no specific political 
will to pursue any meaningful development agenda (Agunbiade & Olajide 2016).
At the close of military rule in 1999, Nigeria had declined politically and economically. 
While most other countries in transition and with similar economic prospects and 
a natural resource base were advancing and aiming at developing productive cities, 
this was stymied by vandalism, lawlessness, and grossly inadequate infrastructures 
in many cities in Nigeria. However, in a relatively short period of time, commencing 
precisely from year 1999, Lagos went from a basket case to one of the examples of 
a well-run African city with promising prospects. The potential of Lagos was always 
framed in terms of its potential and capacity to become ‘world-class’. 
From this perspective, reformers have been heavily influenced by specific examples 
of urban efficiency and prosperity, for example, Dubai, Singapore, etc. There is a 
desire to become Africa’s main financial services and economic hub, a key node in the 
locational dynamics of economic globalisation. To achieve this, determined political 
leaders have embarked on ambitious policy reforms and flagship projects. In the 
more recent years this modernisation agenda has been framed by the smart cities 
discourse, manifest most acutely in fashioning the character of Dubai. In order to 
explicate one aspect of how the global manifests in the local, the chapter focuses on 
the relevance and impact of smart city discourses on governance and policy priorities 
of Lagos, using the transition from neglect to proactive urban management as context. 
Transition from neglect to proactive urban management
At the turn of the millennium, owing to the long period of infrastructure and services 
neglect, Lagos already demonstrated signs of urban decay and inefficiency in all its 
sectors. This resulted in a chaotic mixture of socio-economic and environmental 
problems, manifested in high incidence of slum formation, inequality, poverty, 
unemployment, overcrowding, crime, violence, pollution and urban disorder. 
Evidently, these are contrary to the ideology of a smart city, which seeks to improve the 
efficiency of infrastructure and services and, in turn, the quality of life of the citizens. 
The emerging nuanced discourse of smart cities in Lagos is a combination of many 
factors including political stability and a steady development policy framework backed 
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by visionary leadership, political will and strategic spatial planning mechanisms. Also 
important to recognise is the tremendous improvement in the city’s economy and 
government revenue base. The improvement of the revenue base stemmed from 
effective reform of taxation systems which brought considerably more resources into 
the public purse. 
From the available data, Lagos currently generates about 75% of its income from 
internally generated revenue (IGR) and is unarguably the most financially viable state 
in Nigeria today. The increase in the state government’s revenues resulted in huge 
investment in urban development plans (model city plans, regional master plans 
and integrated transportation master plans), transportation facilities, new housing 
schemes, new industrial and commercial districts (Lekki Free Trade Zone and Eko 
Atlantic City), healthcare facilities, city beatification and slum regeneration efforts. 
These are tagged as flagship projects (Table 1 on p. 136). Several of these projects have 
attracted global acclaim and interest while serving as potential platforms for advancing 
smart city initiatives. Taken together, they are expected to provide an opportunity 
to examine the intersection of ICT, digital Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) and 
sustainable good urban governance in the smart city aspirations of Lagos.
Conceptualising urban governance, smart city and flagship project
There seems to be some commonalities or overlaps between good urban governance 
and smart city debates as presented by some scholars, such as Dirks and Keeling 
(2009), Hatzelhoffer et al. (2012), Komninos, Pallot and Schaffers (2013). From the 
views presented by these scholars, it could, however, be argued that every city with 
good urban governance is not necessarily smart, but every smart city has good urban 
governance components. To advance this argument, it will be necessary to put in 
proper perspective what urban governance is and how it relates to the smart city.
Urban governance
There is extant literature relating to the definitions of governance (World Bank 1989; 
McCarney, Halfani & Rodriguez 1995). The World Bank (1989: 60) defines governance, 
at the national scale, as the exercise of power in the management of a nation’s affairs. 
Within the context of this paper, focusing on the urban scale, governance is described 
as the relationship between civil society and the state; between rulers and the ruled; 
and between the government and the governed (McCarney, Halfani & Rodriguez 
1995). Governance involves a variety of actors – formal and informal/traditional, local 
and international – who share responsibility to govern and exercise power through 
a multiplicity of instruments. Central to this exercise of power are the people: the 
government and the governed. This is usually shaped through continuous interactions. 
In this regard, the quality of relationships amongst the various stakeholders (rulers 
and the ruled) and the instruments involved are critical. 
The outputs of governance within the urban systems is a product of many 
interacting forces resulting from diverse decisions taken by city administrators 
(state) and a spectrum of people (agency). These decisions are informed by the 
desire to satisfy certain motives. Depending on what these motives are, the society 
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is continuously shaped and modified by the outcomes. Some scholars (Beall & Fox 
2009; Harvey 1989, 2007; Vliet 2002), have commented on the political economy 
implications of injecting neoliberal ideology into spatial planning and development to 
support corporate capital accumulation and foreign investments in most developing 
countries, especially in Africa. These days, urban administrators are being guided 
by the contemporary events and fashionable policy discourses circulating around 
the world. Some of the significant ones being issues, discussions and conventions 
around: climate change, sustainable development, smart city initiatives, city deals, and 
the internet of things.
It is not unusual for thinkers to suggest that developing countries can jumpstart 
their socio-economic development by aligning local policies to leverage contemporary 
global thinking and development trends, for instance, green economy (UNEP 
2011); and ICT for development (Pieterse 2010). However, beyond the rhetoric and 
buzzwords, as Watson (2004) termed some of them, there are some fundamental 
issues that need to be considered when discussing these trending issues. The focus of 
this chapter centres on smart city initiatives and good urban governance. Governance 
in this respect is considered to be an institutional factor in the smart city initiative. In 
other words, the motive of city administrators will determine the depth and perception 
of smart city initiatives and how these are translated to policies, especially with regards 
to flagship projects being embarked upon by government.
Smart city
The smart city is conceptually defined as ‘an urban space that is surrounded by 
or is embedded with smart systems or a city with ideas and people that provide 
clever insights’ (Anthopoulos 2017: 7). Eremia et al. (2017: 14) noted that ‘the term 
incorporates elements of sustainability and social inclusion, at the same time being 
suited to the evolutions of the new internet technologies.’ However, Albino, Berardi, 
and Dangelico (2015) observed that it remains a fuzzy concept. Clearly, there are 
conceptual variants of the term as some scholars have replaced smart with alternative 
adjectives like: digital (Shin & Kim 2012), intelligent (Komninos 2008), knowledge 
(Yigitcanlar, O’Connor & Westerman 2008), ubiquitous (Leem & Kim 2012). Albino 
et al. (2015) observe that, in the urban planning field, the term is treated as a normative 
claim and has an ideological dimension, that is, being smarter entails having strategic 
direction. Governments and public agencies now use ‘smart city’ as one of the 
contemporary master signifiers for urban development programmes and policies 
which aim to achieve sustainable development, sound economic growth, and better 
quality of life (Gunder & Hillier 2009). 
Since the emergence of the sustainable development principles in the Brundtland 
Commission Report of 1987, the concept and practice have witnessed several 
transitions. The evolution and application of the concept has also been expanded to 
accommodate the digital and development realities of the last three decades. From the 
theoretical grounding and applications of the concept in the 1990s; to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) experience of the 2000’s, and now the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), the core principles have not only survived, but they have 
also shaped most global development discourses since their emergence. During the 
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same period, the smart cities movement was also developing and the digital realities 
of today have fuelled the sustained relevance and nexus of both concepts.
While precursors to the smart city concept first appeared in development discourse 
during the early to late 1990s, the conceptual evolution is traced to different terms 
ranging from digital city to future city and more. Although the article by Graham 
and Aurigi (1997) on web or virtual city is widely cited as one of the pioneer literature 
related to the present-day smart city concept, Anthopoulos (2017) showed that different 
cities around the world were gradually transitioning into future and digitally smart 
city approaches as early as 1994 but all took different pathways in their evolution. 
The different individual baby steps of those days (including basic efforts such as map 
digitisation, geographic information systems, e-commerce, e-government, e-library, 
e-books, computerisation of work processes, wireless broadband and databases etc.) 
have now collectively crystallised to drive the current ICT-focused smart city agenda. 
Today, smart city considerations are increasingly becoming integrated into 
sustainable development discourse in many cities around the world, including Lagos. 
For instance, since 2016 the Lagos State Government has been vigorously promoting 
a comprehensive Smart City Programme that seeks to provide a 24-hour driven 
economy with recent announcements to install 10 000 high definition CCTV cameras 
around the state among other future interrelated projects (Onwuaso 2018). This will 
be expected to build on the reported ‘installation of free wifi infrastructure across 
the city’ in 2017 (Raji 2018). While information technology is elevated as the central 
tool to achieve the smart city objective, it seems the ultimate target is socio-economic 
development of Lagos and its people. 
However, a closer look at different stakeholders confirms that this is being viewed 
from divergent perspectives and thus, it means different thing to different people. For 
instance, Nigeria’s National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) 
adopts what it calls a ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ to help drive the smart city project 
in Lagos1 while establishing the Nigeria Smart City Initiative (NSCI) in February 2016. 
The agency’s primary vision is to champion e-governance in Nigeria but the trick is 
to align and balance social goals with private business opportunities for the ultimate 
public good.2 With Lagos’ reputation as Nigeria’s centre of innovation and business 
excellence, it is only to be expected for the agency to view the Lagos smart city project 
as requiring public-private collaboration. Some urban development professionals, on 
the other hand, think there is a ‘missing link’ between the future smart city aspirations 
and the core infrastructure required for Lagos to survive.3 
Ekwealor (2016) contends that while a smart city ‘has digital technology embedded 
across all of its functions’, Lagos is currently facing a deluge of debilitating infrastructural 
challenges including energy shortage, and the absence of basic databases required to 
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and unpredictable tax systems in Lagos, the smart city aspirations are not misplaced, 
but cautioned that it may be better to pursue Lagos as a smart ecosystem of which 
the government smart city initiative is only a component. Abiodun (2016) noted that 
Dubai had laid the foundations for essential infrastructure of a smart city starting in 
the 1990s. Therefore, promoters of the Lagos smart city project must understand 
that there is no shortcut around it. Rather it is an incremental development process, 
gradually evolving out of a strategic plan with specific elements of achievable targets.
Some scholars, like Bakıcı, Almirall and Wareham (2012); Marsal-Llacuna, Colomer-
Llinàs, & Meléndez- Frigola (2015) and Zygiaris (2013), consider a smart city as a city 
that innovatively and creatively builds on its resources and assets, with a view to achieving 
a healthy environment, better living conditions, retain and enhance local economy, 
efficiently use city resources. Others, such as Caragliu, Del Bo and Nijkamp (2011) and 
Giffinger et al. (2007), argue that a smart city should not be limited to the integration 
of various ICT systems and solutions to manage the city resources, but that due 
consideration should be given to the people; hence, its human and social capital.
Caragliu et al. (2011: 50) observed that a city can be defined as ‘smart when 
investments in human and social capital and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) 
communication infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality 
of life, with a wise management of natural resources, through participatory action 
and engagement’. Put differently, a smart city not only possesses ICT, but also deploys 
it in a manner that impacts the local community and the environment positively. 
Furthermore, it should positively enhance regional competitiveness, transport, and 
information and communication technologies, economics, natural resources, human 
and social capital, quality of life, and participation of citizens in the governance of cities 
(Giffenger et al. 2007). In this regard, Albino et al. (2015: 4) argued that consideration 
should be given to strategies that enhance and ‘enable transportation linkages, mixed 
land uses, and high-quality urban services with long-term positive effects on the 
economy’.
In spatial planning and development discipline, smart city is often considered as 
an ideology which prioritises and integrates investment in critical infrastructure and 
human capital through institutional strategic policy directions (Nam & Pardo 2011; 
Albino et al. 2015). Drawing on this understanding and to allow for a better structuring 
of thoughts, this chapter considers flagship projects within the context of smart city 
plans based on three pillars: smart policy, smart investment, and smart technology. 
These are further expanded into six dimensions: smart economy, smart mobility, a 
smart environment, smart people, smart living, and smart governance and how each of 
these are related to different aspects of urban life and urban living as presented by 
Giffinger and Gudrun (2010) and Lombardi et al. (2012).
Shapiro (2006) argues that smart cities start from the human capital dimension: 
governance and policy, rather than assuming that ICT can automatically create smart 
cities. From this perspective, Giffenger et al. (2007) conceptualises a smart city as one 
with positive outcomes in the aspects of governance, economy, mobility, environment 
and patterns of living. With this view, it could be argued that for a city to be smart, 
the governance structure and policy thrust should equally be smart. In other words, a 
smart city should have a strong governance-orientated underpinning that emphasises 
the role of social and human capital as well as good interactions to facilitate urban 
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development. In addition, it must be able to deliver city deals of a shared vision for the 
city’s productivity and livability. This will be achieved through coordinated investment 
and a collective plan for growth in the given city underpinned by suitable regulatory 
reforms and policies.
From an investment and economic perspective, smart city is expected to be 
structured to deliver long-term economic returns to all stakeholders. This, according to 
the Government of Australia (2016), involves: prioritising projects that meet broader 
economic objectives; treating infrastructure funding as an investment wherever 
possible; getting involved early to ensure rigorous planning and business cases; and 
increasing investment. This is, however, a contested issue in highly unequal societies, 
like many sub-Saharan African cities, where the majority struggle to cope with basic 
needs. From this perspective, there is limited general public support for investment 
in the smart city (Downs 2005), despite its normative ideology that it will promote 
social equity and inclusionary governance (Scott 2007). The implementation often 
shifts development benefits away from the majority through the exploitation of 
market mechanisms of capital accumulation (Scott 2007; Gunder & Hillier 2009). 
Therefore, arguably, contrary to its normative ideology, smart cities often promote 
social inequality and exclusionary governance through predominant market forces 
(Scott 2007). Paradoxically, while the market mechanisms of capital accumulation are 
enhancing the development of smart cities, they are also becoming barriers for socio-
economic sustainability and inclusive development owing to higher cost of living 
(Anthony 2006; Scott 2007).  
The third pillar is smart technology. Thinking about technology has been the 
interest of most governments and investors with regards to smart city initiatives. As 
cities evolve and new technologies emerge at a very high rate, cities are expected to 
leverage these technologies. For example, this means that cities should take advantage 
of open and real time data to drive the use of energy efficient technologies, especially 
with regard to investing in smart intermodal public transport systems. Considering 
these, therefore, the role of spatial data infrastructure in smart future cities is very 
fundamental. Harrison et al. (2010: 1) observe that the term denotes an ‘instrumented, 
interconnected and intelligent’ city. As described further by Harrison et al. (2010), 
instrumented is the capability of acquiring and integrating real time data through the 
use of sensors and devices. While interconnected refers to the integration of these data 
into a computing platform for better utilisation through various city services. To be 
intelligent, however, denotes there will be complex analytics, modelling, optimisation, 
and visualisation services to make better operational and policy decisions. These are 
the technical underpinnings of an evidence-based approach to urban governance 
which is something the smart city promises to achieve.
Urban governance, technology and smart city: The intersect
As illustrated by Nam and Pardo (2011), the three main dimensions of a smart city are: 
technology, people, and institutions (Figure 1). Significant in this equation are data 
that assist city administrators to make informed decisions about human settlements.
Examining the connections between these factors, a city will be considered smart 
when investments in human/social capital and IT infrastructure stimulate sufficient 
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sustainable growth and enhance better quality of life, through participatory governance 
(Caragliu et al. 2011). This intersect could potentially find expression in flagship 
projects.
Flagship projects
For a better understanding, it is important to contextualise flagship projects within 
the smart city initiatives. In this regard, it will be reasonable to know what constitutes 
a flagship project and how this is connected to smart city initiative. Most importantly, 
how significant are these projects within an urban setting? What role do they play in 
shaping the future growth and development of our cities? How are they helping to 
improve the quality of life of residents?
The first approach is to see this from the lens of new urbanity. As argued by Harvey 
(1989), new urbanity is achieved through recreating the urban space by relying on 
large-scale and symbolic projects, largely describing the evolution of the neoliberal 
city in which the state relinquishes its service provision role and assumes that of a 
collaborator in an entrepreneurial activity. The twin approaches of globalisation and 
liberalisation, as described by Swyngedouw et al. (2002), influence the production of 
new forms and scales of governance and the relationship between flagship projects 
and political, social, economic power relations in the city. 
While Lagos may still lack the advanced institutional systems and structural 
capacities of similar megacities of the global North, the conception, design, financing 
Figure 1: Fundamental components of a smart city 
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and implementation of the selected flagship projects are modern, ambitious and 
global in outlook. As the next sections will show, proponents of these projects mostly 
envisaged them as iconic and, in some cases, uncommon on the African continent. 
Financed through public-private partnerships, the political leadership in Lagos has 
attracted local and foreign private investors to participate in urban redevelopment 
activities while guaranteeing returns on their investment. To achieve this, the local 
power relations rely on a delicate balance of political compromise and patronage. 
De Gramont (2015: 1) summarised these unique processes thus: ‘governance 
transformation in Lagos was driven by a technocratic vision of a modern megacity 
but relied on creative policy proposals that also served multiple political interests’. The 
next section discusses the methodology for analysing the Lagos case study.
Methodology for Lagos case study
There are many approaches and schools of thought for developing knowledge. 
As described by Kitchin and Tate (2000) these include: empiricism, positivism, 
behaviouralism, idealism, realism, postmodernism and feminism. The realist 
approach is considered consistent with the central issues discussed in this paper. 
This involves the investigation of underlying mechanisms and structure of the social 
relations while still using a scientific approach. This is in addition to content analysis of 
available documents; newspaper articles, to understand the space in which discourse 
has emerged and in which it acquires meaning. Hollands (2008) identified three 
different discourses in the definitions and criteria that are selected to describe smart 
cities in African cities: infrastructure-based services; business-led urban development; 
and social inclusion, learning and development. It is believed that these different views 
will assist in understanding different assumptions about cities and their inhabitants.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is underpinned by ‘smart city’ 
definition as presented in the earlier section. In other words, the broad considerations 
are: investments in human and social capital; the use of modern (ICT) communication 
infrastructure; a wise management of natural resources; participatory action and 
engagement. This approach is also consistent with the categorisation of Hollands 
(2008), as highlighted above. The focus is to bring out smart city initiatives within 
the flagship projects, emphasising the institutional dimension of participatory 
governance. It is apprehended through an analytical focus on: institutional capacity, 
inclusiveness, accountability, and contestation. This builds on the assessment of the 
context of flagship projects to know whether they reflect being smart investments, 
embodying smart technology and smart policy.
Findings and discussion
The shortage of basic infrastructure and the need to bridge the widening gap 
have remained a common urban management challenge for many African cities. 
Hence, recent reforms and the onset of a seeming Africa urban renaissance are the 
focus of attention. Lagos is one of the African cities with several flagship projects, as 
summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1: Selected Lagos Flagship Projects and Initiatives
Description of Flagship Project Urban Sector Timelines Status






Lagos Strategic Transport Master Plan
– Lagos Bus Rapid Transit
– Lagos Rail Mass Transit Network











Lagos Home Ownership Mortgage Scheme Housing February 2014  
(Project launch)
Under construction /  
delivery ongoing
Lagos Tax System Reform Revenue/finance November 2005 
(Commenced structural 
change of the LIRS)
Implementation ongoing
Lekki Free Trade Zone Industrial Growth 
Pole
2006 (Master Plan initiated 
and document developed)
Under construction
Badagry Port and Free Zone Industrial Growth 
Pole
Early 2018 (Planned soft 
start)
Pending construction
Some Major Road Infrastructure
– Lagos-Epe Expressway Rehabilitation
– Lekki-Ikoyi Link Bridge Construction
– Lagos-Badagry Expressway Upgrade




May 2008 (Contract)  
May 2013 (Launch)  
April 2009 (Launch)  
August 2012 (Launch)
Almost completed  
Completed
Under construction  
Almost completed
Some Commercial Development Projects
– Tejuosho Market Redevelopment
– The Palms Shopping Mall, Lekki
– Actis Shopping Mall, Ikeja














Lagos City Beautification Project Environment/ 
landscape
Continuous Project
Lagos Waste Management Reform Environment/ 
sanitation
Continuous Project
Lagos-Dubai Smart City Project Infrastructure and 
technology 
June 2016 In progress
Motivation for the design and conceptualisation of flagship projects
It was noted that the main motivation was the commitment to transform cities and 
invest beyond the conventional budgetary allocation thereby responding to the noticeable 
signs of urban decay in all sectors. The question then is: are these configured to adopt 
smart city initiatives?
It could be argued that most of the projects were motivated by infrastructure-based 
service provisions. These have significantly altered the pace of development and are 
observed to be ‘turning Lagos around’, but there is still much more to be done in 
the journey to a ‘smart’ destination. So, if the concept of a smart city is viewed from 
an infrastructure perspective, it could be asserted that though many of these projects 
are not originally structured to satisfy smart city initiatives, they certainly have the 
potential to key into the broad policy direction.
Other significant drivers of change that have contributed immensely to smart city 
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initiatives in the present political dispensation – the fourth republic – in Lagos, include: 
a clear vision and determination by the government; high improvement in the city’s 
economy within a relatively short period, with potential for further improvements. 
Most importantly, there is apparent political stability and a functional policy direction 
backed by political will, conscious urban planning and management mechanisms. All 
these variables set the scene for a smarter city. These have been underpinned by the 
financial transformation triggered by a significant change in the taxation system. This 
motivated major urban development initiatives by the government and bolstered the 
confidence of private investors to participate in the process.
Analysis of specific flagship projects in Lagos
As initially noted, the understanding of flagship projects in Lagos is framed through 
the lens of participatory governance to establish the connections between the 
institutional, technological and human factors; being the three key dimensions of 
smart cities. The analysis is also based on the ways in which these projects have been 
promoted, how they link up with national or global smart city plans or policies and how 
they have been implemented on the ground; the perception of local people regarding 
the understanding of the flagship projects, limits and possibilities of smart cities in 
Lagos, in particular, Nigeria and Africa in general.
Lagos was once described as a ‘self-service city’ by Gandy (2006), where the 
residents had substantially given up any expectation of services being provided by the 
government. Gandy noted that the residents had developed several alternative means 
to provide necessary physical and social infrastructures. It is common knowledge that 
provision of physical and social infrastructures had degenerated to an unprecedented 
level in most cities in Nigeria, including Lagos. The concerns of city administrators to 
address this critical shortage led to deliberate efforts at developing large-scale projects 
as solutions to the problems facing Lagos. The next sections provide a more detailed 
assessment of these projects from the perspective of smart city initiatives.
Eko Atlantic City Project
The Eko Atlantic city project was conceived first as a mitigation measure to the 
perennial ocean surge along the bar beach area of Victoria Island, Lagos. Today, it is 
considered one of the most ambitious new city development projects, in terms of 
technology, cost and innovation, in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Substantial work 
had been carried out with regards to retaining walls and the land filling of the site. At 
the moment, a city is gradually rising from the depths of the Atlantic Ocean, as one of 
the strategic flagship projects in Lagos. This is one of the initiatives aimed at creating 
technology-enabled modern living and working spaces. Lagos State Government is 
collaborating with the private sector to build Eko Atlantic city on the southern tip 
of Lagos, abutting the Atlantic Ocean, as a massive futuristic living and business 
complex which is intended to become the financial centre of Nigeria.
Eko Atlantic city is structured to leverage the use of modern technology solutions to 
better manage traffic and coordinate emergency services in the city (Harrison et al. 2010). 
Lagos also participated in the IBM Smarter Cities Challenge where the use of technology 
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was emphasised and reinforced to validate the philosophy of the initiators of Eko Atlantic. 
However, with regards to the way the project has been promoted, some have argued 
that it is elitist, with limited participation from the public. At the initial launch of the 
project, there were several negative comments from the residents and experts. Some of 
the comments regarding the draft EIA report suggest that the project lacks transparency, 
participation and does not always adhere to the rule of law (Njoku 2012).
The majority of Lagos residents consider the project to be grandiose and driven by 
profit-making capitalist motives under the hegemony of neoliberalism. The planning 
and implementation are considered too exclusive. There are no conscious efforts by 
either the government or project developers to address these concerns but instead 
construction continued unabated. The negative public perception of the development 
processes did not pose enough of a threat to affect neither the progress on site nor its 
global marketability. Ironically, the project website claims that Eko Atlantic City intends 
‘to solve the chronic shortage of real estate in the world’s fastest-growing megacity’. 
The reality is, rather, that the project will only provide opportunity for investment and 
wealth creation for corporations and corporate elites, which some scholars regarded as 
unadulterated capital accumulation (Harvey 2007; Peck, Theodore & Brenner 2009). 
However, with the level of development now, it appears the skepticism is gradually 
fading away, with many people getting excited at the prospect of this global city 
becoming the hub of activities in Lagos. The statement below describes the feelings of 
a few online commentators:
I was dumbfounded such huge project is fast developing [and] becoming a 
reality. The visit to the city was a real push, I have been inspired, motivated, 
enlightened, educated and exposed beyond dots and lines … At the 
completion of the project I see a city that will change the face of Africa and 
probably transform Lagos to a successful mega-city. It’s going to be the source 
of great national pride for our country (Nigeria) … Kudos to the city planners 
and developers for this great vision … Looking forward to its completion. 
(Mustapha Holasunkanmi Yusuf, Eko Atlantic, 28 March) 
I think Lagos State has always produced thinking governors who are 
innovative, who believe in the impossible, who have gone beyond culture, 
tradition, religious and tribal politics, and instead are focused in transforming 
the state into a place where everybody will be welcome and be proud to call 
their home. (Esene Prayer Henry, Eko Atlantic, 3 May) 
In total, out of 603 reviewers, as on 14 July 2017, 425 rated the project five out of five, 
and another 98 rated it four out of five.4 
However, to sustain the good rating, Eko Atlantic will need a city manager, a mayor-
type position, who is capable of running a city-within-a-city. In other words, there 
will be a need for a bespoke governance structure that will recognise the importance 
of effectively conducting the day to day running of the city. This would mean that 
4 https://www.facebook.com/pg/EkoAtlantic/reviews/?ref=page_internal
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Eko Atlantic city should operate under high standards of transparency and good 
governance consistent with similar cities around the globe.
Municipal waste management and urban greenery
Municipal waste management and urban greenery gained momentum in the 
last decade. Waste management that was initially the greatest nightmare of city 
administration has been turned into money-making ventures. Waste is now being 
recycled from the source. Viewed from the perspective of environment, one can argue 
that Lagos is becoming smart. As presented by Banire (2008), the Lagos beautification 
process commenced with the ‘direct sponsorship, landscaping and beautification of 
open spaces, roundabouts, recreation parks, road medians and verges’. This effort saw 
the reclamation of encroached road right of ways for use as planting areas. 
Several of the beautified public spaces were previously black spots or ‘area boys’ 
territories known for crime. Converting these spaces into recreational land uses not 
only served an aesthetic function, it also provides a solution to some of the city’s safety 
and security challenges. One innovative approach, using a combination of reward and 
cohesive power, was to redirect the energies of the ‘area boys’ towards constructive 
activities including employment opportunities in gardening, traffic control and 
environmental policing (De Gramont 2015).
Specifically, prior to 2007, Oshodi was a notorious commercial hub in the heart 
of Lagos, avoided by residents and visitors alike after 6pm and before dawn. It was a 
permanent site of intense trading activities, as well as pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 
Daylight robberies were endemic; pickpockets and various other criminals held sway. 
Government interventions took different forms. First, the traders were cleared from 
the roads. A task force providing 24-hour security ensured that the place remained 
free for movement. Also, Oshodi was lit up with halogen streetlights that ensured 
that felons could no longer hide under cover of darkness to perpetrate their evil.5 To 
ensure this intervention succeeded, there was a delicate balance of politics involving 
negotiations, concessions and patronage among key stakeholders; major market 
unions, opinion leaders, as well as local and state government actors. Many displaced 
traders from the roads and railway lines in Oshodi were resettled in an ultra-modern 
market constructed close by while the road and railway setbacks were beautified.6   
Currently, Lagos boasts over 200 landscaped sites and ‘over five million trees have 
been planted across the metropolis which is now wearing a new look as the trees 
planted some years back have enhanced the aesthetics of the environment’ (Ugbodaga 
2014). With high quality public spaces that bring people together to exchange ideas 
and build a sense of community, it could be argued that the environment is more 
sustainable and liveable. As it is the case in most advanced cities, amenities such as 
community gardens, public artwork and playing fields, as provided in Lagos, can give 
people a range of lifestyle options. Also, improved tree coverage and green spaces 
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the quality of air and reduce the heat island effect, while enhancing general amenity. 
They also give people greater connection with nature and provide important places for 
recreation and healthy lifestyles.
The Lagos State Home Ownership Mortgage Scheme (Lagos HOMS)
The Lagos State Home Ownership Mortgage Scheme (Lagos HOMS) is an initiative 
to address the problem of providing ‘affordable’ housing. It was aimed at developing a 
mortgage culture and institution in Lagos. It was also aimed at urban redevelopment 
through densification and infill of residential development across the metropolis on 
lands hitherto underutilised and otherwise prone to slum growth. The Lagos HOMS 
initiative was an outcome of a process of housing problem identification. Considering 
the structure for implementation, one of the requirements involves the digital 
registration of potential beneficiary as residents of Lagos state. This is considered 
as one of the ways to develop data infrastructure that is needed to facilitate efficient 
city governance. With regard to inclusiveness, the low-income groups and those who 
work in the informal sector, who are disproportionately affected by housing deficit, 
are excluded because of eligibility criteria. Thus, the initiative is largely considered as 
neither inclusive nor affordable. It could also be argued further that the Lagos HOMS 
specifically targets a particular economic group – the middle class who are working in 
the formal sector or those who have traceable income in the informal sector.
However, the process of allocation, through a public draw which goes through 
various stages, reasonably ensures transparency and accountability. Notwithstanding 
that homeownership through mortgage finance is a good approach to empower people, 
there are tensions and contradictions regarding the cost and economic capability of 
the majority of the targeted group. This makes the initiative fail the inclusiveness test. 
In response to these criticisms, the government recently introduced a rent-to-own 
option in the programme and is about to initiate incremental-development as another 
option. There are two big challenges that can potentially limit the sustainability of this 
programme. One is the capacity to sustain the programme’s achievement and improve 
on the transparent processes. Also, the prospect of replicating this programme in other 
Nigerian cities and on an even larger scale will be critical to a lasting success. The first 
issue speaks to the need for building strong institutions in Lagos while the other will 
depend largely on how successful and popular the programme can become to attract 
interests from other cities in Nigeria. However, Lagos is no stranger to setting the pace 
of development as well as exporting successful ideas around the country. 
The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
In the last decade and a half, Lagos has witnessed a significant improvement in urban 
transport development. This includes the development of major road infrastructure 
and improvement projects such as the expansion and modernisation of major roads 
like the Lekki-Epe Expressway. The estimated value of this project was about USD 450 
million and was conceived as a Public-Private Partnership (LSPPP 2010a), in what 
could be described as smart investment.
More recently, Lagos state government has involved private organisations to develop 
  CHAPTER 10      141
the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), as an important element of the city’s changing public 
urban transport system. The vision of the Lagos public transport, as described by the 
state governor, is to develop ‘the Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP), which is 
already being implemented, a 30-year plan. Ultimately, the plan is expected to deliver 
to Lagos a truly world-class integrated public transport system with 6 rail lines, 1 
mono-rail, 14 BRT corridors, 3 cable car corridors and 26 developed water routes’ 
(Ambode 2015).
The goal of the BRT, as part of this integrated transport plan, is to provide 
‘significant socioeconomic benefits, especially for the low-income population’ of Lagos. 
Therefore, the project is considered inclusive in conceptualisation. The successful 
engagement of the transport unions as well as other local stakeholders in the planning 
and implementation of the BRT project is a powerful example of the project’s 
inclusiveness. The BRT project planning stage benefitted from inclusive measures of 
local and foreign consultations that eventually improved the final product.
The ongoing expansion of the BRT project to other districts as well as the parallel 
deployment of the Bus Franchise Scheme (BFS) allows a larger portion of the 
metropolitan population access to better public transport. When viewed through the 
lens of smart city, the BRT project is founded on sound technical and intellectual 
grounds, considering the composition of key technical experts in Lagos Metropolitan 
Area Transport Authority (LAMATA). In terms of strategic direction, it qualifies as 
a smart transportation vision for Lagos. LAMATA is manned by qualified personnel 
and the agency has an institutional structure that allows it to carry out its statutory 
responsibilities. The operating environment of LAMATA was acknowledged as 
productive and world-class while importance of local and foreign technical partners 
was emphasised as crucial to the agencies’ capacity to deliver the BRT project.
With regards to accountability, its revenue collection system promotes financial 
accountability and provides comfort for local banks while introduction of electronic 
ticketing is expected to further improve the system. From the governance and 
institutional perspective, separation of power among government agencies involved 
in transport-related functions promote democratic relations with LAMATA while 
minimising the risk of conflict. However, the perception of local people regarding the 
understanding of the concept was put to the test, with the idea having been initially 
resisted. The informal transport union represents a major stakeholder identified as 
a potential impediment to the BRT project and was, therefore, engaged from the 
planning through implementation stages. LAMATA later made substantial efforts in 
the area of producing precautionary documentation and interaction with the project 
stakeholders to address contested issues
In terms of value addition, the BRT project has delivered a range of benefits for 
Lagos. These include: improved connections to employment and services, reduced 
congestion and increased productivity. Overall, it combines smart investment with 
smart policy and smart technology seamlessly.
The Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ)
The Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ), located 65km east of Lagos metropolis, is part 
of the overall multi-use development plan for a new city on the Lekki peninsula. The 
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development objective of the LFTZ project is to ‘establish a free economic zone and an 
international city with multi-functions of industry, commerce, trade, tourism, recreation 
and residence to attract foreign investment, create employment and expedite economic 
growth’ (CCECC-Beyond International Investment and Development 2009).
From the investment perspective, the LFTZ is a major public-private economic 
investment and industrial development project, which targets different types of activities. 
This industrial zone encompasses hubs for oil and gas, logistics, light and medium 
scale industries, hospitality and resort, engineering and infrastructure support services, 
commerce, retail, real estate development for urban services, finance, trade, hotel, 
recreational, business and residential facilities, and information and communication 
technology (LFTZ 2014; LSPPP 2010b). The project is based on smart investment that 
enables partnerships between governments and the private sector. The global lesson is 
that cities collaborate to compete. Success requires all tiers of government, the private 
sector, and community, to work together towards shared goals.
However, the major challenges with the LFTZ included the legal and institutional 
framework, as well as land resettlement issues and infrastructure. The legal framework 
is a hurdle to all development zones in Nigeria; therefore, it needs to be tackled 
with great urgency. There are strong policy and infrastructure rationales behind 
establishing a Special Economic Zone like the Lekki Free Trade Zone. International 
experience has shown that successful SEZs have compelling business cases, enabling 
legal/regulatory frameworks, effective management arrangements and enjoy strong 
political support at all levels of government. In addition, they are well integrated with 
the local economy and have clear ownership and accountability arrangements.
The World Bank (2010) specified some of the more specific attributes of SEZs 
to include: the articulation of physical planning and development of infrastructure to 
allow for integrated, multi-use development and effective IT systems and networks. 
From an investment perspective, it also encourages a demand-driven, as opposed 
to policy-driven, approach. However, from the policy consideration, it encourages 
imposition of neoliberal ideals and expectations, but promotes national economic 
growth strategy through public-private partnerships or the private developer builds/
owns/operates on a cost-recovery basis. Another good intent of SEZ is the support 
for reform and efficiency. Best practice regulatory frameworks and stable business 
environments are targeted at multi-markets and not just for exports. Therefore, a wide 
range of activities are permitted, which ensures environmental compliance. Most 
often, SEZs are promoted by emphasising an institutional framework that is based on 
the establishment of a single administration for efficient regulation, while MOUs with 
stakeholders govern relationships and public-private partnership arrangements. This 
often aligns with the smart investment consideration of a smart city.
However, contrary to these putative benefits, this study shows that the implementation 
of the Lekki Free Trade Zone has largely not delivered the socio-economic benefits 
assumed to be associated with this kind of development for the local communities. At 
the core of this development paradox is the issue of land governance which permitted 
local resource grabbing through large-scale land acquisitions. The project became 
a tool for displacement, exclusion, conflicts, dispossession of livelihoods capital, 
corruption and loss of livelihoods. Essentially, in its implementation benefits were 
significantly shifted in favour of corporate and elite investors.
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Lagos-Dubai Smart City project
Lagos-Dubai Smart City project was conceived in 2016 through a partnership between 
Lagos state government and Smart City Dubai, to develop sustainable, smart, globally 
connected knowledge-based communities that drive the knowledge economy. 
According to Raji (2018), to achieve this objective, a memorandum of understanding 
was signed between the Lagos state government and Dubai Holdings LLC, owners of 
Smart City Dubai LLC, in June 2016. 
The proponents have argued that the motive for establishing the Lagos Smart City 
initiative, like other similar projects, is to bring multi-billion dollar investments to the 
State to create jobs and transform the Ibeju-Lekki axis in particular. Governor Ambode 
added that the motive of the Lagos state government ‘is a deliberate attempt to establish 
a strong convergence between technology, economic development and governance’ 
(Ambode 2016). The governor added that Lagos ‘will become an important centre for 
innovation in smart technologies, wellness and destination for green tourism.’ By the 
time the Lagos Smart City is completed, it will have, among other features: ‘a 12-lane 
road, hotel resorts, world-class technological education facilities, and a rail metro line’ 
(Ambode 2016).
The question, however, is how these will be possible when electricity generation 
is actually falling in the face of geometrical higher demand for energy? In May 2016, 
the Ministry of Power released figures that showed national power output reduced 
significantly from a peak 4 500MW to 2 500MW; which is nearly half of the original 
capacity being generated (Ogundipe 2016). There is a huge electricity supply deficit 
in the state, as it only gets about 20% of the 5 000MW it currently requires to attain 
stable power supply.
Conclusion
Prior to the inception of the current political dispensation, the notion of smart cities 
in Lagos State, as conceived in this paper, was significantly constrained by inadequate 
infrastructure, lack of integrated transport plans, inadequate knowledge of investment 
strategies, inadequate technology and poor urban governance and the corresponding 
poor government policies.
This brief overview of a number of dynamic flagship initiatives in Lagos during the 
past decade, supported by technologies and governance structure, has laid a strong 
foundation for future smart city initiatives. Furthermore, the flagship projects arguably 
provide a platform to start sustainable inclusion of spatial data infrastructure in the 
urban agenda. This is very significant in a context where arbitrary policy-making 
was the norm. We also observe an opportunity to build and develop digital data 
infrastructure to improve the operation and maintenance of the flagship projects, 
creating a precedent for other developmental projects. 
However, it is imperative that Lagos State must, as a matter of necessity, come up 
with its own unique smart city approach. In this regard, Lagos cannot afford to copy 
themes from other countries. It must evolve its own because of its uniqueness. Thus, 
its aspiration should be different. However, the obsession with Dubai is probably not 
a good sign that this is indeed happening.
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Beyond the rhetoric of developing a smart city, as is being presented by the 
government, substantial challenges are noted that urgently need attention as these 
projects are being implemented. The major ones are electricity supply and mobility. 
Notwithstanding that most of these projects propose to have built-in power supply 
systems, the more fundamental imperative is that the entire city of Lagos should be 
well integrated and connected, drawing from a constant power supply across the state 
(i.e. outside the targeted enclaves such as Eko Atlantic). 
It is logical to argue that a smart city cannot be a reality when over half of the 
city residents do not have access to basic social and physical infrastructures like 
electricity, reticulated water, good roads and drainages. Adequate availability of these 
infrastructures is meant to be a pre-requisite for smart city development. As it stands 
now and as it will be in the near future, the initiation and sustainability of smart city 
initiatives should be closely linked with the residents’ ability to have access to the 
basic necessities of life, in an environment that promotes civil engagement and smart 
solutions.
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Improving urban governance is top of Ethiopia’s urban development policy agenda 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Development [MOFED] 2006, 2010; National 
Planning Commission [NPC] 2015). Specifically, Ethiopia adopts an urban governance 
model that follows a decentralised structure, in which urban centres are governed by 
‘an elected council, elected mayor, Mayor’s Committee, and city manager’ (Ministry 
of Urban Development, Housing, and Construction [MOUDHC] 2014). Principles of 
good urban governance are emphasised to guide overall urban development policy 
process. The good urban development principles are: (1) subsidiary administrative 
and fiscal decentralisation; (2) efficiency and effective service delivery; (3) sustainability 
equity and participation; (4) transparency and accountability; and (5) rule of law and 
security (Ministry of Works and Urban Development [MOWUD] 2007: 40). Urban 
governance has been widely promoted in developing countries as a means to increase 
accountability, better government responsiveness, and improved public services 
(Jones, Clench & Harris 2014; Speer 2012). This is partly explained in terms of the 
Ethiopian government’s ambitious plan to ensure structural transformation in its 
economy through a shift from a rural-based subsistence production system to urban-
based, high technology-driven economic activities (NPC 2015). In this regard, the 
government of Ethiopia has been convinced that transition from an agrarian to an 
industrial society cannot happen without the existence of a network of effective and 
‘competitive’ cities (NPC 2015). The ambition to make Addis Ababa a global city is 
reflected in the City of Addis Ababa mission statement. It reads: 
By 2023, Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia will provide a safe and 
liveable environment for their people and become Ethiopia’s hub to ensure 
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the national vision of becoming a middle income country, Africa’s diplomatic 
capital and international competitive city. (Addis Ababa and Special Zone 
Development Planning Project Office 2013: 4)
Furthermore, evidence from recent studies shows that the implementation of mega 
city projects was part of the government’s conviction in making Ethiopian cities 
global cities (Terrefe 2020; Kloosterboer 2019). In arguing how Ethiopian cities 
would be a hub for industrialisation, diversification and structural transformation, 
a chapter prepared to guide Ethiopia’s structural transformation shows ‘building 
both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure’ would be instrumental to improve Ethiopian 
cities’ competitiveness in the global economies (UN-Habitat 2014). Thus Ethiopia’s 
commitment to urban governance is closely related to its perceived and tangible 
benefits in facilitating rapid growth and transformation. Within this background, this 
chapter aims to explore how one of the mega urban projects implemented in the city 
of Addis Ababa, that is, the Addis Ababa Light Rail transit (AA-LRT) has evolved; the 
government’s discursive rationale in choosing AA-LRT as an urban transport option 
through elucidating whether or not the AA-LRT was developed out of a felt need or 
the pressure to be global. In addition, the study discusses the politics around the 
investment in AA-LRT and how it is governed through highlighting the governance 
structures and institutional setups. 
Urban governance under a revolutionary developmental state 
Urban governance refers to processes and mechanisms through which diverse actors 
in a given urban centre/city organise their actions and resources for the common 
urban good through utilisation of economic, social, political and environmental 
resources (Harpham & Boateng 1997). Multiple actors include formal and informal, 
governmental and non-governmental, public and private. For these actors to function 
effectively and achieve collective goals, institutionalised arrangements establishing 
structures and systems have to be put in place, and these will emerge out of the 
stakeholders’ diverse interests through consensus building and/or contestation 
(Hendriks 2013; Lindell 2008; Melo & Baiocchi 2006). Under normal circumstances 
urban governance is robust enough to accommodate contestation, as relevant actors 
promote their own vested interests on what they want to be done and how. Ideally, 
urban governance as a process facilitates persuasion, contestation, bargaining and, 
finally, consensus building among actors during urban policy development. Lindell 
(2008: 1880) further suggests that urban governance consists of ‘multiple sites where 
practices of governance are exercised and contested, a variety of actors, various layers of 
relations and a broad range of practices of governance that may involve various modes 
of power, as well as different scales’. Lindell’s characterisation of urban governance 
as made up of multiple, contested sites highlights how any given urban policy is 
supported or opposed at different levels, and its fate will depend on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of formal institutions and the relative power between policy actors. 
Hence, the effectiveness of urban governance is dependent upon how these 
multiple actors engage with different levels of governance structures and with each 
other, shaping the exercise of governance. The relationship of relevant actors as well 
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as their active participation in the process of planning and implementation of urban 
policy and strategy vary by context. Ethiopia is one of the countries that endorsed the 
global campaign on ‘urban governance,’ which openly advocates for a participatory 
democratic process between citizens, public and private actors in urban agenda setting 
and decision-making processes (see UN-Habitat 2002). The globally promoted notion 
of urban governance includes planning and governing a city’s common affairs through 
an ongoing process that accommodates conflicting or diverse interests, leading 
to cooperative action. In reality, however, Ethiopia’s political landscape limits the 
applicability of many of the attributes of commonly accepted definitions of governance. 
This relates mainly to Ethiopia’s ruling party’s adherence to ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
as its guiding philosophy and political economic strategy. Ethiopia’s ‘revolutionary 
democracy’ is an ideology that draws its inspiration from Marxism, Leninism, 
Maoism, and liberal ideologies in defining the socio-economic and political structures 
of the country (Bach 2011). The ideology is promoted as the only doctrine that would 
help defeat Ethiopia’s major social, economic, and political challenges based on one 
vanguard political party system. It thus grants discretionary power to party leaders and 
bureaucrats at all levels, effectively eliminating other voices. In other words, a decision 
taken by the party can override a decision arrived at within state institutions following 
the normal conventions. Vaughan (2011) analysed the state party and the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) revolutionary democratic nation 
building process and highlights ‘democratic centralism’ as a fundamental tenet of 
EPRDF’s ideology. Hence, Ethiopia’s revolutionary democracy is an ideological tool 
legitimatising the way central committee members of the EPRDF leadership interact 
with local level structures to guide and lead the socio-economic development processes. 
According to Fantu Cheru (2016: 606), Ethiopia blends different ideologies together in 
‘a cleaver meshing of selected development experiences from East Asia (China, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, South Korea, Singapore and Japan) with ‘soft neoliberalism’ from the West 
under the guidance of a strong developmental state.’ Thus, understanding Ethiopia’s 
urban governance requires situating it within its historical, social, economic, and 
political history. Against this backdrop, this study looks at the governance of the Addis 
Ababa Light Rail Transit (AA-LRT) project as the country’s major attempt to provide 
mass urban transport for a rapidly expanding city using a political economy approach. 
Analytical approach and research questions
As discussed above, Ethiopia’s political and economic strategy based on ‘democratic 
centralism’ empowers party leaders to make policy decisions and inhibits the 
application of globally promoted urban governance models that assume contestation 
and bargaining between interest groups with competing interests. This chapter applies 
a political economy lens in analysing the governance of AA-LRT. Mcloughlin (2014) 
describes the aim of political economy analysis as locating development interventions 
within an understanding of the prevailing political and economic processes in a given 
society. Applying a political economy approach offers a means to situate the structure 
and processes of Ethiopian urban affairs within the ruling party’s overarching political 
ideology and how it dictates policy agenda setting and the interaction between the 
state and its citizens. According to Drake (2001), political ideologies are clusters of 
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values espousing the underlying philosophies and principles of the government 
through which socio-economic and political systems and structures are operated. 
Drake further argues that political ideologies generally are determined by state views 
of how a society should be organised/governed, and the extent to which a state may 
interact with its citizens and intervene in their daily lives. 
Specifically, this study draws on a ‘state centred approach’ to political economy in 
studying the governance of AA-LRT. In their seminal work on diverse strands within 
political economy, Caporaso and Levine (1992) show that different approaches vary 
by their assumptions about the primacy of economics or politics in decision-making 
processes. A state centered approach to political economy focuses on situations where 
states systematically exclude non-state actors from the policy process and generate 
policy initiatives on their own. This accurately describes how the political regime 
in Ethiopia has instituted a developmental state governance structure and allocates 
major decision-making power to party leaders in guiding urban development 
priorities. Thus, this chapter critically analyses AA-LRT’s institutional and governance 
arrangements including its structures and capacities. Specifically, this chapter focuses 
on the following interrelated research questions: 
1. Where did the idea for the AA-LRT originate?
2. What was the discursive rationale and strategy for the government of 
Ethiopia choosing AA-LRT as an urban transport option?
3. What are some of the politics surrounding the investments in AA-LRT and 
were there external influences?
4. How is AA-LRT governed? What are the structures and institutional setups?
Methodology: Design, data collection methods and data analysis
In order to address the aforementioned research questions, this study used a qualitative 
research design. Creswell (2007: 17) defines qualitative research as ‘an inquiry 
process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that 
explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, 
analyses words, reports the detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a 
natural setting.’ There were two reasons for choosing a qualitative study design. First, 
qualitative research is appropriate when not much is known about the topic under 
inquiry (Creswell 2007; Padgett 1998). As the AA-LRT was launched in 2015, there is 
no literature that studied the AA-LRT from a policy and urban governance perspective. 
Second, a qualitative design provides the most appropriate methodology to obtain in-
depth information on the process through which AA-LRT received prominence and 
emerged as a major urban transport option in Ethiopia by generating explanations 
embedded within empirical observations. Hence, qualitative data were collected using 
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions1 conducted with AA-LRT users in 
1  Focus group discussion (FGD) participants were selected based on their age and sex 
categories. Accordingly, 8 FGDs with female and male LRT users were conducted. 39 AA-
LRT service users and 8 women’s association leaders (i.e. 20 women, 14 male youths, and 13 
older men) participated in the FGDs.
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two stations (i.e. CMC station and Meskel Square). A total of 17 in-depth interviews 
with key government officials relevant to the AA-LRT project, research institutes, and 
civil society members were conducted (see Annex I: Summary of study participants). 
Specific attention was given to government officials who were involved at the initiation 
phase of the AA-LRT and were on the board of directors. Data were analysed using 
Padgett’s (1998) multiple interrelated steps. Transcripts of interviews and discussions 
were reviewed and frequently emerging themes relevant to the study questions were 
identified. Once relevant themes were organised based on the research questions, 
interpretation of themes was conducted. To ensure the credibility, transferability and 
dependability of the data (Lincoln & Guba 1985), triangulation of emerged data by data 
source was used. 
In presenting findings, this chapter is structured into three parts. First, a description 
of the overall status of public transport in the city of Addis Ababa is presented to 
contextualise the LRT’s emergence as an important mass transit service in Addis Ababa 
City. In this section, the process that led to prioritisation of the AA-LRT in the public 
policy arena is discussed vis-à-vis the politics around financing the infrastructure, 
operation and maintenance costs of AA-LRT. The question of finance and delivery of 
the infrastructure goes to the core of external influences in the process. Second, the 
governance of AA-LRT is described, including the governance structure, institutional 
capacity, and relationship between national and city governments. Finally, the chapter 
discusses implications of the findings for urban governance policy and practice in the 
Ethiopian context. 
Public transport in Addis Ababa: Current status and the quest for 
mass transit 
Literature that provides a comprehensive understanding about the status of public 
transport in Ethiopia, in general, and the city of Addis Ababa, in particular, is sparse. The 
few available materials on public transportation do not have up-to-date data. Existing 
literature and government documents show that public transport in Addis Ababa has 
been dominated by city bus services provided by the public enterprise Anbessa City Bus 
Enterprise and taxis operated by private sector actors (Gebeyehu & Tekano 2007). Fenta 
(2014) conducted a study on public transport demand in Addis Ababa and estimated 
that there were nearly 10 000 taxis with a capacity of 12 persons, 460 buses that seat 22 
to 27 persons, and 6 500 sedan taxis that seat four persons. Three-wheeler taxis (bajaj) 
and animal carts are also used in the peripheral areas of the city. 
Qualitative findings for this study also indicate that public buses make up the bulk 
of public transport in the city, in addition to privately owned taxis (mini-buses and 
sedan taxis). According to key informants, different bus systems exist. For instance, 
the oldest bus service is Anbessa City Bus Enterprise, which is publicly owned and 
has 814 buses and currently transports nearly 500 000 passengers daily. After the 
city administration issued its transport policy in 2011, the city administration has 
been making efforts to improve the mass transport service in the city. For instance, 
the city administration introduced a Public Service Employees Transport Service 
Enterprise, which has provided free transport to civil servants, running during rush 
hours in the morning and after office hours since 2015. There are 410 of these buses 
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transporting 98 000 persons per day. Furthermore, in May 2016, the Addis Ababa 
City Administration Transport Programs Coordination Office introduced a ‘Sheger 
Express’ bus system and deployed 150 buses. Sheger Buses are equipped with modern 
features such as automated ticketing and are accessible for the elderly and people 
with physical disabilities, which enhances the city’s ambition to provide inclusive 
transport service for nearly 25 000 individuals. In addition to the newly introduced 
buses, the city administration planned to bring in 1000 metered taxis, of which 150 
are already functioning. After critically examining the inadequacy of existing public 
transport systems, the city administration granted permission for 300 privately owned 
cross-country buses to serve citizens before and after office hours; these serve 65 000 
individuals. Private cars only transport 20% of city residents2 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Total public transport service users in Addis Ababa 
Mode of transport # of vehicles Total # of service users/day
Addis Ababa City Bus Enterprise (publicly owned) 815 500 000 
Sheger Express Bus (publicly owned) 300 25 000
Blue Public Buses (publicly owned) 410 98 000
Cross-country buses 300 65 000
Higer buses 640 17 280
Mini-bus taxis 10 000 120 000
Total public transport users 800 280
Private cars 646 200* 
Total 1 446 480
* Currently the city of Addis Ababa has an estimated 3.2 million residents (projected from CSA, 2014) of which 20% have private cars.
Source: Compiled from data obtained for this study from key informants and Fenta (2014)
Despite the City Administration’s efforts, the existing motorised transport system 
does not meet Addis Ababa transport demands. Motorised transport (i.e. city buses, 
taxis, private cars) only provide for about 50% of Addis Ababa’s residents. A significant 
majority of Addis Ababa residents do not have access to motorised transport. Available 
data estimates 40–60% of Addis Ababa residents use walking as their primary mode 
of transport. For instance, a 2012 report by Addis Ababa City Planning Office and Lyon 
Town Planning Agency shows that walking accounted for 45% of the trips made by 
residents in 2006 (Addis Ababa City Government & Lyon Planning 2012). Similarly, a 
recent report by the Addis Ababa City Road and Transport Authority (2014) estimates 
that pedestrians make up 55% of daily journeys but do not have appropriate walking 
facilities and confront a transport network characterised as ‘non-pedestrian friendly’. 
The inadequacy of public transport coupled with a lack of planning and integration 
of motorised transport systems makes mobility in Addis Ababa chaotic, unreliable, 
2  Interview with representatives of Addis Ababa City Administration Mayor’s Office (23 August 
2016). Interview with representatives of Addis Ababa City Administration Transport Authority 
(27 July 2016) 
  CHAPTER 11     155
unsafe, unaffordable and inefficient for an expanding city (Fenta 2014). A recent study 
by UN-Habitat (2017) confirms that public transport in Addis Ababa is inaccessible 
and unaffordable for the majority of city residents. As a result, the Addis Ababa City 
Government has been searching for an alternative mass transit system. The federal 
government eventually embarked on a massive project and introduced the AA-LRT 
service as the first modern mass transit system in the country (Ministry of Transport 
2011a, 2011b). It has been promoted as a major breakthrough in the transport industry, 
not only for Ethiopia, but also in the history of sub-Saharan African countries (Jemere 
2012; CNN 2015; The Economist 2015). The AA-LRT development took three years 
with a total infrastructure investment cost of USD 475 million and the project was 
inaugurated on 21 September 2015. The AA-LRT consists of two lines: the East-West 
axis from Ayat to Tor-Hailoch and the North-South axis from Minilik II square to 
Akaki/Kality. The LRT covers a total length of 34.25km (North-South line 16.9km and 
East-West line 17.35km) (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Addis Ababa LRT North-South and East-West routes
Source: Maximilian Dörrbecker
Light Rail Transit: Its origin, discursive rationale and the politics 
around financing the project 
Over the past 15 years, several initiatives were considered and tested as the Addis 
Ababa city government searched for an afforfable and efficient mass transit system 
to reduce traffic congestion and urban pollution. A Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system 
similar to successful bus transit systems in several Brazilian and Colombian cities 
was the first seriously considered initiative. The city government in collaboration with 
1 East-West route
2 North-South route
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the French Development Aid agency commissioned a French consulting company to 
undertake a feasibility study for a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system for Addis Ababa in 
2004.3 The study recommended rapid bus corridors along the North-South and East-
West direction of the city. In 2005, the city contracted and commissioned an Indian 
consulting firm to draw up a transport master plan (Lyon Town Planning Agency 2011).4 
 Based on its suggestions, several initiatives were taken to translate the BRT idea into 
practice on the ground. For instance, the current two LRT route (i.e. north–south, and 
east–west) corridors were initially planned for the implementation of BRT.5
Long before the Light Rail came to the fore, a BRT demonstration corridor was 
built in the north–south direction, starting from the centre of the city (i.e La Gare) to 
northern Kality. The current La Gare to Kality LRT route was a full-fledged asphalt 
road, which was designated as a BRT route. Buses with a carrying capacity of 23 and 
above started providing a rapid bus service along the proposed corridor. While the city 
of Addis Ababa was undertaking the BRT pilot project as a preferred mass transport 
option, a swift discussion on the idea of Light Rail Transit (LRT) emerged, seemingly 
out of the blue and without warning. As one key informant succinctly put it:
BRT was initially considered as a solution to the city’s mass/public transport 
need and the two lines; one from La Gare to Kality and Megenagna to Ayat 
round about was left as BRT corridors. Without any further consultation to 
relevant stakeholders. No justification was given on abandoning the BRT 
and embarking on LRT. The current LRT routes (North-South and East West 
lines) were originally planned to be BRT routes.6
Moreover, a key informant reported that the rise of LRT, while abandoning BRT, had 
been a public transaport idea imposed on the Addis Ababa City administration by the 
federal government:
The city undertook various studies in search of mass transportation means 
and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) was initially considered as solution. The city 
administration constructed one BRT corridor from La-Gahar to Kality, 
which now serves as LRT south-north route in due time though, LRT got 
momentum, and the focus shifted from BRT.7
Another key informant noted:
BRT was the first choice of the city Administration and much was done from 
allocating a BRT corridor and running pilot rapid bus service in the city. The 
3 Interview with Bureau of Addis Ababa City Administration
4  A report by Lyon Town Planning Agency reported that the pre-feasibility study and the 
development of Addis Ababa city transport master plan were part of the Ethio-French project 
from 2002–2010.
5 Interview with Addis Ababa City Road Authority
6 Interview with AACRA
7 Interview with Ethiopian Railway Corporation
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BRT corridors were now serving as LRT routes. The LRT idea won and the 
city dropped the BRT idea. However, after the completion of the LRT, BRT 
is rising. The city has completed a study to introduce BRT so that it can be 
integrated with the LRT service. (Interview with Addis Ababa City Transport 
Authority) 
The qualitative findings strongly suggest that Addis Ababa City’s transport planners 
and the mandated city administrators developed the BRT strategy to curb the ever 
growing city residents’s transport need. However, the swift decision to focus on the 
more expensive AA-LRT project poses a practical question: What was the rationale 
behind choosing AA-LRT over BRT? 
The rise of LRT: Issue emergence and discursive rationale 
‘The late prime minister, Meles Zenawi, first suggested LRT as a quick solution to the 
city’s growing transport problem.’8 Almost all key informants who participated in this 
study unequivocally confirmed that the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was the 
person responsible for singlehandedly promoting the LRT as the best mass transit 
option. A key informant from the Addis Ababa City Road Authority stated:
Once LRT was introduced as his ‘Ethiopia renaissance’ showcase, all cabinet 
members backed the idea without much confrontation. ‘Once the late PM 
introduced the idea, no one dared to challenge,’ as one key informant pointed 
out.9
The LRT was thus a priority project for the government as it strived to demonstrate 
to the visiting African heads of state and to the people of Ethiopia the regime’s 
commitment towards enhancing the image of Addis Ababa as the capital of Africa, 
as well as to reinforce the ‘Ethiopian Renaissance’ narrative that was getting political 
traction. In short, LRT had strong political backing from the highest levels of 
government. The urgency of completing the LRT project in a very short time-frame 
was promoted by the preparation surrounding the 2015 national elections. As one key 
informant succinctly put it:
In addition to the social and economic significance of LRT for the residents 
of Addis, it is a political project that had symbolic meaning enhancing the 
renaissance of the country as well as helping the ruling party gain popular 
support.
Despite the efforts made in seeking an in-depth explanation, the swift government 
decision from implementing BRT to initiating the LRT remained a mystery. The late 
prime minister singlehandedly advocated for the emergence of LRT as a mega city 
project. 
8  Interview with representative of AA city administration 
9 Interview with a senior researcher/policy advisor to the government of Ethiopia
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Discursive rationale
This study found that the interaction of two major factors contributed to the sudden 
abandonment of the BRT initiative in favour of the LRT in 2007. The first factor 
has to do with Addis Ababa’s rapid population growth due to the dramatic growth 
of the Ethiopian economy, particularly in the capital and its surroundings. Addis 
Ababa’s population is thought to be growing at an annual rate of 2.1% (Central 
Statistics Agency 2013). With the spatial expansion of the city, fuelled by expanding 
industries and other economic enterprises, more and more people were migrating 
to the capital in search of jobs and other economic opportunities. This expansion 
was further exacerbated by massive urban renewal projects initiated by both the 
federal and city governments. Since the 2005 urban policy, the city was busy clearing 
major slum areas in the inner city. As a result, 80% of inner-city dwellers who used 
to live in public housing were relocated into condominium apartments that were 
built in satellite cities, which have appeared in the outskirts of Addis since 2005.10 
 Relocated residents have been forced to commute long distances to and from the 
city centre where their work and social life are concentrated. As the city expands and 
creates satellite cities, a huge demand for transport is emerging that can no longer 
be satisfied with existing systems. Consequently, the government concluded that the 
BRT option was unlikely to meet the growing mobility needs of the fast expanding 
urban population. Instead, the federal government opted for the Light Rail Transit 
(LRT) option as the best solution given the changing dynamics of Addis Ababa and 
the surrounding regions.
Second, the government wished to modernise the city’s image by introducing 
a modern mass transportation system, and that the LRT initiative fits very well 
with the evolving ‘Ethiopia’s Renaissance’ narrative. Similar to the ‘Africa Rising’ 
narrative, the notion of ‘Ethiopia’s Renaissance’ evolved internally while the country 
was celebrating the Ethiopian millennium nine years ago in 2007. Since then, the 
notion of ‘Ethiopia Rising’ has dominated the national development discourse, and 
is increasingly reflected in key strategic plans and documents, such as the Growth 
and Transformation Plan (I & II). For instance, the Growth and Transformation Plans 
(I & II) emphasise government financed mega infrastructure projects such as the 
‘renaissance dam’ and industrial zones. The LRT represents one of the key mega 
projects that are designed to showcase the country’s economic renaissance and the 
government’s success in reducing poverty through accelerated economic growth and 
diversification. 
Besides attractiveness, environmental friendliness was used as an important 
indicator for prioritising LRT as the most suitable form of public transport for Addis 
Ababa. Growing acceptance of the LRT among policymakers contributed to the 
10  The city of Addis Ababa has been building condominium houses on the outskirts of Addis and 
established satellite neighbourhoods that can accommodate an average 15 000 households in 
areas such as Tulu Dimtu, Ayat, Bole Arabsa and Abdowolo. These new sites do not have 
transport mobility networks. And the city has been working hard to establish a mass transport 
service to and from the city centre to these new satellite sites.
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fading away of BRT, although BRT would have been significantly cheaper than LRT.11 
 This study found that arguments for LRT’s capacity, attractiveness and environmental 
friendliness received more support than the initial investment cost that the LRT would 
incur. In other words, cost considerations were not given serious attention in the 
decision to go with the LRT.
The pragmatic stance that the government had taken in terms of LRT’s capacity 
and environmental friendliness, the government of Ethiopia’s ambitious plan to make 
Addis Ababa a global city have been major drivers for choosing AA-LRT over BRT. 
Perhaps this fits into the ‘urban fantasies’ that decision-makers are made to believe, 
such as ‘Ethiopia is rising’ (Terrefe 2020; Watson 2009)
The politics around LRT infrastructure investment 
Once the LRT was recognised as a viable mass transit option with significant political 
backing and potential financing, the next stage of the process was the selection of 
its mode of delivery and construction. A conventional approach of ‘design and build’ 
was taken to choose potential contractors with prior experience in LRT infrastructure 
development. The Ethiopian government issued a Request for Expression of Interest, 
and companies from Russia, Italy, Turkey, India and China responded. It is striking 
what the geographic footprint of international interest is when such calls are issued. 
The preliminary selection process identified an Italian company based on its technical 
competence and prior experience in designing and building railways following EU 
standards. However, Ethiopia was challenged at that time by its capacity to finance the 
project in its entirety. According to one informant: ‘For Ethiopia, it was not possible 
to secure financial resources from European countries, as the timing was when the 
European financial crisis emerged.’12
The rationale for the ‘design and build’ approach was twofold. First, it was clear that 
the LRT would require large financial investment that the Ethiopian government would 
not be able to generate on its own. Second, the country neither had prior experience 
in designing and building an LRT system nor adequately trained human resources for 
planning and executing such a project. Hence, the government deliberately sought 
a company that would bring both financial and technical resources. In the end, the 
government of Ethiopia decided to award the AA-LRT construction to the Chinese 
LRT turnkey developing contractor (China Railway Engineering Corporation [CREC]) 
after considering the company’s experience in rail construction and its willingness to 
mobilise 85% of the financial cost of the LRT. 
There was no debate or opposition to this decision due to the political backing of 
the LRT. The fast-track approach had several limitations. According to key informants, 
the ‘design and build’ approach by its very nature does not require precise planning 
in advance of construction, making it difficult for decision-makers to determine the 
actual project cost prior to its completion. For example, several amendments to the 
11  ITDP estimates that BRTs are between four and twenty times cheaper than tram or light rail 
transit (LRT) and ten to a hundred times cheaper than metro.
12  Interview with representative of Addis Ababa City Road Authority (one of the board members 
for AA-LRT).
160     REFRACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL, THE POPULAR AND THE GLOBAL IN AFRICAN CITIES
AA-LRT north–south and east–west routes were made during the construction phase, 
such as building additional bypasses, elevator shafts, which considerably inflated the 
investment costs. For instance, the construction of the LRT line is for a total of 31km, 
of which 23km is ground level rail; 7.33km is bridge construction, 0.9km underground 
tunnel. The 23km ground level line is fenced on both sides of the tracks. 
Decisions regarding the bridge construction, creating an underground tunnel, and 
fence to separate the rail tracks were made after the start of LRT construction, again 
leading to an increase in construction costs. Furthermore, lack of proper planning 
introduced unintended social and economic costs. For example, the decision to fence 
off the rail tracks from the main road disrupted the urban fabric by blocking free 
pedestrian movement and cutting cars off from existing intersections and turning 
points. The LRT project also caused traffic congestion near train stations and at the 
new roundabouts where the LRT line is at ground level. Placing the LRT line between 
opposite traffic lanes has led to poor pedestrian safety, as pedestrians must cross through 
moving traffic while walking to and from the train stations. Furthermore, the average 
distance between LRT stations is 800 metres and pedestrians must watch out for both 
the fast driving cars on the road and the LRT when crossing. This makes crossing the 
LRT lines from one side to the other side of the road difficult for older people and people 
with disabilities. According to one informant, ‘Since we did not have the design before 
the construction, we were not able to make relevant decisions in a timely manner.’13 
On 12 March 2017, MailOnline reported that the half a billion-dollar investment in 
public transport failed to curb Addis Ababa’s traffic problems, featuring the headline, 
‘light rail fails to fix Ethiopia’s traffic troubles’. The report went on to say:
Electric light railway tracks soar over Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa, a rare 
example of mass transit infrastructure on the continent … But despite 
government promises, the roads below are still clogged with traffic 14 months 
after the light rail system’s opening, and for many residents the city’s network 
of overcrowded minibus taxis remain the only option. (MailOnline 2017)
During data collection, the current author observed how the lack of prior planning on 
the design of AA-LRT routes created enormous traffic in all roundabouts where the 
LRT line is on the ground level and near all train stations (see Figures 2 & 3).
Economically, LRT led to financial loss to individual business operators whose 
businesses face the fenced roads. The fence disrupts the normal conduct of business 
as communities are split apart. Furthermore, construction of LRT lines resulted in 
economic waste by the government. A report by the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, 
Building Construction and City Development (EiABC 2015) identified major waste 
and costs incurred during the AA-LRT development, including the following: 
13 Interview with key informant from the Addis Ababa City Road Authority.
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• A 40m wide road that was part of a BRT corridor and completed only in 
2010 with a total cost exceeding 283.6 million birr (~USD 13.5 million) was 
demolished.
• The construction of the 8km LRT line from the CMC area to Mexico 
roundabouts involved the relocation of an 8km main water pipeline that 
provides water to over a million people from the Legedadi Dam. The total 
cost of the relocation of the pipeline was about 421 million Ethiopian birr 
(~USD 21 million).
• The AA-LRT line construction required relocation of electricity lines 
costing the Ethiopian Electric Power Authority 130 million birr (~USD 6 
million). 
Hence, a total of nearly USD 42 million was wasted that could have been used for 
other infrastructure or urban service provision. This could have been avoided if 
decision-makers had taken the time to assess the potential social, economic and 
financial consequences of the fast-tracked approach as well as if different actors had 
had a greater role in decision-making. Thorough planning using benchmarking could 
also have streamlined the process. For instance, countries such as Morocco have done 
well in constructing an efficient tram system instead of expensive LRT lines. As a 
result, the Casablanca tramway has been custom-built to facilitate free movement 
Figure 2: LRT line-induced traffic jam around roundabouts 
 
Source: Photograph taken by Meseret Kassahun March 2017
Figure 3: LRT-induced traffic jam near one LRT Station 
Source: Photograph taken by Meseret Kassahun, March 2017
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of passengers and significantly lessened traffic jams.14 If the tram had been chosen, 
‘better traffic flow could have been achieved since tram lines/routes can be shared 
by other transport/mobility systems.’15 For instance, in a guideline developed for the 
planning of BRT, Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (2007) asserts 
that BRT is a cost effective mechanism compared to LRT and can help cities to rapidly 
develop a public transport system while delivering quality service.
Accessibility, affordability and reliability of AA-LRT service
Although impossible to get an official report, attempts have been made to assess 
the experience of AA-LRT service users with the specifc emphasis on accessibility, 
affordability, and its reliability. Emerged qualitative data shows an average 135 000 
residents use the LRT service per day.16 A key informant reported:
Although operated by the federal government, LRT daily ticket sells indicates 
that the 28 LRT cars transport 120 000–150 000 passengers daily.17
The LRT also provides multiple benefits such as time-saving to passengers as the 
LRT lines are fenced, and reduction in pollution as the LRT consumes electricity. 
In addition to the effectiveness of the LRT in terms of its benefit, assessing the 
effectiveness of the AA-LRT as a mass transit service needs to take transport users’ 
preferences, the reliability of services, convenience, safety, comfort, accessibility, and 
affordability issues into consideration (Imam 2014). Similarly, Friman and Fellesson’s 
(2009) extensive literature review suggests reliability, frequency, travel time and fare 
level, comfort and cleanliness, network coverage/distance to stop, and safety issues as 
relevant factors in customer evaluations of the public transport service. 
Accessibility and affordability
FGD participants’ experience in using the LRT and their overall assessment of the 
service is positive. In relation to its accessibility, study participants expressed their 
dissatisfaction that the LRT lines cover only certain areas. As shown above, in the AA-
LRT map, the AA-LRT has only two corridors, these being, the East-West corridor that 
runs from Ayat to Tor-Hailoch and the North-South corridor that runs from Minilik. 
As a result of its limited connectivity to the different parts of the city, AA-LRT service 
users expressed their strong desire to see AA-LRT service in every direction of the city 
with better horizontal connectivity. Hence, its accessibility is only for people who are 
currently living near the LRT lines. This limits its accessibility for residents outside of 
the LRT lines. 
14  http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/casablanca-tramway/
15 Interview with a senior urban development policy advisor, August 2016
16 Key informant from Addis Ababa Transport Authority Bureau 
17 Key informant from Addis ababa Light Rail Transit Project office
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When it comes to affordability, the most recurrent themes emerged from all FGDs 
were that the LRT is affordable, fast and covers long distance. An observation on the 
transport fee shows that the train tariff fee is significantly lower compared to other 
transport services such as city bus and mini-bus taxi fees for similar distance. The 
tickets cost two to six birrs (USD 0.08 to USD 0.20) depending on the distance of the 
trip. A discussion participant noted:
The LRT is cheap. I could have payed more than 10 Bir for the trip via taxi 
from where I live (Hayat area) to the centre of the city. Now, I only pay 4 Birr. 
Reliability of LRT service
Service users’ perception of service frequency in relation to travel and waiting times, 
as well as frequency of departure was assessed and findings from FGDs consistently 
confirm that the LRT is a reliable and efficient service.
In the city where you wait in line for an hour or two for taxis, the waiting time 
for the train is 15 minutes which impacts other parts of the city’s economy 
positively.
Most FGD participants agree that the waiting time is on average 15 minutes during rush 
hours. However, there are times where service users experienced 40-minute delays 
(two FGD participants) and 50 minutes (one FGD participant). Furthermore, service 
users reported that they also witnessed a train arriving on time and not boarding 
passengers. This might be explained in terms of a dedicated train as ‘Express Line’ 
that might avoid some stations or a train that might have no space to board additional 
passengers. Furthermore, despite the dedicated power supply for the LRT, there were 
some incidents where the train stopped mid-trip and later announced to passengers 
that electric power was the cause. The challenge in relation to power disruption is 
also confirmed during key informant interviews. However, the integration of the city’s 
major infrastructure and utility providers was instrumental to reducing the impact of 
electric power.
AA-LRT governance structure, institutional and human resource 
capacity
AA-LRT governance structure
The city of Addis Ababa is a federal government’s capital and a city administration 
by itself. This offers opportunities for maximising the city’s unique position in the 
country’s urban development. Ethiopia’s Urban Local Government framework guides 
the overall city development process and the city’s legitimacy in collecting taxes 
and municipal revenues for its socio-economic development purposes. The city is 
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mandated to provide major urban infrastructure and services.18 The budget for these 
administrative functions is approved by the city council, and thus the city retains 
some decision-making power. This puts Addis Ababa in a better position than other 
Ethiopian cities. 
Despite this presumed advantageous position, Addis Ababa is not fully exercising 
its administrative autonomy. The lines between its State and Federal functions are 
blurred due to excessive federal involvement. According to the World Bank and Cities 
Alliance (2015: 66), ‘State government and Urban Local Government roles in the 
execution of state and municipal functions are not necessarily clear.’ For example, 
the decision to construct the LRT was made exclusively by the federal government. 
Although providing transport service is the mandate of the city, AA-LRT does not 
fall under the jurisdiction of the city government of Addis Ababa. Ethiopian Railway 
Corporation (ERC) was established in 2008 based on Regulation No. 141/2007 and 
tasked with developing railway infrastructure and providing freight and passenger 
railway services in the country (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2007). 
According to key informants, the rationale for the establishment of an ERC 
independent of the old bureaucracy was threefold. First, the train network needs an 
independent regulatory body, which raises a couple of issues that need to be addressed 
by higher officials. Issues like whether or not to have one regulatory body for LRT and 
another for the ongoing and emerging national train networks that the country has 
embarked on. Second, the country did not have the technical capacity and experience 
in managing the day-to-day functioning of the AA-LRT. Third, the country had to find 
a way to cover the upfront infrastructure and operation costs. Hence, the ERC was 
established.
The political backing from the prime minister’s office and the personal interest 
of the late PM in the LRT project warranted the creation of a management system 
independent of the normal government bureaucracy. The ERC, as an independent 
institution with strong political backing from the highest office in the land, was able 
to freely formulate and implement rules and regulations for the operation of railways 
in the country. The decision to have a single management and governance strategy 
in order to avoid red tape and unnecessary gridlock from the existing city and federal 
bureaucracy was instrumental in increasing the efficiency of the AA-LRT project. 
However, the establishment of ERC in 2008 introduced a gap concerning the role of 
the city government of Addis Ababa vis-à-vis AA-LRT management. A key informant 
from the city government of Addis Ababa noted:
Our role was visible during the infrastructure phase of the project. It was 
the city administration that was responsible for providing land for the LRT 
lines. As a result, the mayor’s office was active. We used to be involved and 
informed. Currently, in the operation phase, the relationship between the city 
18  Basic urban infrastructure and services include: housing, land, water, electricity, telephone, 
road construction; road lights; drainage and sewerages; solid waste disposal systems; poverty 
reduction; maintaining vital statistics; certificates of marriage, birth and death; abattoirs; bus 
terminals and market places; combatting soil erosion, landslide disasters and environmental 
pollution. 
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administration and the AA-LRT project office as well as with the Board needs 
to be reviewed. Our present involvement is extremely minimal.19 
As a federal project, the ERC is currently working on AA-LRT phase 2, that is, expansion 
of existing lines. In the current operational phase, the role of representatives of the 
board, including the city of Addis Ababa, is minimised: ‘ERC is managing both the AA-
LRT as well as other railway projects of the country. Structurally, ERC is accountable 
to the federal government, not to the city Administration.’20 In operating AA-LRT, the 
ERC is dependent on international external institutions for infrastructure design, 
operation and maintenance. 
The ERC is currently functioning with the support of two Chinese companies 
and a Swedish Road consultancy firm. The China Railway Engineering Corp (CREC) 
built the AA-LRT infrastructure. CREC is also partially involved in the current 
operation phase of AA-LRT. Another Chinese company called Chenzen Metro, which 
is experienced in the operation and maintenance of LRT, is contracted to manage 
the operation and maintenance of AA-LRT for the next five years. Significantly, the 
Swedish Road consultancy was hired to evaluate the work of the Chinese companies 
in all phases. Whether the AA-LRT will remain as a federally administered project for 
the foreseeable future is not clear. Questions remain whether the federal government 
will at some point hand over the day-to-day management and operation of the AA-LRT 
to the city administration. If the latter were to happen, city authorities will need time 
to prepare the appropriate legal, regulatory and management systems.
AA-LRT institutional capacity building 
There were no railway engineers in the country prior to 2012.21
A critical look into the AA-LRT institutional setup shows that the nature of the project 
contributed to the government’s decision about how the AA-LRT should be managed. 
As a new industry, LRT requires specific competences in order to successfully manage 
its day-to-day operations. The LRT idea was embraced in the absence of relevant 
professionals who could plan, implement and manage the project. As one informer 
put it, ‘At that time [during the inception of LRT], the country did not have professionals 
on railway engineering. We also had no experience in managing LRT.’22 
The establishment of ERC as an independent institution is not adequate to 
manage the AA-LRT in a sustainable way. Considering the complete lack of relevant 
skills in railway engineering and management expertise, the ERC relies on Chinese 
companies in managing the entire LRT design and operation process. Currently a 
Chinese company, Chenzen Metro, works under the AA-LRT project office to manage 
the day-to-day operation and maintenance of the AA-LRT. At the same time, the ERC 
19  Interview with representatives of the Addis Ababa City Administration Mayor’s Office, August 
2016
20 Interview with representatives of ERC, August 2016
21 Interview with Railway Engineering Institute, Addis Ababa University, August 2012
22 Interview with Institute of Railway Engineering, Addis Ababa University 
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decided to establish a Railway Engineering Institute in the Technology faculty of Addis 
Ababa University in order to train engineers to be responsible for the management 
and maintenance of the LRT in future. According to one informant, ‘There were no 
railway engineers in the country prior to 2012.’23 This is a commendable move, as 
it would reduce the ERC’s dependence on Chinese management and maintenance 
services in the long run. Hence, a two-year Master’s of Science programme focusing on 
three fields of study at Addis Ababa University’s technology faculty was opened. These 
fields include: civil railway engineering, mechanical or rolling stock engineering, 
and electrical engineering for railway systems. After signing a memorandum of 
understanding with the ERC, the institute enrolled 540 students in four cohorts. 
Since its establishment, a total of 58 students graduated in the railway civil, 55 in the 
mechanical or rolling stock, and 27 in the electrical engineering fields. ‘All students 
are employees of ERC and will continue to work for ERC after graduation.’24 This 
initiative demonstrates that Chinese experts are not meant to remain in the agency 
indedifinitely. Instead, local experts will progressively occupy operational and 
management roles in all aspects of the service. 
Discussion 
The political economy of Ethiopia’s developmental state approach to governance clearly 
limited involvement of diverse actors during AA-LRT inception and implementation. 
The former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s sole decision to impose the AA-LRT 
system on the city, despite the city administration’s choice and perhaps the expert’s well 
designed concrete plan to implement BRT, was a political decision. The government’s 
grip on decision-making leaves no room for other visible and invisible policy actors to 
contribute to policy decisions. This reflects the uncontested ‘democratic centralism,’ 
a driving principle of the the ruling party that guides its strategic day-to-day activities 
(Bach 2012; Vaughan & Gebremichael 2011). There is a notable absence of a ‘level 
playing field’ that would offer favourable conditions for organisations and civil society 
interest groups to negotiate and debate the merits of an urban project on the scale 
of the AA-LRT to maximise its benefit and reduce the negative social and economic 
impacts on Addis Ababa residents. The AA-LRT’s emergence as the only viable 
transit system and the decisions taken during its implementation illustrate the idea 
of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Kelsal et al. 2010). According to Kellsal et al., 
developmental patrimonialism promotes personal rule. Hence, the ultimate decision 
made by the late Prime Minster Meles Zenawi in 2007 consistently confirms the role 
of ‘personal rule’ in guiding the city’s infrastructure development and growth. 
AA-LRT’s governance structure and institutional system also demonstrate a top-
down institutional arrangement and the decision-making based on embedded 
consensus within EPRDF’s elite circle. As a result, open contestations and entertaining 
alternative policy ideas on how to provide an environmentally sound and economically 
beneficial mass urban transit system that would have averted the socio-economic 
chaos the AA-LRT project engendered were not allowed. 
23 Interview with Railway Engineering Institute, Addis Ababa University, August 2012
24 Interview with AA-LRT project office 
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Top-down institutional setup
The AA-LRT demonstrates how a ‘developmental state’ can usurp the functions 
of local governments in the interest of optimising the delivery of urban services 
from its perspective. While the government has committed itself to decentralising 
decision-making to lower tiers of government, in reality, it bypasses these same local 
institutions or fails to consult them fully. Hence, the devolution of autonomy at local 
level government institutions remains unrealised. It would be fair to suggest that the 
requirements of strategic external actors, such as the Chinese investors, reinforce this 
pre-existing tendency. The federal government’s decision to institute an independent 
railway corporation with a separate structure to be managed by the board rather than 
the city government of Addis Ababa, appeared as a pragmatic decision rather than 
adhering to and translating the country’s established urban governance principles into 
practice. The narrative of good urban governance in key urban development initiatives 
is merely an alibi to cascade top-down decisions through embedded consensus at all 
levels. In this regard, the decision that was made in 2007 by the EPRDF elites to 
elevate the LRT service as the sole option to meet the city residents’ transportation 
needs and showcase Ethiopia’s ‘rise’ blurred existing urban governance structure and 
systems. Despite the city of Addis Ababa’s autonomy and mandate to provide urban 
services such as a reliable, fast and affordable transport system, the top-down decision 
from the central government to introduce LRT has not to date created any controversy. 
The swift decision to introduce the LRT over the city’s own preference to introduce 
a pilot BRT service perfectly shows the hierarchical power relationship between the 
federal and city governments. Furthermore, the federal government’s sole decision 
on loan agreements with Exim Bank of China shows the limited autonomy of the 
city administration in terms of initiating and implementing socio-economic related 
development plans. 
Urban governance based on ‘embedded consensus’
The absence of any complex or dynamic interactions between policy actors is 
obvious within the ‘developmental state’ or ‘developmental patrimonialism’ approach 
to governance. What is interesting in the AA-LRT case study is that the AA-LRT’s 
emergence faced no contestation, and its implementation did not raise debate 
between the national/federal and local level governance structures. There is no public 
document showing any conflict between the federal and city government bureaucrats 
throughout the entire political process. The consensus surrounding the introduction 
of LRT was seemingly absolute. The city administration expressed no concerns over the 
amount of investment neither for the initial LRT infrastructure development nor the 
ongoing operation and maintenance costs. In addition, none of the authority figures/
elites questioned the relevance of the project as it led to financial waste of nearly USD 
42 million. Although the loan agreement has its own grace period and maturity time, 
the city government of Addis Ababa was not involved in any of the negotiations and 
agreements pertaining to repayment of loans. Furthermore, the city administration 
did not undertake research into the feasibility of the project in terms of sustaining 
the service through revenue generation. The level of consensus and cohesiveness 
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between the federal government and the city administration resonates’ with Kelsall’s 
(2011) neo-patrimonial ‘embedded bureaucratic autonomy’ of the federal government 
excluding other non-state actors including the private sector. The cohesiveness of the 
federal and the city government of Addis Ababa show the effectiveness of the regime’s 
commitment to govern based on the principle of democratic centralism where the 
State and ruling party are one and the same. Top party leaders are the leaders of the 
country and focus only on State effectiveness in both policy decision-making and 
service delivery process. Hence, the structures that are instituted around the three tiers 
of governance (federal, regional and local level) are more symbolic than substantive. 
Conclusion
The political economy of the state-society relationship within ‘developmental state 
democracy’ operates within the deeply entrenched bureaucratic centralism through 
which patrimonialism is harnessed. Hence, the system of governance does not 
promote dynamic interactions between various actors in line with the principles of 
good urban governance. Instead, the overriding concern is State effectiveness, which 
operates through embedded consensus and this seems the most likely way forward. 
AA-LRT’s contribution in providing transportation for a significant number of Addis 
Ababa residents is commendable. Despite the effectiveness of the Ethiopian state 
in achieving the completion of AA-LRT construction in a few years to fit into the 
‘Ethiopian Renaissance’ narrative, I argue that the absence of citizens, civil society 
organisations, and Ethiopian business involvement in the decision-making process is 
responsible for a huge amount of wastage. Had an authentic and genuine process of 
decision-making involving the federal government and the city authorities existed, a 
more cost-effective alternative form of transport services would have been proposed 
and debated without the federal government having to impose its will on the city 
government. The governance systems in place narrowed the space that could provide 
democratic checks and balances as well as feedbacks, which are fundamental in 
facilitating the social and financial efficiency of the LRT. 
Furthermore, the government’s ambition to reposition the city of Addis Ababa 
as a global city perhaps fits into the completely imported urban fantasies of which 
decision-makers were convinced in pursuing the ‘Ethiopia is rising’ and ‘eco-friendly’ 
project that also provided mass transit service (Terrefe 2020; Kloosterboer 2019; 
Watson 2014). As a result, local realities were ignored, and emphasis was more on the 
symbolic significance of AA-LRT as a mega city project that had helped the country 
get international attention. Moreover, the project has helped to provide affordable 
and reliable transport service although further research is needed to explore how the 
expensive modern mass transit has helped ease the city residents’ transport need. 
Obviously, the desire to have modern transportation prevented decision-makers 
from averting LRT-induced financial wastage that could have been spared for other 
infrastructure developments. In fact, further research is needed to actually determine 
the cost and benefit of AA-LRT. The persistence of the government’s decision to 
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expand the LRT lines25 without critically examining the unintended negative socio-
economic impacts sufficiently explains the lack of transparent and accountable urban 
governance. Hence, the overall governance systems and structures in Ethiopia do 
not provide democratic checks and balances as well as feedbacks, which are vital to 
increasing the social and financial efficiency of LRT. External actors and their agendas 
are folded into these overriding dynamics, they are not determined by external actors.
Annexure I: Summary of study participants
Institutions Number of participants
Government institutions* 12
Civil society groups 3
Research institutes 2
Focus group discussants 8
* Study participants from government institutions such as Ethiopian Railway Corporation, Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit, Addis Ababa City May-
or’s office, Addis Ababa City Road Authority, Addis Ababa City Transport Bureau. Civil Society representatives are from (1) Addis Ababa Women’s 
Association; (2) Addis Ababa Youth Association; (3) Ethiopian Cities Association. Research institute representatives are from Addis Ababa Univer-
sity, Institute of Technology, and department of Railway Engineering. 
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CHAPTER 12
Conclusion: African cities in the  
world of today and tomorrow
Göran Therborn & Alan Mabin
In African cities, the music is relentless – AbdouMaliq Simone, 2004
How do we imagine the past, present and future of Africa’s cities? With what images 
of the African city might we choose to work? Is it Djenne, Mali, and its earth-walled 
grand mosque? Is it the postcoloniality of Bamako, contained in its avenues, post-
independence buildings or fluid markets? Does the sweep of the waterfront of Luanda, 
and the murky, oily bargaining in its reemergent hotels capture the spirit of urban 
Africa? How does the focus change as the skyline of modern, central city Nairobi gives 
way to the garbage in its alleys or the decay in its buildings? Does the postmodernity 
of Johannesburg’s suburban architecture reveal something exceptional, something 
repetitively global, or just possibly something of wider significance?
How do we think and read African cities? Are they mostly sites of chaos, or zones 
of sharp clashes between modernity and tradition? Are these the capitals of corrupt 
elites or the spaces of freedom and opportunity longed for across the continent? Do 
they offer promise of different futures or seem bound by colonial pasts and betrayed 
independence?
This book approached African cities through three perspectives: those of the 
national, the popular and the global. Here we reflect on and seek to refract through 
these themes, without claiming that we are at all close to exhausting the terrain.
The national
The nation came late to Africa, and usually in a form very different from the European. 
It was united, not by language, culture or religion, but by a common history of colonial 
occupation. Most, if by no means all, capitals and major cities were colonial creations, 
in many ways segregated from the rural African societies. Colonial cities were often 
referred to by the colonised as ‘white villages.’ However, in some other respects, many 
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African cities include an ancient, pre-colonial, pre-modern pattern of authority not 
found in cities of other continents, the authority of chiefs. Important, but very variable 
in resources and competence, as Philippe Ibaka Sangu shows us from Kinshasa.
The widespread colonial novelty of cities has stimulated a particularly strong 
African urban innovation of new capital city constructions. Gaborone in Botswana 
and Nouakchott in Mauritania had to be built because the new states had no urban 
colonial centre within its boundaries. Others have resulted from political choice, for 
various reasons and with diverse outcomes. Abuja has become the full political centre 
of Nigeria; Dodoma is rather a seasonal political capital of Tanzania. Yamassoukrou 
has survived the death of its patron and become a significant city of its own; but not 
the capital of Côte d’Ivoire, Abidjan. The new Ciudad de la Paz or Oyala in Equatorial 
Guinea is still under construction. Sometimes, existing smaller cities have been 
upgraded to capitals instead of the inherited colonial centre, like Lilongwe in Malawi 
and currently Gitega in Burundi. The contemporary construction of a new capital in 
Egypt, replacing ancient Cairo, might have drawn some inspiration from sub-Saharan 
Africa, but is actually more akin to Asian plans of de-congesting old capitals such as 
Tokyo and Seoul. With one difference: the military plan of a new capital for Egypt is 
unhampered by parliamentary politics and an independent judiciary, which in the end 
stopped or stymied (in Korea) the East Asian plans. 
The ethnic diversity of African nations has not disappeared with urbanisation and 
modern class formation but remains a major force of structuring urban social and 
political relations, from dwelling concentrations and employment networks to electoral 
vote banks and occasional political violence. (See further the profound study of this 
by Noah Nathan 2019, centred on Accra.) As ex-colonial cities, African cities share the 
issues of decolonisation most immediately with Asian cities but also with the ex-settler 
states of Latin America, more than of North America and Australia where the native 
communities were almost exterminated, as well as of South Africa. Issues ranging 
from name-changing and commemorations to urban layout and planning. Above we 
have a previously little studied example of Yaoundé, presented by Jean-Pierre Togolo. 
In Africa, as on other continents, the establishment of a nation-state could be 
a gradual, negotiated process or a rupture with the pre-national rule, more or less 
violent. Africa has had its experience of both, and urban monumentality remembering 
one or the other. Two nations and cities out of the former French empire express the 
alternatives with extraordinary clarity. The capital of the Republic of Congo is keeping 
its colonial name, Brazzaville, and the recent centenary of the arrival of the French-
Italian officer Brazza and his expedition was commemorated in an imposing statue 
of him dressed rather like a pilgrim. In Algiers, by contrast, the statue of its colonial 
conqueror general Bugeaud has been taken down, and his square renamed after the 
leader of the anti-colonial resistance, Emir Abdel Kader, now tall on horseback with 
drawn sword.
The popular
There is a paradox of the popular impingement on African cities. On the one hand, it 
is obvious and overwhelming, as major parts of the cities are built and maintained by 
the people outside the establishment, the ‘informal’ settlements, housing the bulk of 
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the population in many African cities. A legacy of the colonial urban duality, between 
the centre of the colonisers and the settlements of the colonised, between ‘la ville’ and 
‘la cité’ in the Francophone colonies, a duality lopsidedly expanded after independence 
with the same centres overtaken by the new nation-states and their meagre resources 
and, on the other hand, the popular settlements now hugely swollen by massive 
urban immigration. Occasionally, popular informality erupts in massive, spontaneous 
rioting, for example, ‘IMF riots’ against imposed ‘structural adjustment’ policies, or 
against sudden governmental price hikes, like petrol prices in Nigeria. 
As already cited in the Introduction, Garth Myers (2011: 198) noted ‘[s]trangely, 
political science seems only an occasional presence in African urban studies, when 
it ought to be a central field in our analyses, because these are such fascinating years 
for urban politics in Africa’. The conference of which this book is largely a product 
reflected that situation and trod lightly over popular political and related organisation. 
With notable exceptions, even (trade, industrial) union organisation escapes much 
scrutiny in the city literatures, and popular organising, whilst an ever-present theme, 
plays second fiddle to issues of administration, governance, planning and institutional 
matters. One searches indices in general volumes for the most part in vain for 
references to popular struggle, community-based organising and union activity. Yet 
popular movements have a long and significant history across the continent’s cities. 
However, cases of popular power in the ‘formal’ city are rare or even absent. Formal 
city power itself tends to be weak – ‘the absence of a strong local state with a clear 
and unchallenged mandate to manage the city’ is one of ‘the leitmotifs of African 
urbanism today’ according to Pieterse and Parnell (2014: 10). Formal popular power 
tends to require autonomous and city-wide popular organisation which is difficult in 
African cities, with their ethnic diversity and, in some instances, chiefs, their mostly 
embryonic or fragile class formation, and their pervasive patterns of Big Men patronage 
and clientelism, although ‘populist’ electoral strategies are sometimes employed 
by successful politicians (Resnick 2014). In some cities with developed institutions 
of local urban administration there can emerge local formal urban resistance and 
contestation of national policies more distant from local popular experiences and 
concerns. Margot Rubin gives us insights into such processes in Johannesburg and 
Ekurhuleni. On occasion, organising is along divisive lines, by language group, or 
other forms of ethnicity. Popular action dissolves into attacks on members of out-
groups. The September 2001 events in Zaria, Nigeria provide one of many unfortunate 
illustrations (cf. Adetula 2005: 228).
In between the informal ‘slums’ and the institutional city power, there are 
movements struggling for basic urban services, like water in Mathare, Nairobi as 
studied by Wangui Kimar, and in the informal settlements themselves a kind of 
popular urban government may develop, as may also be spotted in Nairobi. One 
popular sphere common to Africa’s cities is that of waste. Pickers on dumps and 
trolley pushers symbolise the enormity of engagement in this sector: but it seldom 
appears to lead to substantial social organisation, though there are exceptions, such 
as that briefly portrayed by Grest et. al. (2013: 128) in the case of Associação de Agua 
e Saneamento do Bairro Urbanização (ADASBU) in Maputo. But the emphasis in the 
literature remains one of governance, and relationships between largely individual 
even if substantial ‘groups’ of social actors and the state or government remain open 
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to exploration. The trope that dominates is that of ‘informal economic activity’ rather 
than popular organising for change.
As Ngonidzashe Marongwe highlights in this volume, international urban popular 
movements too have their refractions in Africa, as in the case of the Occupy movements 
which began with targeting Wall Street in New York, mutating into Occupy African 
Unity Square in Harare.
The global
African cities have always been caught between the global and the local. In this way 
they are no different from the world’s other cities. But the tension between the two 
seems especially acute in Africa. That tension expresses itself in a thousand ways, 
none more dramatic than the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of formal and 
informal ways of doing things.
How do Africa’s cities fit in to the ‘fragmented, hierarchical’ features of Henri 
Lefebvre’s ‘geographies of globalisation’? or the ‘satanic geographies of globalisation 
and uneven development in the 1990s’? (Brenner 1997)
African cities came late both to the first, national, and to the current, capitalist 
wave of globalisation. The continent was not part of the time when the globalisation 
of nationalism generated capital cities ‘worthy of the nation’ looking to Paris of the 
Second Empire. International Style Modernism was an inspiration to several figures 
of the first generation of African – as well as Asian – national leaders, like Nkrumah, 
for instance. But actual implementation was limited. 
After the millennium shift, several African cities are now eager to enter the 
competitive field for global imagery and foreign attraction to real estate opportunities, 
business locations, and upscale conventions and tourism. Dubai appears to be the 
most popular model, although Singapore and Shanghai are also points of reference. 
Skyscrapers are important indicators of this ambition, once a symbol of the rise to 
supremacy of US capitalism, after 2000, a world race, first of all between China, with 
East Asia, and the Arab Gulf states leading the trend. Africa is about to enter the fray. 
Kenya is leading for the time being. Carlton Centre in Johannesburg is, at 201 metres, 
still the tallest building in Africa, built in 1973; but the Kenyans show more drive 
to the top. Kenya’s tallest completed building is the Britam Tower in Nairobi at 200 
metres, but by 2020 the Pinnacle Tower is to be completed at 320m, and the 370m 
Palm Exotica in the beach resort of Watamu. Cairo is building an Iconic Tower slated 
to be 385m. In Nigeria, the political capital Abuja is vigorously competing for the skies 
with the economic centre, Lagos. Dar es Salaam and Luanda have recently started 
to build vertically, though still on a globally modest scale, with the Tanzania Ports 
Authority from 2016 at 157m and Luanda with its 2018 IMOB tower at 145m (www.
skyscrapercenter.com). Like in the rest of the world, these developments seem driven 
primarily by local and national global aspirations, rather than by foreign investors.
A world-class city image usually has to include other elements than skyscrapers. 
In Addis Ababa searching for an imagery was, as Meseret Kassahun’s careful study 
shows, a major reason for the adoption of an expensive light rail transit system in 
Addis, stopping the already started much cheaper Brazilian-type bus rapid transit. It 
may be added, though, that the second reason invoked, that the bus system would not 
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be able to cope with the city’s population growth and relocations, was probably correct. 
The most famous such system, that of Bogotá in Colombia, was soon overtaken by 
surging transport needs.
Waterfront developments are frequent features of recent urban upgrading 
ambitions, whether the water is a river, a lake or an ocean. In Luanda, it is of course 
the ocean at the Bay of Luanda, with its renamed Avenue of February 4 (in 1961, the 
start of the war of independence), across the ocean from the Avenida Atlantida of Rio’s 
Copacabana. In her study of Luanda, Sylvia Croese also takes note of another aspect 
of current urban globalisation, the invention of traditions and the use of historical 
pastiche. The latter is here deployed in a strikingly post-national, globalist way: the new 
2015 National Assembly building is modelled after a landmark of colonial Luanda, the 
(Portuguese) National Bank of Angola.
This century has started well in Africa and there is immense urban construction 
and renovation going on all over the continent, even in a failed state such as Kinshasa, 
Congo. However, African cities still have handicaps to overcome, stemming from their 
uncompleted tasks of nation-state consolidation and of popular upliftment in terms 
of rights, resources, and cohesive trust. Attempting to build a ‘smart city’ out of a city 
where half the population has no direct access to electricity is not very promising, or 
it may mean building a still more divided city of exclusions, as the chapter on Lagos 
points out. ‘Gated communities’ are another prominent feature of global cities, which 
entered postcolonial Africa in the late 1980s (Morange et al. 2012). The economically 
most developed African country, South Africa, already harbours some of the world’s 
most unequal cities, an urban inequality on par with that of the planet as a whole (UN-
Habitat 2008: 72; Milanovic 2005: 142). 
However, as Agunbiade, Olaide, and Bishi also stress, the resurrection of Lagos in this 
century, out of chaos and decay, is an impressive example of creative urban leadership 
and innovative energy. The city’s fascination with the Dutch star architect Rem Koolhaas, 
who studied it in the transition period of 1998–2001 is understandable, without sharing 
his peculiar perspective of hype and dystopia (Koolhaas et al. 2001: 652f).
There is, in addition, a scholarly and research connection with the global across 
Africa’s cities. ‘The conditions under which urban knowledges are produced are 
changing’ (May & Perry 2005: 347). What do readings of African cities offer to 
understandings of African society, to reimagining Africa? What do they offer to 
thinking about and indeed, living in, cities across the world?
African cities form a marginal category in the global urban literatures, which 
mirrors the minor attention which African society at large receives in much ‘global’ 
literature – that is, western-sourced scholarship on the concerns of the contemporary 
world (Ferguson 2006: 25–27). Aidan Southall, despite his own history as African 
anthropologist, devotes no more than four pages to Africa in his global urban history 
The City in Time and Space. Peter Hall, celebrating Cities in Civilisation, implied that 
African cities are not very civilised. Every reader of this book will be aware of growing 
debates on this matter. But perhaps 90% of African urban publication (at least in 
English or French) is still north American and western European.
Of course, the book is based on a shared notion of the connectedness of African 
city life with points and patterns in and through other continents: something perhaps 
becoming more likely inversed to infuse writing the city in the northern hemisphere. 
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The major advances (with limitations) thus far have been made in a few historical 
studies, and in postcolonial literatures which form part of broader culturalist work. 
An indication of the possibilities can be found in a couple of pages provocatively titled 
‘Cosmopolis: de la ville, de l’Afrique et du monde’26 (Malaquais & Marchal 2005). The 
postcoloniality of cities including London, Paris and Rome as well as those of Asia 
and Africa and (sometimes) Latin America seems more widely imbibed, though not 
endemic, in northern and western spaces of urban scholarship. At least there is now an 
elaborate foundation for thinking cities across the world simultaneously, as Anthony 
King, followed by more recent authors such as Jenny Robinson, have prominently 
demonstrated. In other words, African cities are becoming part of the global cannon 
of research and scholarship rather than being a curious and neglected backwater.
To close
African urbanisms are longstanding (Freund 2007; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1993, 
2006). African cities were key points of interaction in their own regions and way 
beyond the continent for centuries. But once subjected to colonialism they became 
secondary to European and to other cities in their networks, Asian in some cases, and 
American later, perhaps Chinese in particular today. African cities also transmitted 
forms and images, materials and people, to cities of every other continent, over very 
long historical time. African cities also fostered resistance to colonial rule which 
ultimately broke them free – only to be submerged in new nation-states with generally 
nationalistic developmentalisms, over time once again subjected to western-centred 
linear development thinking which has only recently begun to vacillate. The cities 
nevertheless have continued and survived. They have faced, and still face, dangers 
of being swamped by ‘imagineered’ nationalism (within ex-colonial boundaries and 
frequently parasitic elites) and/or failed developmentalism (punted more or less 
vigorously since late colonial times with minimal understanding of city possibilities). 
There is, though, a deepening sense, in Africa’s cities as well as in the literatures 
concerned with them, that the cities will be more and more the place where Africa’s 
futures are decided (Freund 2007: 196) – partly because urbanisation is much more 
than a century long process and it still has a long way to go with no certain result. 
Africa is making its own, specific urban experiences and practices, and that is 
exemplified across all of the chapters in this volume. But it makes sense seeing them as 
refractions of tendencies and challenges common to urban modernity worldwide. The 
continent has just entered into the beginning of a large-scale urban transformation, 
promising a fascinating field of observation and learning to urbanists of the world for 
decades to come. The urban arm of the UN, UN-Habitat, was prescient in locating 
itself in Nairobi.
One of the exciting prospects of Africa is that it remains the least urban continent 
– thus Africa is the key continent of urban growth to come – along with parts of south 
Asia. Urban growth and change are being globally, as well as locally, shaped and there 
may be rising popular movements also reshaping trajectories. The urban obsessed 
politicians have not yet emerged, but their constituency may be forming – and it may 
26 ‘Cosmopolis: On the city, on Africa, on the world’
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not merely be a poor one. The rising cosmopolitanism of African cities; with their 
own knowledges and creativities which Africa did not have to wait to be given and will 
not wait to be given from beyond; the fluidities of African cities – which may in some 
respects prefigure an urban future of the world (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2006: 1118).
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